



IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY 
ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS INSTITUTE 








THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THE 
PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA AND 







Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Recep ŞENTÜRK 











IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY 
ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS INSTITUTE 








THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THE 
PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA AND 







Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Recep ŞENTÜRK 












 I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and 
presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as 
required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and 





















 The aim of this study is to explore the role of Muslim religious leaders in 
reconciling the divided society in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their contributions to the 
process of peacebuilding. Even though religion had been misused for nationalist causes 
during the war in Bosnia, research conducted in societies with histories similar to that of 
Bosnia, suggest that religion can be a powerful source in peacemaking and religiously 
based individuals impactful peacemakers. Inspired by the organic peacebuilding 
framework (Lederach, 1997, 1998), this research defines imams as middle – level 
leaders and examines their position in the overall reconciliation processes. Based on nine 
in – depth interviews with imams from the cities of Banja Luka, Srebrenica, Bratunac, 
Kiseljak, Orašje and Prozor this thesis’s central argument is that local imams are 
effective religious peacemakers. Compared with the top – level leaders of the Islamic 
Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH), these local religious representatives 
have more opportunities to contribute to the reconciliation process in their communities. 
Imams at the local level utilize religious values and use three types of strategies to 
reconcile local communities: the individual, relationship or structure – centered 
approach. They affirm the importance of cooperation, relationship building, and 
rapprochement for the Bosnian society and act upon the improvement of economic and 
religious conditions, as well as inter – communal relations between Bosniaks, Bosnian 
Croats and Serbs. 
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 Bosnia is a society of fragile peace and stability. The Dayton Peace Agreement 
has ended the war but peace has yet to break out. A society divided by human rights 
violations, carnage and forceful migration is not united and unified by itself after the 
conflict is settled. Moreover, when the perpetrators are neighbors and war criminals 
continue to serve as policeman and politicians the level of mistrust and injustice 
increases and engender more entrenched positions. At the end a paralyzed society is 
created. How to deal with memories of murder, rape and other atrocities and still 
imagine a common future? The formula of “forgive and forget” is readily dismissed, 
while “remember and repent”, “remember and forgive” and “remember and change” are 
more likely to be accepted. In an ideal state victims are entitled to full justice, namely 
punishment of the perpetrator and truth – finding processes which disclose “the truth and 
nothing but the truth”. In the ideal state the sufferings are mutually acknowledged and 
responsibility for crimes and war atrocities accepted by the guilty side. However, this 
ideal can almost never be reached in most of the societies. There are too many 
perpetrator and too many victims which paralyses the legal system. Because the 
accounts of what has happened are contested, truth – finding commissions, official 
judgements, punishments and reports do not lead to reconciliation. For these reasons, 
these societies have to find other ways to deal with their troubled past. 
 Reconciliation is predominantly discussed within the conceptual framework of 
transitional justice which developed in three periods. Transitional justice of the first 
generation, symbolized by the Nurnberg trails, was concerned with the establishment of 
the rule of law, democratic institutions and procedures. Transitional justice procedures 
focused on delivering retributive justice through international courts and the 
international community. In the second stage countries responded to the shortcomings of 
the previous model by emphasizing the importance of truth over justice. Truth 
commissions and truth – seeking procedures of the Argentinian model were established. 
However, the Latin American approach to dealing with the past was termed national 




from the legalist, institutions – centered and procedural conceptualization of transitional 
justice took place.1   
 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission replaced these old 
concepts of justice and truth with restorative justice. Restorative justice, instead of 
focusing on punishments, emphasized the need to bring perpetrators and victims 
together and heal their wounds. The Rwandan Gacaca courts presents another trend in 
the third wave of transitional justice: the institutionalization of traditional practices. 
While the classical transitional justice literature ignores the cultural and religious 
potentials in reconciliation processes and assumes that democratic institutions, a 
powerful civil society and political reconciliation are sufficient means to bring about 
social reconciliation these two trends recognized the significance of cultural (ubuntu) 
and religious (Christian) values and how they can be utilized for the sake of 
reconciliation.  
 Parallel to these new developments in the transitional justice literature, several 
authors argued for a deeper understanding of reconciliation that will consider 
psychological, cognitive, emotional, cultural and religious aspects. Louis Kriesberg 
(1998, 2004) and Herbert Kelman (1999, 2004, 2005, 2006) contributed extensively to 
the socio – psychological approach to reconciliation while John Paul Lederach (1997, 
1998, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2015) and Daniel Philpott (2007a, 2007b) brought to our 
attention the religious dimension of reconciliation. Philpott argues that reconciliation is 
what religion brought to the literature of transitional justice. Thus, religion offers a new 
paradigm and an alternative approach to deal with the past.     
 Religions can be used both to divide and unite civilizations. I will demonstrate in 
this thesis how religion serves as a uniting force in intercivilizational relations. This 
thesis explores if and how faith and religious leaders can contribute to peacebuilding in 
the Bosnian society and in more particular to the reconciliation processes in post-conflict 
societies. Specifically, this research focuses on the reconciliation initiatives in post-war 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and how imams of the Islamic Community of Bosnia define 
reconciliation and envision the reconciliation process. Moreover, how do imams 
                                                 




contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation, can they be called religious peacemakers 
and if yes what is characteristic about their approach?  
 In the case of Bosnia the legalist approach has had minimal success in 
reconciling the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. The transitional justice 
procedures, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia being its 
epitome, are far – removed, contested by the ethnic groups and perceived as imposed. 
While the impact of religion in the Bosnian society is often assumed to be negative, the 
role of religion and religious institutions in the Bosnian reconciliation efforts is not 
thoroughly researched. Specifically, the Islamic perspective on reconciliation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is rarely voiced. The aim of this thesis is to address this gap by 
allowing representatives of the Islamic community to present their perception and 
experiences on reconciliation. In this way, this research builds on the previous literature 
that researched the role of religious actors in peacebuilding efforts in South Africa, Latin 
America, the Balkans and Europe.   
 Instead of focusing on the activities of faith – based non – governmental 
organizations or highly visible religious leaders I chose to focus on imams, who I define 
as important middle – level actors in the process of peacebuilding. Specifically, this 
research presents the perspectives and activities of nine imams who live and work in 
regions that were specifically targeted during the war and cities in which the Muslim 
population today does not exceed 40% of the overall population. Kiseljak, Prozor and 
Orašje are the cities in which Bosnian Croats are the majority population and Srebrenica, 
Bratunac and Banja Luka cities in which the majority population is Bosnian Serbs. I pay 
attention to the (religious) values that inform their reconciliation efforts, investigate their 
personal experiences and perceptions of reconciliation in their particular settings.  
 My research is composed of three chapters and a conclusion section. In chapter 
one, I give a brief outline of the religious background in Bosnia and describe three 
dominant interpretations of the religious factor in the conflict. Reviewing the different 
interpretations of the religious factor in the Bosnian war is crucial because these 
different accounts have different implications on how religion is understood to 




characteristics of divided societies that apply to the Bosnian social reality as well.  
 Chapter two offers an overview of the different conceptualizations of 
reconciliation in the literature and a set of elements connected to this process. This 
section discusses reconciliation from a structural approach, socio – psychological 
approach and spiritual approach. In this thesis reconciliation is understood as a peace – 
building tool that is crucial in deeply divided societies and as a process at which center 
is the building of relationships and social healing. Lederach’s (1997, 1998) 
comprehensive peace – building framework serves as the basic analytical framework to 
determine the role of imams in the overall peacebuilding framework and Lederach’s 
pyramid of leaders.  
 In the third chapter the research design and approach that were used to collect the 
empirical data is discussed and the reasons for employing them explained. Translations 
of the verbatim interviews are presented and findings discussed. I organize the findings 
under following questions: how do imams understand reconciliation, what kind of 
strategies do they use to reconcile their local society, what are the religious and cultural 
values and principles that inform them, and what kind of obstacles thy face in their 
work. Further, this chapter discusses the empirical data with reference to Lederach’s 
peacebuilding framework. I specifically analyze to what extent imams can be defined as 
middle – range leaders and what kind of advantages they have compared to top – level 
leaders of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of their position 
















CHAPTER ONE: THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE 
CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 In this chapter I discuss briefly the nature of the Bosnian conflict with respect to 
the function of the religious factor during the 1992 – 1995 Bosnian war. This chapter 
gives a broader context for the relationship between peacebuilding, reconciliation and 
religious communities and is important for the understanding of the specific socio-
political circumstances in Bosnia. In addition, the discussion of the role of religion in the 
conflict should be the first step towards answering the question: Can religion be part of 
the solution? I outline the three main accounts of the function of religion during the war 
and the linked assumptions about the role of religion is in present Bosnian society. This 
reflection on the historical role of religions in Bosnian society is significant because 
successful religious peacebuilding can only take place in settings in which the religious 
factor played a prominent role during the conflict and where religions are a vital social 
force. Further, I define the characteristic properties of intractable conflicts and divided 
societies and compare the Bosnian conflict and society to these attributes.  
1.1. THE DESTRUCTIVE AND UNITING ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE 
BOSNIAN WAR 
 In the Bosnian society historically ethnic and religious identities overlapped and 
Bosnian people in everyday conversation use these identities interchangeably. Since the 
19th century national identity is based on religious identity and not territory: “The 
majority of Bosnian peoples considered religion and confessions a fundamental element 
for determining identity and individual and collective consciousness”.2 More than this, 
religious identity became even more important source of communal and personal 
                                                 
2 Dino Abazović, “Religious Claims during the War and Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Borderlands 




identification with the waves of nationalism, the related campaigns beginning with the 
end of 1960’s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. At the political level religious 
institutions identified with the political programs of the new nationalist parties. The 
emergence of the nation – building religious actors in the public sphere with their 
specific rhetoric, symbols, rituals and myths replaced the old communist ideology.3 The 
religious rhetoric, the growth of the religious leaders in the media, mass pilgrimages and 
religious rituals merged with nationalist movements which revived the memory of their 
great nations through these religious tools. Religious institutions were supported 
financially and rhetorically by the emerging nationalist political leaders. At the level of 
society, when threatened by the new situation, individuals started to seek stability and 
security in their own religious groups. This quest for identity and rising nationalism 
encouraged each group to search for its lost “great nation”. As religion was one of the 
few identity markers, groups designed their identities around them and when threatened 
“embraced [religion] explicitly and even aggressively using religious symbols in their 
act of violence against those not of their own ethnoreligious identity.”4 The religious 
identity was the most distinctive marker of all three ethnic groups and the new national 
identity was built on this particular element. But what was the function of religion 
during the Bosnian conflict? Analyst give three different answers to this question: 
“religious war”, “ethno-religious war” and “the paradise lost” accounts.5 In their 
reflections authors have focused on the actions and rhetoric of religious institutions, 
governments, political parties, groups, and prominent individuals who identify 
themselves with a certain religion or justified their causes in religious language. 
 1.1.1. Was the Bosnian War a “Religious War”? 
 The first groups of historians and analysts are clearly in the minority and view 
                                                 
3 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
4Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Plymouth, 
UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 148. 
5 I used the categorization according to Powers, but included in addition other characteristics that the three 
different accounts on the Bosnian war have based on my own analysis of the literature. Gerard F. Powers, 
“Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia,” Journal of 




the Bosnian conflict through a “religious war” lens. They argue that previous to the war 
the Bosnians were not religious but with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian 
people rediscovered their religion, aligned with coreligionists and started to fight other 
religious groups. Accordingly, the historical religious bigotry, hatred and intolerance led 
to the Bosnia war. Several authors directly link the eruption of conflict with the religious 
revivalism which emerged in the form of religious fundamentalism. How deviant their 
approach is can be seen from the argumentation that Alija Izetbegovic, the first president 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in his book The Islamic Declaration laid 
down a program for the Islamization of the Bosnian state. Even more unfounded is their 
claim that Bosnian Muslims considered Izetbegovic as their “religious leader” and “not 
only as a martyr but almost as a prophet, next to Mohammed.”6 These authors point to 
the presence of clergy and imams in the battle field, religious education among soldiers, 
their cloths and prayer as examples of how religious revival was connected to religious 
homogenization, mobilization and finally war.7 Following this line of argument, it is 
assumed that “ancient hatreds” based on religious differences, fear, intolerance and 
hatred and reoccurring armed conflicts are inevitable in the region of the Balkans.8 The 
origins of “ancient hatreds” are found and explained through historical religious 
encounters and injustices inflicted by the dominant religious group upon subjected 
groups. One of the main justifications for this recurring violence based on injustice is the 
devshirme system during the Ottoman rule. While he acknowledges other elements that 
contributed to the conflict (political, economic, psychological and social) Mojzes 
stresses that “ancient hatreds” were an important cause. The different nationalities lived 
in such an environment that “tolerance was often the result of rule by foreign powers, 
which forcefully prevented groups from fighting each other.”9 Henry Kissinger 
                                                 
6 Sergej Flere, “Was the Bosnian War a Full Fledged Religious War...?,” in Demitologizacija Religijskih 
Narativa Na Balkanu: Uloga Religija U (Post)Konfliktnom Društvu I Procesima Pomirenja (Novi Sad: 
Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva, 2012), 19. 
7 Lenard Cohen, “Bosnia’s ‘Tribal Gods’: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Politics,” in Religion and 
the War in Bosnia (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1998), 43–73. 
8 See for example: Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: Picador St. 
Martin’s Press, 2005). 
9 Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Plymouth, 




represents this account with all its main points. In his article, written in December 1995, 
he argues that “the [Dayton] agreement will indeed mark a watershed in the bloody 
history of relations between the Muslim, Catholic and Eastern Orthodox groups making 
up Bosnia-Herzegovina”.10 According to Kissinger, the Bosnian conflict is about religion 
and not ethnicity, as the three “historical adversaries” are of the same ethnicity. The 
political solutions, reached at by the end of the war, created a precarious and instable 
environment – “a time bomb, not a stable political entity” – and “a mythology of 
Bosnian national reconciliation.”11 He posits that history has shown that foreign 
observers could not “[restrain] the blood lust of the parties” and would only be drawn 
into “the bottomless morass of Balkan passions.”12 Thus, Bosnia is notorious for its 
“ancient hatreds” which are causes by nothing else but religious differences. This line of 
argumentation sees religion as the problem and as an obstacle to the resolution of 
present day issues.    
 However, there are several problems with this “clash of civilization” hypothesis. 
In the first place Bosnian war does not fit the traditional definition of “religious war”. 
Esad Ćimić, one of the first sociologists of religion in the Balkans, gives arguments 
against treating the Bosnian war as a religious war. First, while a religious war assumes 
that two religions fight against each other in the Bosnian war Christians fought against 
each other, moreover Christians together with Muslims fought with another group of 
Christians.13 Second, he posits that all religions have a common moral framework that 
stipulates respect for human dignity, human rights and freedoms. Therefore, extreme 
behavior, which has been witnessed during the war, can only be attributed to individual 
members of religious communities but not to a religion per se.14 He posits that the 
absence of democracy, nationalism, and exclusively political motives and profane 
interests were the real sources of the Bosnian war. Religious leaders and justifications 
                                                 





13 Esad Ćimić, “Bosanska Raskrižja,” Društvena Istraživanja : Journal for General Social Issues Vol. 3, 





were used to conceal the aggression and the aggressor.15 It is insufficient to claim that 
based on the fact that soldiers were wearing religious symbols this war should be 
characterized as a religious war. These signs were not worn because of its religious 
importance but for the sake of expressing cultural belonging to a national community.16 
On the other hand it needs to be said, that condemnation of the war by the religious 
representatives is not evidence enough that religions were not utilized for the war aims 
because other religious leaders have given ritual support for war campaigns.  
 1.1.2. The Ethno – Religious Account  
 The second account states that the Bosnian conflict was an “ethno – religious 
conflict”17 which means that the conflict was not about religion per se but religion 
served as a justification for the war. Ethno – religious conflicts are primarily 
characterized by: 1) the centrality of the identity which is based on ethno-religious lines, 
2) the significant role of religion and religious institutions in legitimizing or justifying 
war objectives, and 3) the use of religious texts and images in mobilizing the populace. 
As religious identity is significantly related to nation identification, religion indirectly 
contributes to the eruption of the conflict. The Bosnian conflict can be treated as an 
ethno – religious conflict as it overlaps with Kadayifci – Orellana’s elements that 
constitute these conflicts.18 The Bosnian conflict was an ethno – religious conflicts 
because it involved parties that defined themselves along religious lines; it occurred in 
societies where religion is an integral aspect of social and cultural life and where 
religious institutions represent a significant portion of the community, possess moral 
legitimacy, and are capable of reaching and mobilizing adherents. They are called ethno 
– religious conflicts because it is impossible to separate the religious component from 
the ethnicity.  
                                                 
15 Ibid., 615-616. 
16 Peter Palmer, “The Church and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia” in Ken R. Dark, Religion and 
International Relations, first edition (Wiltshire: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000), p.85. 
17 Paul Mojzes, The Yugoslavian Inferno. 
18 S. Ayse Kadayifci - Orellana, “Ethno - Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict 





 However, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is different from 
conflict to conflict and from party to party involved. In some conflicts leaders use 
religion to exploit ethnic hatreds and in other cases religion is a peacebuilding factor. 
Digressing from the primary topic here it is helpful at this point to remember what Johan 
Galtung defines as “cultural violence” in order to be able to fully understand how 
religion is utilized in these conflicts. “Cultural violence” refers to the utilization of one 
or more of the six aspects of a culture – religion, ideology, language, art, empirical and 
formal science – for the sake of legitimizing direct or structural violence.19 Cultural 
violence legitimizes acts of violence on the bases of these cultural dimensions and 
renders acts such as killing or rapping morally acceptable. Similarly, scientists explain 
this new form of conflict with “primordial violence” which refers to a “destructive 
conflicts originating primarily from cultural differences.”20 Primordial violence is 
motivated by primordial sentiments which “may arise from language, customs and 
traditions, race, ethnicity, religion or region”. Furthermore, “peace in the political and 
economic sense is not desired by the initiators of primal violence because their interest is 
in total domination of territory, resources, and people, in being able to control the future 
of the loser’s world.”21 The authors explain that “children learn that the values, norms, 
and procedures of their people are natural and therefore better than other people's values, 
norms, and procedures.”22 One’s own culture and people are felt to be superior, while 
other peoples are seen as inferior. In this account religion is conceptualized as a conflict 
– galvanizing factor, not because as compared with the previous account religion is per 
se violent or automatically induce violence and conflict, but because it is misinterpreted 
and represented in a way that it suits the political goals. Religion, or any other dimension 
of culture, is used to legitimize goals that are not related to religion and do not spring 
from religion, such as the nationalist aspirations of the ethnic groups in the Bosnian 
conflict. Mojzes writes that the unsolved ethnic questions in combination with “ancient 
                                                 
19 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 27, No. 3 (1990): 291–305. 
20 Wolf B. Emminghaus, Paul R. Kimmel and Edward C. Stewart,  “Primal Violence: Illuminating 
Culture's Dark Side,” pp. 126-149, in Eugene Weiner, ed., The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence (New 
York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1998). 
21 Ibid., 128. 




hatreds” and political ambitions culminated in the Yugoslav wars.23 Within this school 
the phrases “politization of religion”, “nationalization of the Churches and religious 
communities” and “sacralization of the national” are frequently used to explain the 
relationship between religion and the war in Bosnia. In the process of “nationalization 
the Churches”, a particular nation is assigned to a religion and sometimes this nation is 
given a special role in the history of that religion.24  
 Elaborating on this concept in more detail Peter Palmer gives the Serbian 
Orthodox Church as a case in point. The “nationalized” Orthodox Church saw itself as 
the protector of Serbia identity and nationalism was channeled through the Church 
institution because it was the most traditional and persuasive source of legitimacy.25 For 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, hierarchy, clergy and believers, the Serbian cause in the 
war was just because it was presented as a defensive war that will protect the Serbian 
people from a new genocide.26 Palmer gives specific instances and statements of Church 
leaders which reflect their extremely nationalistic and aggressive stances. The example 
of Patriarch Pavle stating that “a war of self – defense must not become a war of 
conquest, by which one would gain territory but lose morality”27 shows the ambiguity 
embedded in the Church position in the Bosnian war. The patriarch does not question the 
legitimacy of the Serbian cause but emphasizes that it should not be achieved by 
immoral means. At the end of his analysis of the activities of the Serbian Orthodox and 
Catholic Church during the Bosnian war, Palmer concludes that members and leaders of 
the Churches were “among the most vociferous supporters of the nationalist cause” 
which made it difficult for them “to disentangle their devotion to the cause of their 
nation from their devotion to the cause of God” and question the war.28 Vrcan argues 
that the war has been a political war, which erupted in the century long unstable 
multireligious, multicultural and multinational society. Religious and political leaders 
                                                 
23 Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Plymouth, 
UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 137. 
24 Peter Palmer, “The Church and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia,” in Religion in International 
Relations (Wiltshire: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000), 84. 
25 Ibid., 91–93. 
26 Ibid., 93. 
27 Ibid., 94. 




realized that they could benefit from each other in the new political setting. With the 
breakup of Yugoslavia the emerging nationalist political elites realized that religious 
groups were the potential advocates of their politics, while the religious leaders saw an 
opportunity in benefitting from a positive relationship with political parties. The new 
political parties identified dominantly with one of the religious communities and sought 
to strengthen their position by identifying with the established religion of the nation.29  
 In addition to these developments, national memories and myths were used to 
glorify and transmit alleged victimization of one’s own group while at the same time 
they were utilized to demonize the other religious/ethnic groups. “In the former 
Yugoslavia, nationalism does not appear and become more and religion somehow 
declines, but an upsurge of nationalism goes hand in hand with a religious revival.”30 
Vrcan argues that the most cruel and brutal aspects of war are consequences of 
nationalist political strategies that inflamed religious hatred: “It was not hatred that 
produced nationalist politics but nationalist politics deliberately generated and inflamed 
hatred.”31 The primary involvement in the war events by religious institutions was by 
giving confessional legitimacy to the nationalist strategies of the dominant parties which 
was possible through the parallel processes of previous “politicization of religion” and 
“religionisation of politics”.32 Churches and religious communities, more or less, 
encouraged the war in Bosnia and identified closely with its aims, failing to condemn 
publicly this violent conflict. They have not used their potential in promoting peace and 
reconciliation because of their close identification with the respective nationalist cause 
of their people. Religiosity in this account is described as “belonging to the tribe” which 
refers to strong affiliation with a religious group but weak religious knowledge and 
practice. Surveys of religiosity carried out in the 1980’s in every ethnic group, 80% and 
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more of its members that regard ethnic and religious identity as identical.33 Only 60% of 
those considering themselves religious or associate themselves with a religious 
institution practiced religion regularly and had knowledge of fundamental religious 
tenets and doctrines.34  
 This account acknowledges the complexity of the war, religion being one among 
other factors contributing to the war. However, religion had a divisive function in the 
conflict because religious leaders made false decisions. Defenders of this perspective on 
the relationship between religion and the Bosnian war do not argue that religious 
differences per se are the cause of conflict but they state that religion needs to be 
depoliticized and “the national” desacralized for harmonious and tolerant coexistence. 
 1.1.3. The Paradise Lost Account   
 The third account, “manipulation of religion” or “paradise lost” explanation, 
contends that religious symbols and arguments have been misused to justify violence but 
downplay the role of religious leaders in the formation of nationalism or the significance 
of religious differences in instigating conflict.35 Thereby, the advocates of this account 
distance themselves from any violence. Advocates of this perspective underscore the 
presence of periods of ethnic harmony and religious tolerance and stable intergroup 
relations. In favor of this approach is the anthropological research of a Central Bosnian 
village conducted by Tone Bringa in 1987 – 8. It depicts how Bosnian Muslims and 
Bosnian Croats lived harmoniously with each other, maintained their distinct religious 
identities but at the same time saw themselves as members of the same village 
community. She noticed that the concept of neighborhood took an important place in 
interethnic communication and conduct.36 Bosnian Muslims and Croats visited their 
neighbor regularly, celebrated and mourned together. Aware of their differences and 
similarities, engaging with each other on the daily bases they moved between social 
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context of unity and closeness at one hand and separateness at the other.37 An example of 
strict separateness between the ethnic communities is that villagers highly disapproved 
mixed marriages. Bringa however gives examples of deep friendships, affection and care 
between Croats and Bosniaks. Whom the villagers let in their homes gives another 
example of the closeness and separateness of the community. While they socialized and 
frequently visited each other in their homes in their immediate neighborhood they would 
not visit villagers of another ethnicity or religion if they lived far from their own houses. 
At other contexts, such as for example the building of a house all villagers regardless of 
the proximity and ethnic or religious affiliation would unite to help. Further, to do 
justice it needs to be mentioned that religion and religious representatives did not only 
play a destructive role during the Yugoslav crises. Individuals from all religious 
communities envisioned a peaceful resolution of the conflict and resisted the 
nationalistic propaganda. Representatives of religious institutions met during the war 
and in 1997 all four representatives of the religious communities signed the “Statement 
of Shared Moral Commitment” in which they condemned hatred based on ethnicity or 
religious differences, the obstruction of the free right of return, acts of revenge and the 
abuse of the media with the aim of spreading hatred.”38 Like the first group, these writers 
are in the minority, especially because it is difficult to explain the role of the religious 
factor during the period of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the ensuing violence when the 
role of religion and religious leaders is idealized. While their argument that religion was 
manipulated is legitimate and important, these writers often lack to address the issue that 
some religious leaders have contributed to violence or at least stayed silent. Prevalently, 
religious leaders emphasize this explanation of events. The Islamic Community of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina states: “In this war, religion was misused, but it was not a 
religious war because it was not lead for the sake of conversion but to destroy, primarily 
Muslims.”39  
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 Political scientists and historians acknowledge that the most simplified 
explanations for the Bosnian war are the “religious war” and “ancient hatreds” accounts. 
Causes for the Bosnian war were multiple and complexly interlinked, religion being one 
among other sources for the conflict and one among other legitimization instruments. 
Powers argues that of the three accounts the “religious war” is the least tenable because 
it exaggerates the role of religion as much as it underestimates the role of other factors.40 
Instead, he states that the conflict erupted due to the failure of the Yugoslavian idea and 
the successive incompatible claims of self – determination. In his personal account of 
the Bosnian war, Powers states that the involvement of religion and religious leaders in 
the conflict was to a lesser extent than suggested by the “ethnoreligious war” account 
and greater than defined in the “manipulation of religion” account.41 The war should not 
be understood as a classical religious war, but more correctly as a religious war by non-
religious people.42  
 It is noticeable that analysts assign to the religious communities different 
amounts of responsibility in complicity during the conflict. Vrcan, for example, states 
that the position of the Bosnian Muslims in regard to legitimizing the nationalist political 
strategies was initially weaker compared to that of the Serbian Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic Church43 and Perica’s research shows that the calls for an Islamic religious 
nationalism was less aggressive compared to its counterparts in the former Yugoslavia 
and that “[u]ntil the mid-1990’s Yugoslav Islam was still relatively the least nationalistic 
and militant organized religion in Yugoslavia”44. Michael Sells speaks explicitly about 
Serbian and Croatian religious nationalism and states that “the Serbian Orthodox Church 
became a direct servant of Serbian religious nationalist militancy”45. Sells introduces the 
concepts of “religious nationalist militancy” and “religious genocide” to explain the 
causes of the conflict and to present the role of religion and its effects in the Bosnian 
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war.46 It is a more serious attempt to address the religious nature of the Yugoslav wars 
but he does not offer a clear exploration of the role of religion. The religious aspect of 
the war is tightly bound to violence and the notion of nationalism. “Religious violence”, 
“religious genocide” and “religious nationalism” occurred as they were religiously 
motivated and religiously justified. The clergy supported those who carried out the 
genocide, programs of ethnic expulsion and the destruction of mosques.47 A complex 
religious ideology – Christoslavism – was created based on the Serbian religion, history, 
mythology, literature, art and culture, used for the Serbian nationalism and utilized to 
justify the crimes, violence and the Bosnian genocide.48 According to Sells, the Croatian 
Christoslavic religious nationalism was more subtle and its nationalism was based on a 
different ideological background. Tudjman’s religious ideology, who was the first 
president of the Croatia after the independence from Yugoslavia, was that Muslims are a 
contamination of the Orient and that the Europeanization of the Bosnian Muslims was 
necessary.49 Thus, the link between religion, violence and nationalism is differently 
intense for the two Christian groups, while Sells does not mention Islamic religious 
nationalism at all.  
Table 1.1.3.: The Religious Factor in the Bosnian War 
 The relationship 
between religion and 
conflict 
The role of religious 










Religion per se is the 
reason of conflict 
Because of “ancient 
hatreds” that are based on 
religious differences and 
intolerance war broke out 
 
Religion cannot be a factor 
in reconciliation 
 
Ethno – Religious 
War Account 
Not religion but the 
“politization of 
religion” and 
“sacralization of the 
national” are the 
reasons for war 
 
Active role in supporting 
nationalist political 
programs and the 
justification of war 
Religious interpretation 
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manipulated for the 
sake of the conflict 
Religious leaders and 
institutions have nothing 
to do with violence 
Religious institutions need 
to break the silence in case 
of misuse of religion 
 
 Today, the citizens of Bosnia identify themselves more with religious institutions 
than they did during Yugoslavian regime and religious representatives are frequently 
present in public debates shaping national policies and public opinion.50 Religious 
representatives and institutions are more trusted than politicians by Bosnians and they 
represent themselves as defenders of their religious communities’ national interests. 
While religiosity in all religious groups of Bosnia has increased, authors claim that 
religion is experienced as “belonging rather than believing and/or practicing.”51 
Religiosity in post – communist Bosnia when mentioned is connected either to religious 
illiteracy or religious intolerance. However, surveys show as well that a significant 
portion of individuals in Bosnia who call themselves religious are active in their 
religious communities, regularly visit the church or mosque, and have knowledge about 
the doctrines and teachings of their religion. More specifically Bosnian Muslims when it 
comes to the level of religious commitment are above the average level of the South 
Eastern Europe.52  
 Concluding from what has been said so far, it is evident that the Bosnian war was 
an identity – centered conflict in which religious institutions were involved by either 
supporting or cooling the conflict. Religion, religious symbols, myths and images were 
used to justify and legitimize the nationalist strategies and the war. To be active players 
in social change, religious institutions need to denationalize their Churches and 
desacralize the national. Nevertheless, the discussion shows that is wrong to equate the 
Bosnian war with a religious war and false to conclude that religion per se hinders 
peacebuilding and reconciliation. To reject the active involvement of religious 
representatives on the other hand is not feasible because there are various examples that 
prove the fact. Therefore, if religious institutions and leaders want to contribute to 
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peacebuilding efforts they need to acknowledge the wrongs and break the silence. The 
examples given here show as well that different religious communities to different 
extents aligned themselves with the nationalist cause. 
 
1.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF “INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES” 
 Armed conflicts in the post – Cold War period have changed profoundly. At the 
end of the Cold War era violent conflicts have new properties which challenge the 
traditional conceptualizations of war53 but also require new approaches to successful 
conflict resolution in these specific contexts. Contemporary conflicts are nonmaterial 
and identity – based conflicts, intranational in scope but internationalize as parties to the 
conflict seek military, financial or any other support from other countries.54 In civil war 
contexts two sides to a conflict live next to each other and have more complex and 
interdependent social and economic relations than is the case in international conflicts. 
Consequently, this has influence on the intergroup relations and the overall society that 
emerges in the post – conflict period. In this section we give more attention to clarifying 
the terms “intractable conflict” and “divided society” and how they are related to the 
Bosnian society. 
  The term “intractable conflicts” is used since the 1980’s “to describe settings that 
combine cyclical violence, with long-standing identity-based animosities and social 
division.”55 These conflicts56 are historical conflicts, persisting for at least one 
generation, and resist all resolution attempts. They take place within the context of a 
long history of social division and conflict. These conflicts emerge from contexts of 
                                                 
53 Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, “Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War, 1989-93,” 
Journal of Peace Research Vol. 31, No. 3 (1994): 333–49. 
54 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 11–18. 
55 John Paul Lederach, “Spirituality and Religious Peacebuilding,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion, 
Conflict and Peacebuilding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 546. 
56 Other writers refer to the same phenomenon as “protracted conflicts”, “enduring rivalries”, “deep - 
rooted conflicts” or “ethno-political conflicts”. See David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 




great injustice and instability and revolve around irresolvable issues.57 Members to the 
groups experience “generational and transgenerational division and animosity”58 and 
often have “direct personal experiences”59 with violence and its consequences. 
According to Kriesberg intractable conflicts are 1. protracted, 2. extremely violent, 3. 
irreconcilable, and 4. require huge economic, military and psychological investment.60 In 
addition Bar-Tal suggests other conditions that complement the above mentioned: a) 
intractable conflicts are total wars, b) of a zero-sum nature and c) central to the 
individual’s psychological life and the life of the community as a whole.61  In a 
protracted conflict individuals live with a constant threat that their life is in danger. 
Because of the moral, cognitive and behavioral dynamics of these conflicts protracted 
conflicts are highly intense and perceived as intractable.62 
 The proximity of the perceived enemy and the dynamics of protracted conflict 
create a deeply divided society with its specific characteristics. Stereotyping, 
ethnocentrism and selective memory, dehumanization, moral exclusion, feelings of 
hatred and animosity develop and become imbedded in the social interaction. In order to 
endure and comprehend these conditions of intractable conflict Bar – Tal notes that 
societies develop beliefs that form the society’s psychological infrastructure. Societal 
beliefs are “society members’ shared cognitions on topics and issues that are of special 
concern for society and contribute to their sense of uniqueness.”63 Societal beliefs form 
the reality to a social group, give meaning to the conflict and motivate them for its 
continuance. Eight societal beliefs are central and they form the psychological state of 
the divided society. These societal beliefs are about: 
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1. The justness of one’s own goals: beliefs that justify the righteousness of one’s 
own goals and the causes behind the conflict;  
2. Security concern: concerns about the survival of the nation and personal safety 
and how safety is achieved;  
3. Delegitimizing the opponent: through negative comparison to one’s own group, 
dehumanization and characterization with extremely negative traits;  
4. Positive self – image: societal beliefs that represent the in-group with positive 
attributes, traits and behavior;  
5. Victimization: the focus is on the harm, injustice and immoral deeds of the 
adversely whereby the complete responsibility for the conflict is given to the 
opponent;  
6. Patriotism: that generate attachment to the society and country and propagate 
love, loyalty and sacrifice;  
7. Unity: these beliefs underscore the importance of ignoring internal differences 
and disagreements during a conflict for the sake of survival;  
8. Peace: peace is presented as the ultimate desire and end result.64  
 These beliefs form the “conflictive ethos” that underlie the attitudes, behavior, 
perceptions and motivations of the group. These processes of intractable conflict divide 
societies and trap them in a circle of violence which is hard to cease by any means. The 
consequences of protracted conflicts are that they completely impair the well – function 
of the society from the personal up to the governmental level. Exposure to this type of 
conflict results in trauma, which is in essence “the loss of trust in a safe and predictable 
world.”65 The communal trauma of a society and the way it is addressed is highly related 
to the intractability of a conflict.66 Another consequence and at the same time a 
significant element that fosters a protractive conflict is the normalization of hostilities 
and violence.67 The status quo is accepted and furthermore perceived as the only 
solution. Moreover, due to the fact that realities are constructed by the different groups 
to the conflict and the various members of the post – conflict society justify historical 
atrocities and rationalizes future violence in different terms, accepting the outer group’s 
sufferings and standpoints is less likely. Parties involved in these conflicts develop a 
relationship that is mutually exclusive, i.e. members of one group isolate themselves and 
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eschew contact with the members of the outside group.68 In addition to this, the violent 
circle cannot be escaped:  
 What seems apparent in the former Yugoslavia is that the past continues to 
torment  because it is not the past. These places are not living in a serial order of 
time but  in simultaneous one, in which the past and present are a continuous, 
agglutinated  mass of fantasies, distortions, myths, and lies. Reporters in the Balkans 
wars often  observed that when they were told atrocity stories they were occasionally 
 uncertain whether these stories had occurred yesterday or in 1941, or 1844, or in 
 1441.69  
 In this context trust, faith and future possibility for cooperation among groups is 
destroyed. Because the social interaction between out – group and in group is dead the 
state of a divided society becomes inescapable.       
1.3. THE POTENTIAL OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS IN BOSNIAN 
PEACEBUILDING AND RECONCILIATION  
 When it comes to the potential of religion in contributing to the reconciliation 
process the broader political situation needs to be considered. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement established a fragile political system that discourages cross – ethnic 
cooperation.70 To the contrary, the political arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rather institutionalizes ethnic discrimination and division. The DPA created two entities, 
the Bosnian Federation and Serb Republic, in Bosnia that are almost clearly divided on 
ethnic/religious bases. (See map 1.3.1. and 1.3.2.) The society is not only divided by 
territory. Food and water that one finds in the Federation cannot be found in the Serb 
Republic and bus lines between the two entities are not connected. Fear and division is 
daily promoted by Bosnian political leaders, specifically by the president of Serb 
Republic who calls for the separation of Serb Republic from Bosnia and argues that 
Bosnian Serbs should turn to Belgrade and not Sarajevo. These circumstances have 
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socio – psychological effects discussed in the previous section.  
 As the political structure are ineffective in this process, religious communities 
can fill the gap and be leaders of post – conflict reconciliation. A professor of Islamic 
Sciences from Sarajevo notes:  
 There is no other actor that can be involved in the reconciliation process. I think 
 that the political institutions do not want to get involved in this, the constitution 
of  Dayton is designed so that it promotes extremist and nationalist positions rather 
 than peaceful ways. Unfortunately, this political reality is like this. We cannot 
 expect that a politician will appear who will lead this process and because of this 
 I think that he Islamic Community is the one who could lead the process.71 
 Recent opinion surveys on the necessity of reconciliation in thirteen different 
cities of Bosnia indicate that the higher the level of importance given to religion by the 
participant the higher is the probability that the person will respond positively to the 
question on the necessity of reconciliation as an important social process.72 In the same 
survey respondents stated that religious leaders compared to political leaders, are more 
important actors and should be included in the reconciliation process. Abazović argues 
that religious actors rather than political leaders have the opportunity to bridge the ethnic 
divide and therefore should be active promoters of post – conflict reconstruction.73 If the 
Churches used their prestige and their strong connection with their nations by defining 
reconciliation to be a national interest, Churches and religious groups could play a 
significant positive role in the process of reconciliation.  
 Authors skeptical of the role religious communities can play in the process of 
peacebuilding and reconciliation point to several developments that limit the influence 
of religious communities in peacebuilding and reconciliation. Philpott defines two 
characteristics of influential religious actors that the religious communities in the state of 
Former Yugoslavia lack: existence of a political theology of reconciliation and 
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institutional autonomy or differentiation.74 A well – developed political theology of 
reconciliation defines clearly a set of principles and norms that animate and inform the 
religious actors in their position to transitional justice, their core doctrines about political 
authority and justice. The second characteristic, differentiation, means that religious 
actors and institutions were independent from the regime during the war or during its 
authoritarian rule and maintained their autonomy during the transitional period. Based 
on the lack of these features in the countries of former Yugoslavia, Philpott concludes 
that religious communities could not play a big role in influencing their governments’ 
transitional justice process. We can mention several features specific to the Bosnian 
religious communities that might explain the moderate influence of the Islamic 
Community in the transitional period. All religious communities in former Yugoslavia 
were subjected to the Communist regime that did not allow for genuine religious 
activities and the development of religious thought. Not only did many high religious 
leaders align with the regime and acted according to the regime’s interests but many of 
those who acted differently were labeled fundamentalists, a threat to the system and 
were imprisoned. Therefore their overall influence on the society was weak before the 
war and remained so in the immediate aftermath.  
 Further, it cannot be argued that in the transitional justice processes religious 
communities were fully empowered by the international and domestic community. One 
reason for this lack to consider the religious actors might be the recent experience of the 
war and the common understanding that religious actors were engaged in the war and 
therefore cannot be part of effective solutions. Another reason might be the secular 
approach many of the international organizations adopted in dealing with the past. 
Consequently, domestic religiously motivated initiatives were not fully empowered by 
international actors while the religious communities were not fully mature nor 
financially powerful to have any influence in their societies. The greatest internal 
obstacle to positive religious contributions to peace and reconciliation remain the 
nationalist tendencies within religious institutions, as Friar Ivo Marković notes: “[O]ur 
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traditional religions cannot reconcile people in the Balkans because they are too 
nationalistic and they coordinate their actions according to national interests.”75 These 
are main factors why the Islamic Community are less likely to develop a political 
theology of reconciliation, or in other words a strategy for reconciliation based on 
religious principles.  
 On the other hand, there are many promising developments that illustrate that 
religion and religious leaders can be unifying forces. International faith – based 
organizations are frequently described to have contributed to the rapprochement between 
religious leaders and initiated interreligious dialogue. Such organizations were the 
World Conference for Peace that tremendously contributed to the foundation of the 
Interreligious Council in Sarajevo or the activities of Pax Christi on similar projects in 
Banja Luka or Zenica. However, despite the disadvantages that religious communities in 
Bosnia have experienced during the past there were local religious leaders and 
indigenous efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully or through relief work, development 
and social services. The predominant example of peaceful involvement of religious 
leaders during the war came from the Bosnian Franciscan order. Friar Ivo Marković for 
example tried to prevent and resolve conflict through interreligious work between 
Serbian Orthodox, Catholics and Bosnian Muslims. At one point of the Bosnian war he 
and an imam are reported to have approached a Bosniak village by crossing the Croat 
line of fire.76 Active during the war, he continues his activities in an non – governmental 
organization that he founded in war years in Sarajevo, “Oci u Oci” (Face to Face), which 
is an inter – religious service, and a project of a multi – religious and multi – ethnic choir 
that developed from this organization. However, not only individuals from the 
Franciscan order have established valuable peacebuilding initiatives in the war and post 
– conflict period. Charitas, Merhamet, Women to Women, Dobrotvor, and La 
Benevolencia are three local humanitarian organizations that were established by 
members of the Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities and provide help for their 
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own communities but also help other needy people regardless of their religion, ethnicity 
or gender. While faith – based these organizations’ work is limited to humanitarian aid. 
In addition to the aforementioned initiatives by Ivo Marković, other more significant 
initiatives for interreligious dialogue, the development of trust and coexistence include 
the Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Multireligious 
and Intercultural Centre, and Abraham.77 Minor initiatives as well can be considered as 
evidence that religious leaders are open and ready for interreligious dialogue and 
cooperation that would lead to more stable interreligious relationships. The new 
publication The One by Pavle Mijović from the Catholic Theological Faculty in 
Sarajevo and Muhamed Fazlović from the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo under 
the initiative of Mirnes Kovač a Bosnian journalist and political analyst, is a common 
endeavor to give answers to pressing religious and profane questions. The authors focus 
on issues that unite both religions and try to show how both religions share the same 
norms and values on important issues. Another recent example is the Declaration “A 
Step Ahead” that was signed by the Catholic cardinal Vinko Puljić, Muslim religious 
leader Husein Kavazović and the religious leader of the Jewish community Valentin 
Inzko at the beginning of the International Summit on Peace and Reconciliation in Banja 
Luka.78 The representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, however, abstained from 
signing the declaration and chose instead to be present as observers.  
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CHAPTER TWO: RECONCILIATION, PEACEBUILDING AND 
RELIGION 
“No survival without a world ethic. 
No world peace without peace between the religions.  
No peace between the religions without dialogue between the religions”81 
 This study starts from the assumption that peacebuilding is a comprehensive 
process which includes reconciliation as its central element.82 Stable peace does not 
consequently follow the negotiation of the peace agreement, but is a complex and long – 
lasting process that should involve all social levels. The contemporary nature of violent 
encounters require new methods and approaches, unknown to conventional diplomacy, 
that address human relations. The former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
in An Agenda For Peace identified four different areas of action in the aftermath of 
contemporary conflicts: preventive democracy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post – 
conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding as defined by the Secretary – General is the 
support of efforts to consolidate peace, to reconstruct the state structure, to advance 
economic development and democratic institutions and values. However, peacebuilding 
used here as understood by Lederach and others83 is more than post – conflict 
reconstruction but “a comprehensive concept that generates and sustains the processes, 
approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful 
relationships.”84 Thus, while peacebuilding includes institutions building, development 
of democratic governance and socio – economic development peacebuilding addresses 
the root cause of the conflict, damaged relationships. The term “post-conflict” indicates 
that conflict has not disappeared but has taken a different form which is constantly 
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changing.85 In some cases the post – conflict lasts for several decades. The post – 
conflict is a phase in which the entire political, social and economic system is changing 
with promises of a better future. However, at the same time, the people who emerged 
from circles of violence stay committed to what is known to them.86 Therefore it is 
necessary to create an “ethos of peace” a psychological infrastructure that supports 
peace and a web of actors that cross – cut all social levels. Central element to this 
comprehensive understanding of peacebuilding is therefore reconciliation and social 
reconstruction.87 Religions and religious actors are essential not only because they are 
central to the individual and communal identity of parties to the conflict but because 
they bear a positive potential in their resolution through reconciliatory action and 
religious values that support these processes.  
 2.1. A MODEL OF PEACEBUILDING 
 The understanding of and approach to peacebuilding in the present study is 
influenced by Lederach’s peacebuilding framework. Lederach has several important 
observations about protracted conflicts based on which he designs his peacebuilding 
approach. Contemporary conflicts are identity conflicts (community, religion or nation) 
that tend to be internal but internationalized, are long - term conflicts, usually involve 
deep-rooted and long-standing animosities that are “reinforced by high levels of violence 
and direct experiences of atrocities so that psychological and even cultural features often 
drive and sustain the conflict more than substantive issues.”88 At the same time, as they 
are internal cannot be addressed effectively by the international community and need to 
be addressed in different ways. Peacebuilding activities can begin at the top – level and 
“trickle down” to the general population or start at the bottom and progress to the higher 
levels. The first is the top – down and the second the bottom – up approach. Lederach 
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also refers to the first as the hierarchical and the second as the organic method in 
peacebuilding. The overwhelming efforts in peacebuilding are driven by a hierarchical 
focus, from a top-down approach, involving top-level leaders and activities.89 The 
assumption is that aggreements at the highest level will move down through the 
population.90 However, political accommodations are necessary but not sufficient for 
stainable peace in these societies. Successful peacebuilding in deeply – divided societies 
requires new methods, strategies and approaches that are more innovative than the tools 
of traditional diplomacy. Intractable conflict “is a system, a system that can be 
transformed only by taking a comprehensive approach to the people who operate it and 
to the setting in which it is rooted.”91 Therefore, peacebuilding must address social, 
economic, socio – psychological and spiritual changes at all social levels. The final 
result of these changes is a reconciled society.  
 The three central elements of the proposed peacebuilding framework can be 
summarized as: the time consideration, the pyramid of actors and the web of 
reconciliation. First, Lederach argues that peacebuilding activities should be understood 
from a long – term perspective. Instead of focus on short – term emergency oriented 
activities peacebuilding must be planned and conducted within an overall strategy and 
vision for sustainable social change. This means that peacebuilding must be understood 
as a long – term project which nevertheless responds to the immediate needs in a way 
that will support the overall social reconstruction.92  
 Second, Lederach criticizes the hierarchical approach to peacebuilding and 
advocates instead for the organic model. Peacebuilding should be understood as an 
interwoven process a “web of interdependent activities and people” that “links and cuts 
across levels, types of activities, and time” and “creates a binding effect, holding people 
and processes together.”93 Because Lederach understands protracted conflicts as a 
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system he advocates for the “nested paradigm” which is an approach that will deal with 
immediate minor issues and the broader systemic issues of a society in conflict 
simultaneously at all levels of society.94  
 In comparison, the hierarchical focus on peacebuilding is a top – down approach 
that involves only top level leaders. This top – down approach often utilizes structural or 
experiential methods and agents implement policies that generate a common identity, 
decrease structural inequalities, create democratic institutions and punish perpetrators.95 
In this approach to peace-building there is a gap between those at the tables and ordinary 
people. The international community sets the standards, develops reconciliation projects 
and establishes international courts. In this model people have no access, participation 
and responsibility in reconciliation processes. Moreover, the top-level, “official” 
process, is far removed from the socio-political and cultural context of a particular 
society and often has not the capabilities to deliver on its own. The top – level 
agreements often do not trickle down to the general population.  
 International non – government organizations and international organizations 
that establish offices in local societies in order to build civil society and contribute to 
reconciliation fall predominantly into this top – down model as well. While empowering 
the civil society sector is a significant dimension of their reconciliation projects foreign 
actors tend to misunderstand or not fully comprehend the social reality. Moreover, they 
create dependence on the international community’s funding rather than facilitate 
genuine indigenous initiatives. Belloni’s evaluation of the international community’s 
role in empowering civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is sobering and underscores 
the main disadvantages of foreign actors: the lack of a comprehensive strategy. He 
argues that the international initiatives failed to take into account how the understanding 
of civil society by the Bosnian actors is different from the Western conception of the 
term. Further, he points to the paradox that instead of creating a stable and independent 
civil society that would give fruit to indigenous projects, the international projects 
increased the non-governmental organizations’, grassroots’ and local leaders’ 
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dependence on international support. Primarily because local leaders lack the 
experience, financial resources and influence in the Bosnian society they remained 
highly dependent on the international actors.96 The top – down approach is not able to 
explain how negotiations from the highest level can be translated to the overall 
population that lives in the post – conflict setting. While top level leaders negotiate the 
agreement the population at the lower level are caught in dilemmas caused by the post – 
conflict environment.  
 To the contrary, the organic model involves the broader constituency and is as “a 
web of interdependent activities and people”, which links people from different levels. 
An organic approach to political processes “creates a genuine sense of participation, 
responsibility, and ownership in the process across a broad spectrum of the 
population.”97 The organic model has a more systemic view and understands that the 
process of peacebuilding and its various components, levels and actors are interlinked 
and dependent on each other. Changes at one level influence changes at other levels and 
no one component controls the process of change and can bring about social change in 
the whole system as suggested by the top – down model. Therefore, Lederach suggests 
that an “infrastructure for peace” is needed that will cut across the levels and engage 
everyone.98 Similarly, Tutu argues that successful reconciliation should be understood as 
a “mass movement” that effects and involves everyone and changes the hearts and minds 
of the larger population.99 Peacebuilding should “[create] a genuine sense of 
participation, responsibility, and ownership across a broad spectrum of the population”. 
The whole society must take a proactive role in the process and define it according to 
their needs. Peacebuilding should be understood as “an open, accessible system that 
rests on a broad base of participation”. Accordingly, it is understandable why the organic 
model is necessary for sustainable peace. 
 In particular, Lederach offers a pyramid of peacebuilding actors and approaches 
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to peacebuilding that identifies three levels of actors: the top – level, the middle range 
and grassroots actors (Figure 2.1.).100 Each of these levels of leadership represent a 
certain number of people and they have their own peacebuilding approaches. In the 
organic approach top, middle and grassroots agents are interdependent and create peace 
together as leaders at the different levels cannot generate sustainable peace by 
themselves. The top – level leaders represent the fewest people of a society and activities 
at this level involve a handful of key actors. The local middle range agents involves a 
higher number of actors who are religious leaders, community leaders, politicians and 
artists. These leaders can use workshops, conferences, artistic work and intercommunal 
meeting groups as methods for peacemaking. They primarily focus to create a place and 
venue for communities to interact and communicate. External mid-level agents include 
non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian aid and development 
assistance, advocating human rights and contribute to direct peace building efforts. The 
grassroots level activities affect the largest number of people and grassroots leaders are 
local leaders who wish to achieve greater justice for their community. Their activities 
aim at eliminating discrimination, permitting autonomy for local communities and 
compensation for injuries and material losses.  Particularly, the organic model 
emphasizes the importance of mid – level and grassroots leaders who take responsibility 
and ownership in the process. In his peacebuilding framework Lederach gives priority to 
the bottom – up approach because it involve the greatest number of people and sees 
middle – range level leaders as the central figures in the peacebuilding activities. This is 
primarily because they are strategically significant and connect the two other levels. 
These leaders have direct access to a larger population and they can connect the top – 
level to the grassroots affectively:  
 the middle range holds the potential for helping to establish a relationship – and 
 skill based infrastructure for sustaining the peacebuilding process. A middle-out 
 approach builds on the idea that middle-range leaders (who are often the heads 
of,  or closely connected to, extensive networks that cut across the lines of conflict) 
 can be cultivated to play an instrumental role in working through the conflicts.101 
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Figure 2.1. Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding102   
 Third, Lederach explains that post – conflict peacebuilding is not only about 
smooth political transition but is the processes of social transformation and 
reconciliation which are comprehensive, multifaceted and multidisciplinary (Figure 
2.2.).103 Most peacebuilding projects focus on technical task of political transition that 
are related to socio – political or socio – economic concerns. However, this approach 
does not give sufficient attention to transformative and relational dimensions of 
peacebuilding which are socio – psychological and spiritual concerns.104  
 Lederach envisions peacebuilding as a process that includes four interwoven 
processes.105 The first process is setting the agenda. It refers to the peace accords and the 
agreements that result from negotiation which can involve a variety of actions that move 
from conflict to the redefinition of identities. When implemented, these objectives are 
the political transition process that can include socio – political dimensions such as the 
process of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration and socio – economic 
processes such as financial aid or professional trainings to give groups involved in the 
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conflict an opportunity for a new start. This transition process which is purely technical 
is embedded in a broader process called transformation which is concerned with deeper 
questions. While the technical task of transition is to remove guns, in the process of 
transformation the concern is how to define the place and role of military in the new 
context. The final and broadest process is the process of reconciliation. It is built on the 
other three but includes the process of building broken relationships. The population is 
understood as individuals with accumulated emotions and trauma. In addition to this 
comes the spiritual dimension of reconciliation that sees the people not only as 
individuals with psychological needs but “as humans on a journey of healing and 
encounter to restore relations with others within a society that seeks the same.106  
 
Figure 2.2. The Web of Reconciliation107  
 2.2. THE MEANING(S) OF RECONCILIATION 
 Reconciliation is the key element of peacemaking108 and peacebuilding and some 
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authors see it as the most important factor for stable peace.109 Reconciliation has 
emerged as a concept and gained importance as an approach in “the age of 
peacebuilding” and in post – conflict societies.110 In this literature reconciliation is used 
interchangeably with “peacebuilding” and “peacemaking”. However, reconciliation is 
more than peacemaking and peacebuilding because it denotes a long – lasting process 
aimed at changing hostile and suspicious relations between people in a fragmented 
society. Johan Galtung’s famous distinction between positive and negative peace is 
useful for our discussion of reconciliation. “Negative peace” is defined as the absence of 
direct violence while positive peace is “the presence of symbioses and equality in human 
relations … and [the] absence of structural and cultural violence.”111 Most importantly, 
“positive peace is the best protection from violence.”112 The majority of authors agree 
that reconciliation is a process of relationship – building between individuals, groups 
and states: “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared 
future.”113 Reconciliation develops and expands after direct violence has stopped, 
political settlement reached and a space for further social transformation created and it is 
“the heart of deep peacemaking and cultural peacebuilding.”114  
 The concept of “reconciliation” is interchangeably used in the transitional justice, 
conflict resolution, and peace studies literature. In the transitional justice literature the 
traditional focus is on the themes of truth – telling, justice and reparations. The 
scholarship refers to this conventional approach as “thin” transitional justice 
mechanisms because this understanding is unidimensional and dominated by legalism.115 
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In this legal thinking and practice the rule of law, implementation of respect for human 
rights, and state or institution – like actors are assumed to deliver justice and the 
argument is that these actors will satisfy the demands of all parties involved in the 
conflict. However, gradually the limitations of translating this legalist thinking to 
societies that have experienced mass violence, unthinkable atrocities and grave human 
rights violations were recognized and acknowledged. Even whit truth commissions, 
international and national courts and reparation programs the societies remained divided 
and peace unstable.  
 Therefore, the need for community building, dialogue, mutual acknowledgment 
and other processes that constitute a “thicker” version of transitional justice were 
recognized and included in the transitional justice literature. Thereby, the theme 
reconciliation became to be pronounced as the highest goal of transitional justice 
mechanisms. Researches and practitioners brought to attention the existence of a wider 
group of actors other than lawyers and politicians, bottom – up approaches and 
traditional/local initiatives that likewise contribute to transitional justice.  
 Reconciliation is a complex process because it means that the divided society 
learns to live together, restore broken relationships, define a common future and 
accommodate radical differences non-violently. Reconciliation as a phenomenon gained 
prominence in the field of conflict resolution and peacemaking primarily because of the 
nature of ethnoreligious conflicts. The discussion on the characteristics of modern 
conflicts in the previous chapter aimed to highlight the necessity for an innovative 
approach in bringing peace to contemporary post – conflict societies. Reconciliation is 
an important dimension of the overall peace – building initiative, particularly necessary 
in context of extreme violence and a past that involved excessive human rights 
violations, as conventional diplomacy and peacekeeping operations do not longer fit the 
needs of these conflicts.  
 Reconciliation as a concept remains very complex and ambiguous because it 
refers simultaneously to different levels of relationships, is defined by a variety of 
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disciplines and is conceptualized and promoted in a variety of ways. One reason for the 
lack of clarity is that reconciliation is related to a plurality of types and levels of 
relationships with different levels of intimacy and inclusiveness. Reconciliation is used 
simultaneously to describe the reparation of political/national and social/interpersonal 
relations as well as relationships between friends and former antagonists. Each of these 
levels has requirements and ask for certain measures and focuses on different agents of 
reconciliation. While political reconciliation focuses on top – level political leaders and 
on the elements of truth and justice, at the center of societal reconciliation are citizens 
and groups, their relationships and the processes of healing and forgiveness. Because of 
this, reconciliation needs to be understood as a multi – level process that encompasses 
all these different levels and its actors. Further, reconciliation is a concept “laden with 
theological and political and historical legacy”116 which means that each society based 
on its social context and historical legacy has its own definition of what reconciliation 
means. Even within one society or group, reconciliation has multiple possible meanings. 
Hamber and Van der Merwe, for instance, identified at least five ways in which the 
different groups in South Africa based on their concerns, interests and orientations 
understood reconciliation.117 
 2.2.1. Approaches to Reconciliation 
 There are various models for the process of reconciliation after conflict and the 
strategies for transforming divided societies into reconciled ones. Experts in the various 
branches of sciences such as political and moral philosophy, psychology, political 
science and international relations, conflict resolution and peace studies, as well as 
theology engage in the definition of the concept and the correct approach. For De 
Gruchy reconciliation is an interwoven process of processes at the theological, 
interpersonal, social and political level.118 Chapman states that the goal of reconciliation 
is to transform two distinct relationships: 1. between former enemies at the individual 
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level and communal level so as to enable them to live peacefully with one another, trust 
and cooperate with each other and 2. between the state and the citizen which involves the 
process of transforming political institutions, promoting the rule of law and respect for 
human rights.119 Valerie Roseaux classified the numerous approaches to reconciliation 
into three groups: structural, socio – psychological and spiritual approaches.120 Each one 
of these emphasizes different aspects that need to be considered and addressed for the 
sake of reconciliation and defines respectively different elements of reconciliation.  
 This thesis focuses on the underpinnings of the socio – psychological and 
spiritual approach to reconciliation. Therefore, I will very briefly outline the main 
characteristic of the structural approach to reconciliation to turn more extensively to the 
relationship centered reconciliation approaches. The structural approach envisions that 
reconciliation is facilitated and emerges with security, democratic socio – political 
structures and the building of common institutions in divided societies. The socio – 
psychological approach emphasizes the importance of emotional and cognitive aspects 
in the process of reconciliation. While the spiritual approach underlines the healing and 
rehabilitation processes of victims and offenders. Roseaux states that the structural 
approach deals with interests and issues while at the center of the socio – psychological 
and spiritual approach are the relationships within the society.  
 2.2.1.1. The Structural Approach 
 In this approach to reconciliation the goal is to build political relationships. 
Murphy defines how political reconciliation is achieved: 
 .. processes of reconciliation cultivates forms of interaction premised on the 
equal  respect for individuals and their agency; a commitment to the reciprocal sharing 
 of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation; and an institutional structure is 
 based on rule of law and on political, economic, and social institutions in which 
 all individuals have a genuine opportunity to participate.121 
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 This type of conceptualization of reconciliation focuses on the political level and 
reconciliation is identified with efforts to further national unity and nation building. This 
model emphasizes the importance of socio – political institutions and democratic 
processes, the respect for human rights and the rule of law for the reconciliation 
processes. Sides that need to be reconciled are citizens and primarily perceive and 
interact with each other on the bases of this level of identity. Thus, the process of 
reconciliation brings together political advisories and is successful when all sides 
recognize each other as equal citizens who respect the principles of a democratic state 
and accept the political institutions. In their work Reconciliation in Divided Societies: 
Finding Common Ground Daly and Sarkin assert that a structural understanding of 
reconciliation is of greater benefit for societies in transition. Instead of focusing on the 
individual their approach suggests that successful reconciliation programs and strategies 
must focus on the society as a whole where the focus is on the relationship between the 
state and individual and not the relationship between individuals.122  
 The main actor of reconciliation is the state which is responsible to create social 
and political structures that will promote reconciliation. Passing inclusive policies, 
protecting human rights and establishing the rule of law, democratic institutions, a 
common identity, shared values and principles among the populace are at the center of 
this approach. Political and economic reforms are the metastructures which create the 
framework for peaceful coexistence and reconciliation. “The key is not necessarily that 
the groups are getting along better with each other, but rather that various groups are 
committed to the same or similar values.”123 In this approach reconciliation is closely 
linked to democracy and understood as nation – building and the establishment of moral 
order: “For many deeply divided societies the ability to disagree respectfully in the 
context of a political structure is the most that can be expected from reconciliation.”124 
Thus, the process of reconciliation is understood as creating good governance and 
political environment and not social or individual healing nor the transformation of 
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relationships between former enemies. Policies that create linkages, democratization, 
new structures of governance, economic processes, economic interdependence and 
cooperation, policies institutions and mechanism that restore justice. Institutions and 
policies are essential to peace – building efforts, but interpersonal reconciliation gains 
less importance. The model for this kind of reconciliation through political and 
economic initiatives is the restoration of relationships between Germany and France 
through the joint project of the European Union.  
 This approach to reconciliation can be termed “minimalist” because it promotes 
mere coexistence between former antagonists. Reconciliation is identified with activities 
that encourage national unity and nation – building. At the center of this approach are 
institutions, policies and political and economic reforms and to a lesser extent 
relationships and individuals. Other representative of the minimalist or “thin” approach 
to reconciliation are Bhargava and Gibson.125  
 Reconciliation according to Bhargava requires only the formation of a 
“minimally decent society” which is based on the rules and norms of procedural justice. 
He does not believe that “minimally decent” societies have to overcome hostility or 
estrangement but only have to agree upon a moral consensus that prevent excessive 
wrongdoings and endanger procedural justice. Only through those means can a defeated 
barbaric social formation gradually be transformed into a “minimally decent society”.126 
Within this minimalist structural approach to reconciliation James Gibson identifies four 
factors of successful reconciliation: interracial reconciliation, creation of a human rights 
culture, political tolerance and acceptance of the legitimacy of political institutions. 127 
According to these authors, elements such as forgiveness, apology or acknowledgment 
are not necessary factors for successful reconciliation.  
 2.2.1.2. The Socio – Psychological Approach 
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 Other writers acknowledge that structural reforms are facilitators of 
reconciliation but underscore that effective conflict management address not only 
interests of the parties as proposed by the structural approach but also threats to identity 
and feelings of victimization.128 Moreover, while structural economic and political 
reforms are significant facilitators of reconciliation, reconciliation as the restoration of 
relationships and psychological processes are necessary particularly in societies with 
long histories of intractable and deep-rooted conflicts.129 The socio – psychological 
approach to reconciliation focuses on the transformation of previously adversely 
relationships and on the processes of individual transformation. Thus, at the center are 
interpersonal relations between the perpetrators and victims, rather than the relation 
between the state and the citizen. Accordingly, stable peace and successful reconciliation 
depends on emotional and cognitive processes at the personal and social level. 
According to this approach, reconciliation starts with the psychological processes and 
“when the parties in conflict start to change their beliefs, attitudes, goals, motivations, 
and emotions about the conflict, each other, and future relations—all in the direction of 
reconciliation.”130 Thus, in this approach, cognitive and emotional transformations are at 
the center of reconciliation efforts. Bar – Tal and Bennink write:  
 We suggest that it is the process of reconciliation itself that builds stable and 
 lasting peace. Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict 
resolution  to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the 
great  majority of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the 
 relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves. These changes take 
 shape via the reconciliation process, promote thepeace as a new form of 
intergroup  relations, and serve as stable foundations for cooperative and friendly acts 
that  symbolize these relations.131  
 Reconciliation according to the socio – psychological view is “a societal – 
cultural process that encompasses the majority of society members, who form new 
beliefs about the former adversary, about their own society, and about the relationship 
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between the two groups.”132 Reconciliation is primarily a psychological process that 
involves the change in “societal beliefs”. Bar – Tal considers reconciliation as a 
necessary process for societies afflicted with intractable conflict during which time 
animosity, hatred, and prejudice gradually developed into “societal beliefs”. This 
psychological condition of intractable conflicts is called the “conflictive ethos” of the 
society. Therefore, the key task of the reconciliation process is to change five core 
societal beliefs – the psychological infrastructure of the society – and consequently 
transform the entrenched “conflictive ethos” into an “ethos of peace”. The five societal 
beliefs that need to be changes are beliefs about the justified cause of conflict, the 
perception of the in – group and views about the out – group, beliefs about intergroup 
relationships and beliefs about the future.133 In the focus of this model of reconciliation 
cognitive and psychological processes which should take place parallel to the 
democratization and political and economic reforms in post – conflict societies. 
 2.2.1.3. The Spiritual Approach 
 Writers who approach reconciliation from a spiritual lens focus as well on 
restoring and building relationships but the focus of the spiritual dimension moves the 
intensity of peacebuilding a step further and emphasizes elements of healing and 
forgiveness.  Above this, authors use arguments that are rooted in religion or morals for 
the importance of reconciliation. This third approach to reconciliation represents the 
maximalist understanding of reconciliation because it does not only argue for the 
establishment of a “minimally decent society” but for more profound individual change 
that affects the whole society. Lederach uses the term “spiritual” to describe the 
dimension of peacebuilding that goes beyond the political, economic and psychological 
concerns and is concerned with the restoration of relationships. Because of the nature 
and motivation behind contemporary conflicts, such as the proximity of the enemy and 
immediacy of hatred and animosity, Lederach emphasizes the significance of socio – 
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psychological and spiritual dimensions in resolving the conflict.134  
 Lederach describes in his other work turning points in the process of conflict 
resolutions that he attended and he defines these moments as part of a “moral 
imagination”.135 He thinks that these instances are more important for social change than 
the application of professional skills. He states that they “make possible process of 
constructive change in human affairs and constitute the moral imagination without 
which peacebuilding cannot be understood and practiced.”136 These instances he gives, 
altered peace building attempts tremendously in various settings and were neither 
planned nor initiated by professional peacebuilders. Thus, changing a conflict does not 
require a learned skill, but something else. In the example he gives from Ghana, a word 
(“father”) was sufficient to transform the power relationship between two, for centuries, 
hostile tribes and resolve the conflict.137 This simple act transformed the relationship 
between long-time adversaries and changed the direction of the conflict.  
 The “moral imagination” is “the capacity to imagine something rooted in the 
challenges of the real world yet capable of giving birth to that which does not yet 
exist.”138 As for the example given above, the young leader used the word “father” to 
show his respect to the older leader of the opposed party with whom his group has been 
in conflict for several years and with this small gesture achieved that the opposite party 
opened for resolution talks. I think that Lederach wanted to define with “moral 
imagination” those moments in which individuals become aware that one small change 
in their own attitude has great impact on the outcome. The moment they realize this, 
they become and change their acts and sayings in a way that parties in conflict would not 
be expected to, they have contributed to the “moral imagination”.  
 Reconciliation for Lederach is a journey and an encounter. The journey goes 
towards the self, enemy, and God and is “a journey that God calls us to set out on.”139 
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Accordingly, to build relationships and to reconcile has religious values.  
 Philpott states that the theme of reconciliation is the “distinctive features of 
religious involvement in transitional justice.”140 He differentiates between two distinct 
paradigms in the approach to dealing with the past: the liberal human rights paradigm of 
transitional justice and the paradigm of reconciliation which is embedded in the religious 
tradition.141 These are not however excluding or opposing groups. They converge and 
agree on most of the assumptions but have important differences in their viewpoints. 
Philpott points out three elements that differentiate this religious approach from a 
secular understanding and focus in transitional justice. First, the religious approach to 
transitional justice focuses on building relationships and are “fuller… they include the 
confession and repentance of perpetrators, the forgiveness of victims, the empathetic 
acknowledgment of suffering on the part of other citizens, and the overcoming of 
enmity.”142 Second, the sources for reconciliation are different than from the transitional 
justice tradition because they are not based on the liberal human rights tradition and 
philosophy but try to reflect the “vertical relationship” between human beings and God 
into the “horizontal” reconciliation with other individuals.143 Third, the most distinctive 
feature of the religious approach to transitional justice is it’s emphasize on restorative 
justice and forgiveness. Philpott argues that religion has a distinct understanding of 
justice and forgiveness that can enrich the theory and practice of transitional justice. By 
itself reconciliation is a form of justice. The spiritual dimensions of reconciliation are 
often explored from a Christian perspective with its traditional understanding through 
the notions and symbols of forgiveness, covenant and creation, sin, guilt, grace, 
salvation of Christ, redemption, love, power, justice and hope.144 However, other major 
religious traditions – Judaism and Islam – have their own understanding of 
reconciliation and have very different approaches to reconciliation.145 In this context, 
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forgiveness has different warrants in Judaism and Islam. Counterparts to the Christian 
understanding of reconciliation can be found in Gopin’s work for the Judaic tradition 
and Abu Nimer for the Islamic understanding of reconciliation.  
 2.2.2. Elements of Reconciliation  
 Reconciliation is a process of the search for justice, reparations, truth, healing 
and forgiveness. These are understood as the main components of reconciliation but it is 
debated how these instruments are effective in contributing to reconciliation. Book and 
chapter titles use phrases such as “truth versus justice”, beyond “truth versus justice” or 
ask “Can justice/truth bring reconciliation?” to indicate how ambiguous the relationship 
between these elements and reconciliation is and the paradoxes reconciliation 
involves.146 It is important to realize that there is no ready – made way to reconciliation. 
Case studies and analysis of different societies have shown that every society has to 
apply a home – grown solution. There is no single tool that will bring reconciliation 
everywhere nor is one tool enough to match with the complexity of reconciliation. Based 
on her review of the literature Santa-Barbara names several elements necessary for 
reconciliation that she encountered most frequently: truth about the past, 
acknowledgment of the harm done, remorse expressed in apology, forgiveness, justice, 
prevention of future atrocities or violence, and trust – building.147  
 Because this thesis starts from the assumption that the Bosnian society is a 
divided society that is marked by most of properties of intractable conflict as outlined 
before, the author views reconciliation as a processes that is able to address the socio – 
psychological issues typical for intractable conflicts. We therefore define the readiness 
for a change in identity so as to include the other and regard or empathy to the suffering 
of the out – group as important elements of reconciliation. In addition to this, because 
the central focus of this thesis are religious leaders of the Islamic Community attention 
                                                                                                                                                
Noon: War Crimes, Genocides and Memories (Sarajevo: Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, 
2007), 68. 
146 Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
147 Joanna Santa-Barbara, “Reconciliation,” in Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London and New 




is given to elements that are derived by religious traditions. These are restorative justice 
and forgiveness, but in this thesis I will only focus on the second element.     
 2.2.2.1. Victimization, Rehumanization and Accommodation of Identity 
 According to Montville there are three main elements of victimhood which are: a 
history of violent, traumatic aggression and loss; a conviction that the aggression was 
unjustified by any standard; and an often unuttered fear on the part of the victim group 
that the aggressor will strike again at some feasible time in the future.”148 Victimhood is 
an element that maintains the conflict and only through cognitive and emotional changes 
can this circle be stopped. Changing the way groups within a divided society perceive 
and define the in – group and the out – group and their mutual relationship is an 
important dimension of reconciliation. Overcoming victimization in the in – group and 
rehumanizing the out – group are challenging but crucial reconciliation elements. During 
a conflict parties develop an image of the “threatening other” and uphold this sense of 
the other in order to be able to have a stable sense of oneself.        
 Herbert Kelman, relying on the conceptualization of Nadim Rouhana, defines 
reconciliation as one of the three types of peacemaking in interethnic or international 
conflicts: conflict settlement, conflict resolution and reconciliation.149 While all three 
processes teach societies how to live together and negotiate their social environment, he 
sees reconciliation as a distinct process of peacemaking that has a distinct goal unmet by 
conflict settlement and conflict resolution but still related to the two other process.150 
Reconciliation focuses on the “accommodation of identity” and is defined by him as a 
process of negotiating identity:  
 While conflict settlement involves a mutual accommodation of the parties’ 
 interests, conflict resolution involves an accommodation in their relationship and 
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 reconciliation an accommodation of their identities.151  
 In the process of conflict settlement parties discuss a common agreement of their 
interest and their power positions. Conflict resolution creates a durable and pragmatic 
relationship between the two groups in which they accommodate each parties’ needs and 
fears recognizing that peace and cooperation is in their interest. During this process, the 
relationship has changed but is not internalized in the respective worldviews and 
behavior of parties.152 However, reconciliation goes beyond this. Kelman connects the 
internalization of the new relationship to the transformation of each parties’ identities 
which he states is a central feature in the process of reconciliation.  
 Therefore, reconciliation, conceptualized in this way, goes beyond strategic 
partnership and is understood as the internalization of the other, the new relationship and 
behavior in one’s own identity. Moreover, the primary characteristic of that change in 
identity is removal of the negation or exclusion of the other as a central component of 
each party’s own identity.153 While in the context of protracted conflict, antagonist 
groups define their own identity in a way to delegitimize the identity claims of the 
opposed group and shape the national identity of the other that it supports their own 
identity claims. An example of how identity manipulations serve the legitimization of 
the conflict and enduring antagonism, is the claim that Bosnian Muslims are 
Serbs/Croats, who converted to Islam during the Ottoman conquest. Thus, the important 
elements of successful reconciliation “is that each party revise its own identity just 
enough to accommodate the identity of the other”154 which is a huge task for parties in 
divided societies. During the process of reconciliation former enemies come to accept 
each other not only diplomatically but psychologically.155 This leads to a certain level of 
acceptance of the other and the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the others 
narratives. That is why Kelman argues that the quality and durability of change in the 
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relationships and attitudes between and towards former adversaries is highest in the 
peacemaking process of reconciliation.  
 Similar to this element of reconciliation which involves the transformation of 
identity so as to accommodate the identity of the adversary group, Kriesberg regards as 
important what he termed “showing regard”. He uses the term “regard” to capture all the 
actions and expressions that recognize the humanity and identity of the opposed 
group.156 The three major types of actions that demonstrate regard are respectful 
recognition of the other, friendly social interaction, and apology by the perpetrator and 
forgiveness by the victims.157  
 2.2.2.2. Forgiveness 
 Forgiveness is the component that carries spiritual – moral meaning and is one of 
the most challenging dimensions of reconciliation. Forgiveness is a religious 
phenomenon present in all Abrahamic religions but when it comes to conflict resolution 
and reconciliation literature most insight about the theme of forgiveness comes from the 
Christian tradition.158 Proponents consider forgiveness as the central element in genuine 
reconciliation due to its restorative, transformative and healing functions. Forgiveness is 
the opposite of vengeance or resentment and is considered to be directly related to 
reconciliation processes.159 However, there should be good reasons to forgive.  
 Murphy defines forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment on the basis of 
moral grounds which are consistent with self – respect, respect for others and the moral 
order.160 In addition to this, Hampton claims that forgiveness is “the decision to see a 
wrongdoer in a new, more favorable light” based on a revised “judgement of the person 
himself - where that person is understood to be something other than or more than the 
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character traits of which she does not approve.”161 Thus, the wrongdoer should be 
understood separate from his act. A new way of understanding forgiveness thus is 
related to the offended person’s ability to see the offender and the past in a new 
perspective. In this process of forgiveness the offended alters his understanding of the 
other side. The accent is at reframing and understanding the past, not forgetting. The 
goal is to differentiate between the deed of the offender and the person and forgive the 
person without forgetting the evil he committed. Forgiveness is primarily a matter of 
changing how one feels with respect to a person who has done an injury and not treating 
him less harshly for what he has done.162 Overcoming the feeling of resentment is 
forgiveness, while acting less harshly given an evil act is mercy:  
 Because I have ceased to hate the person who has wronged me it does not follow 
 that I act inconsistently if I still advocate his being forced to pay compensation 
for  the harm he has done or his being forced to undergo punishment for his 
 wrongdoing - that he, in short, get his just deserts.163  
 Another advantage of forgiveness is its orientation towards the future and not the 
past. As Bishop Desmond Tutu claims that “in the act of forgiveness we are declaring 
our faith in the future of a relationship and in the capacity of the wrongdoer to make a 
new beginning.”164  
 In Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics Shriver writes about the need for 
forgiveness in the political domain. He identifies the following steps as necessary for 
forgiveness and reconciliation: (1) the open naming of wrong, (2) the drawing back from 
revenge, (3) the development of empathy for the wrongdoer, and (4) the extending of a 
tentative hand toward renewed community still in the future.165 For Auerbach 
forgiveness is an important and in cases of mass atrocities a necessary condition for full 
and genuine reconciliation. However, forgiveness is only possible when the two sides 
agree upon the identity of the perpetrator.166 Similarly, Tutu argues that confession is 
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sincere and true forgiveness can be achieved only if it comes along with material 
reparation.167 At the center of the transformation of the South African society from 
apartheid to democracy stood the Truth and Reconciliation Commission built on the two 
principles of forgiveness and reconciliation. According to Tutu the cycle of reprisal and 
counter reprisal could only be broken via these elements because with forgiveness 
victims give away their right to pay back what was done to them.168 Forgiving has a 
therapeutic function for the victim and offers a chance to repair the broken relationship 
as well. While there are good reasons to forgive, forgiveness needs to be deserved by 
offenders and other conditions fulfilled.  
 Critiques do not regard forgiveness as a necessary dimension of the 
reconciliation process while others question the consecutive relationship between 
forgiveness and reconciliation. Even though in theory the act of forgiveness does not 
advocate the absence of punishment for inflicted pain, Minow asserts that when 
translated into practice forgiveness produces exemption from punishment and when 
adopted by governments institutionalizes forgetfulness and sacrifices justice.169 
Correspondingly, forgiveness, mentioned in the context of reconciliation, is put at the 
same footing with a culture of impunity, amnesia, and “cheap reconciliation”. Therefore, 
these authors emphasize the importance of acknowledgment and apology as necessary 
steps before forgiveness.     
 2.3. RELIGION AND PEACEBUILDING 
 The religious factor neglected by policy – makers, and if considered 
predominantly understood as a divisive force in global politics, gained prominence in the 
last two decades as a positive force in conflict settlement and conflict transformation. 
While it has been extensively reported about prominent religious figures such as 
Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King or Archbishop Desmond Tutu who contributed to 
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socio – political changes, other religiously inspired actors who have contributed to peace 
are less well known. The groundbreaking work Religion, The Missing Dimension of 
Statecraft emphasizes the need for the reevaluation of the role of religion in politics and 
extensively examines case studies in which faith – based initiatives and their spiritual 
dimensions contributed to the resolution of conflicts. In the second part of the book the 
authors outline contributions of religious networks such as the Moral Re-Armament, Pax 
Christi, World Council of Churches or International Fellowship of Reconciliation 
contributions to the Franco – German reconciliation, the Quaker conciliation activities in 
Nigeria or the role of the Churches in revolutions of 1989 East Germany, the Philippines 
or Apartheid South Africa and their peaceful settlement. Authors outline the values, 
focuses and strategies typical to the “religious response” to conflicts. Another influential 
work on the role of religion in conflict and peace, written more from a theoretical 
perspective is The Ambivalence of the Sacred. The link between religion and violence is 
ambivalent and not straightforward because religious actors are capable to stir conflict 
and violence under certain circumstances but at other times successfully mitigate 
violence. Appleby uses the terms “religious militants” when he refers to religious 
extremists who instigated violence but as well for religious peacemakers who dedicate 
their lives and wellbeing to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, harmony and tolerance 
in their societies. Appleby uses the language of “strong” and “weak” religion to make a 
point about the relationship between religion and violence.170 He uses these attributes in 
two ways. In the first usage, “strong” religion refers to a religion that has well developed 
and stable institutions and its adherents are “literate” in the doctrinal and moral 
teachings and devoted to its practice. “Weak” religion is one in which the people  
 retain meaningful contact only with vestiges of the broader religious worldview 
 and network of meanings and resources, in which they are isolated from one 
 another and from education and spiritual – moral exemplars and in which ethnic, 
 nationalist secular – liberal and other worldviews and ideologies have free rein to 
 shape the meaning of those vestiges.171 
 In this way, “weak” religious communities are vulnerable for external 
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manipulation such as nationalists who use the symbolic meaning and social force of 
religion to justify their cause. Apart from the religious literacy, interpreters of religion 
can make religion “strong” or “weak”. Religious fundamentalists are not weak when it 
comes to literacy, but they weaken the full capacity of religion because they legitimize 
intolerance and violence against others. In this way they are weak religions. Therefore 
religion and religiosity cannot be per se the root cause for conflicts but the interpretation 
of religion influences the relationship between religion and violence. While Appleby 
acknowledges the role of religion in conflict he focuses more on positive contributions 
of religion to peacebuilding and sees it as a new form of conflict transformation that 
needs greater attention and encouragement.  
 Peace building and reconciliation are among the concepts in social sciences that 
are deeply rooted in theology. The relationship between religion and reconciliation and 
the religious conception of reconciliation application to the political and social life has 
been analyzed and studied extensively from a Christian perspective. In fact, the most 
salient authors on reconciliation have a religious background and propose reconciliation 
as a form of conflict resolution informed and inspired by reconciliation as a theological 
theme. Reconciliation is at the center of all religions and in essence it means overcoming 
alienation and estrangement between God and man, man and man, and man with all 
other creation. Consequently, De Gruchy concludes, reconciliation understood in this 
way has political and social implications and argues “if there was ever a theological 
theme that had to be developed in relation to the world […] reconciliation is the 
theme.”172 The arguments for reconciliation in the Abrahamic religious traditions are 
based on the attributes and actions of God as related through the Holy Scriptures. 
Moreover, religiously inspired actors utilize the “vertical relationship” between God and 
humanity as a model for the “horizontal” relations and conduct between human beings. 
The two most sophisticated reflections on reconciliation from a theological perspective 
are Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation by Miroslav Volf and Between Armageddon and Eden: The Future of 
World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking by Marc Gopin.    
                                                 




 2.3.1. Characteristics of Religiously Motivated Peacebuilding 
 Religion, religious values and religious tools and instruments to deal with 
conflict become more prominent among scholars and leading not-for-profit 
organizations and institutes researching, investing in related education and training, and 
publishing on the role of religion in conflict transformation.173 This emerging literature 
does not understand religion as a divisive but primarily as a unifying factor in post – 
conflict societies. The presence of religious values and principles promoting peace in all 
major religions, specifically in the Abrahamic religions, and the potential of religious 
teaching and practices to inspire religious leaders was noted in several works.174 They 
underscore that the relationship between religion and peacebuilding is central to every 
religion.175 Religion has a source of values, principles and mechanism to resolve 
conflicts peacefully. Case studies176 from different countries illustrate how religion and 
spirituality, inspiring organizations177 or motivated groups and individuals178, contributed 
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to the resolution of conflicts and social transformation in diverse settings. They 
recognize the potential of religion as a meaning and value creating social fact and of the 
powerful role of religious actors in their societies. Thus, the emerging interest in the 
contribution of religion to peace processes generated relevant literature and new terms 
such as “faith – based diplomacy”, “religious peacebuilding”, and “religious 
peacemakers” which aim to conceptualize the specific characteristics, functions and 
approaches of religion and religious actors to conflict transformation.  
 Religious peacebuilding refers to “the range of activities performed by religious 
actors and institutions for the purpose of resolving and transforming deadly conflict, 
with the goal of building social relations and political institutions characterized by an 
ethos of tolerance and nonviolence.”179 Religiously inspired individuals and groups make 
the central difference between religious peacebuilding and other types of peacebuilding. 
Further, this definition of peacebuilding is more comprehensive and inclusive of 
activities generally referring to all efforts by religious actors in addressing structural 
issues, social relationships and building supportive infrastructure for peace. Thus, 
religious peacebuilding in the broadest sense refers to the variety of activities 
contributing to a peaceful environment and transformation of conflict conducted by 
religious actors with approaches and methods inspired by their own religions. While this 
definition includes activities in conflict management and resolution our primary focus is 
on the role of Bosnian imams in the structural reforms, that refers to activities with the 
goal to reform institutions that generate hate and violence into institutions and long-term 
practices that promote peace and non-violence and promote leadership in the religious, 
political and civic sphere.180 Johnston coined the terms “faith-based diplomacy” and 
“faith – based diplomats” to refer to this new approach to peacemaking as a form of 
track – two diplomacy and the specific category of people involved in it. In faith – based 
diplomacy peacebuilding is not understood as the absence of violence but as the effort to 
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restore healthy and respectful relationships between the parties. Faith – based diplomacy 
is guided by the principles of unity in diversity, inclusion, peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, forgiveness and social justice as essential for the restoration of relationships.181 
Moreover, the faith – based diplomat is equipped with certain skills and tools. The 
efforts of these diplomats is guided by their scriptures and they are inspired by religious 
principles, draw legitimacy from their religious authority, they appreciate and respect 
differences in religious traditions, search for transcendent means of conflict resolution 
and see reconciliation and peacebuilding as a religious calling.182 Nevertheless, religious 
peacemakers are unfortunately underutilized or ignored as track-two diplomats who 
assist official diplomacy.  
 How do we recognize religious peacemakers and what is special about religious 
peacebuilding?  In several cases it is difficult to make a distinction between secular and 
religious peacebuilding actors. Bouth et al. faced this difficulty in the case of Muslim 
peacemakers in the Balkans.183 Not all religious actors and institutions are visible as 
religious actors often do not use religious language explicitly. Some are less visible as 
religious peacemakers and resemble other secular actors because they use secular 
language.184 As a response to the second part of the question Abu Nimer states that 
“religion can […] bring social, moral, and spiritual resources to the peacebuilding 
process. The spiritual dimension in religious peacebuilding can create a sense of 
engagement and a commitment both to peace and to transforming a relationship […]”185 
and in this way can contribute to conflict transformation with different tools. He further 
argues: “Framing the intervention within a religious context and deriving the tools from 
a religious narrative have made it possible for interveners to gain access and increase 
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their potential impact on the parties.”186 David Little gives three possible answers: (1) 
religion provides the “hermeneutics of peace” for religious leaders that guides their 
vision and provides them with motivation and perseverance for their efforts; (2) the 
religious identity provides actors with credibility as they are perceived as both 
empathetic leaders and detached from partisanship; (3) and they can address the 
religious dimensions of conflict with religious actors particular attention to and 
advocacy for religious freedom and equality.187 Religions are therefore socio-cultural 
forces that have specific resources, qualities and approaches. 
 2.3.2. Islam, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation 
 The Islamic tradition has peacemaking qualities, promotes peacebuilding 
teachings and values as well specific practices of conflict resolution that encourage 
peaceful settlement of disputes for the sake of social harmony. While it can be argued 
that sulh is the closest in meaning to the English term “reconciliation” in the Islamic 
religious tradition a direct comparison between reconciliation as used in the Christian 
tradition and promoted by peace and conflict resolution scholars and the Islamic legal 
literature cannot be made. Islam as a religion is rich on teachings and applications about 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, but it needs to be translated into the social and political 
context.  
 Moreover, an elaborate reflection on how sulh, forgiveness or other 
peacebuilding Islamic values should be understood and applied in the complex settings 
of post – conflict societies that involve a variety of actors and religions is not available. 
One possible reason for the lack of the discussion of an Islamic perspective on peaceful 
conflict settlement is given by Abu Nimer who argues that the overwhelming literature 
written on the relationship between nonviolence, peace and war in Islam interpret 
Islamic teachings using the “jihad lens” or are guided by the “war and peace” 
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hypothesis.188 These research assumptions apply for orientalist, conflict resolution 
scholars who are interested in cultural specificities as well as Islamic scholars alike.  
 Scholars who are guided by the assumption that jihad is an integral religious 
principle in Islam. They overemphasize the presence and importance of jihad in Islamic 
religion and history, describing violent jihad as the ultimate method of the conflict 
settlement in Islam. Thereby, they ignore Islamic principles of nonviolence and peace.189 
 The second group of scholars argue that the use of violence is justified in Islam 
under certain well – defined circumstance. Their focus is on discussing and elaborating 
the circumstances and conditions under which violence is justified as outlined in certain 
verses of the Qur’an. Therefore, nonviolence if defined as unconditional pacifism is not 
viewed as an authentic Islamic teaching. These scholars “put the highest emphasize on 
the struggle for justice and perceive the discussion of nonviolence as a means to an 
end.”190 Nonviolence is perceived as secondary in importance because when necessary to 
defend Islam, justice and peace nonviolence cannot be the means to an end. In 
comparison to the first group, these scholars do not assume a direct link between Islam 
and violence but argue that nonviolent means are natural and well – known principles in 
Islam. However, these scholars conclude that Islam is not a pacifist religion and that a 
limited amount of force is necessary if Islam or Muslims are endangered.191  
 The third group of research on the relation between Islam, violence and peace is 
guided by the assumption that peace and nonviolence is inherent in the Islamic 
teaching.192 These scholars assume that there are important elements that can be used in 
the definition of an Islamic nonviolence framework and a “theology of reconciliation”. 
A pioneer in this group of studies is Satha – Anand who defined a list of eight theses of 
nonviolence that are based on Islamic principles: 
 (1) For Islam the problem of violence is an integral part of Islamic moral sphere; 
 (2) Violence, if any, used by Muslims must be governed by rules prescribed in 
the  Qur'an and Hadith; (3) If violence used cannot discriminate between combatants 
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 and noncombatants, then it is unacceptable to Islam; (4) Modem technologies of 
 destruction render discrimination virtually impossible at present; (5) In the 
modem  world, Muslims cannot use violence; (6) Islam teaches Muslims to fight 
for justice  with the understanding that human lives, as all parts of God's creation, are 
 purposeful and sacred; (7) In order to be true to Islam, Muslims must utilize 
 nonviolent action as a new mode of struggle; and (8) Islam itself is fertile soil for 
 nonviolence because of its potential for disobedience, strong discipline, sharing 
 and social responsibility, perseverance and self-sacrifice, and the belief in the 
 unity of the Muslim community and the oneness of humanity.193 
 Mohammed Abu – Nimer himself is one of these scholars who has contributed to 
this approach with his Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice. 
He names a plentitude of Islamic values and principles that together establish “the 
framework of non-violence and peacebuilding” in Islam and compares these values and 
principles with the established principles of peacemaking. The author underscores how 
these values can aid the peace process. This set of Islamic values that constitute the 
Islamic ideals, assumption and beliefs of nonviolence and peacebuilding are as follows:  
• the imperative for social and economic justice,  
• good acts,  
• universality and human dignity,  
• equality,  
• sacredness of human life,  
• quest for peace,  
• encouragement of peacemaking among Muslims and between Muslims and non 
– Muslims,  
• forgiveness,  
• emphasizes on the practice of Islam and individual responsibility,  
• patience,  
• the centrality of collaboration, solidarity and inclusion,  
• and the respect for pluralism and diversity.194       
 In addition to this, in the Islamic tradition the method of sulh stands for a specific 
approach to conflict resolution and symbolizes a specific relationship between justice, 
truth and peace and the idea of peace and reconciliation in the Islamic law and practice. 
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Linguistically, sulh means peace, reconciliation, amicable settlement and agreement. 
Technically, sulh has two meanings within the framework of Islamic law: 1) the method 
through which a resolution to a dispute is attempted and 2) the outcome of the 
negotiation in the form of a contract entered into by the two sides, outlining the terms of 
their settlement.195 Sulh is the practice of peaceful settlement or conciliation and 
peacemaking between two parties and the purpose of sulh is to end conflict and hostility 
between believers so that they can reestablish their relationship. The contract that is the 
result of negotiation is binding for all members who signed the contract and their 
respective communities. Through the practice of sulh the offender will not be punished 
by the rules stipulated in the Islamic law but can be subjected to a punishment of a lesser 
degree. Historically, this practice is found in the pre-Islamic Arab society and was 
applied by elders, chieftains, soothsayers and healers who acted as arbiters or mediators 
within the tribe or between two tribes.196 Sulh is a “settlement grounded upon 
compromise negotiated by the disputants themselves or with the help of a third party.”197 
These third parties’ goal was to establish peace and order when two disputants could not 
resolve their issue by themselves. Sulh signifies a balance between ethical and religious 
principles of peace, truth and justice. Through the method of sulh Islam gives an 
opportunity for offenders and victims to resolve offences peacefully outside the court. It 
encourages the two parties to compromise, reconcile and forgive rather than resolve the 
issue in a trail. Several verses and traditions directly state that the goal of conflict 
resolution should not be to “seek the dichotomous, imposed decision by a judge and to 
insist upon one’s legal rights.”198 Peaceful settlement is legitimated by for example surah 
al Hujurat verse 9, 10 or surah al Shura verse 40 that encourage peace and forgiveness 
among believers after conflict has emerged among them. In addition to this the practice 
and sayings of the Prophet promote the application of sulh as well. Thus, in the Islamic 
tradition it is preferable to settle a conflict peacefully without making use of the judicial 
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procedure, but to reconcile and negotiate in order to maintain relationships in the family 
and the community. The aforementioned Qur’anic verses use the term “believer” and the 
examples from the Islamic tradition urge for the peaceful settlement of conflicts between 
Muslims sulh is not limited to peaceful settlement and reconciliation among the 
Muslims. The Islamic tradition reveals examples of peaceful settlement of conflict 
between non – Muslims and Muslims. The Madinah Declaration, the peaceful conquest 
of Mecca and the Sulh al – Hudaybiyah are cited as examples of peaceful agreement 
between non – Muslims and Muslims. In several countries the practice of sulh is part of 
the legal system199 while in other societies religious leaders and individuals practice it in 
their local communities.200 The most common use of sulh in practice is for the resolution 
of marital disputes, in the case of divorce, or disagreements that emerge because of 
property or monetary issues. These disputes are offences against the rights of individuals 
and individuals are affected personally. Opinions of Islamic scholars on the applicability 
of sulh in disputes that involve the breach of rights that are fixed by the Islamic law 
(hudud) and are considered as a breach of the rights of God. These cases are adultery, 
false accusation, theft, robbery, drinking alcohol and apostasy. However, agreement 
exists among Muslim scholars that in the case of false accusation, theft and robbery the 
victim and offender can settle the dispute through the method of sulh if the case was not 
brought before the court. In offences that infringe both the rights of individuals and the 
right of God such as murder, bodily injury, breach of trust, false testimony, defamation, 
taking interest and cheating, sulh is applicable. Sulh can be understood as a form of 
restorative justice. 
 2.3.3. Characteristics and Roles of Religious Peacemakers  
 Religious leaders possess extraordinary qualities that make them specifically 
suitable to act as mediators, advocates and educators in societies inflicted by conflict. 
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Based on Kadayifci’s observations among the major three qualities of religious 
peacemakers is that (1) they have legitimacy and authority in the society they live in; (2) 
they have the adequate resources to heal trauma and injuries through religious texts, 
values and beliefs, and (3) religious leaders have access to community members, 
institutions and schools that enables them to approach a wider audience and motivate 
them to reconciliation.201 Due to their characteristic qualities and social position religious 
peacemakers have greater access to the communities and thereby can reach individuals 
more easily than political leaders. The fact that religiously motivated peacemakers live 
among and often belong to the peoples and groups involved in conflict gives them an 
entry point to the conflict. In some failed states, where centralized authority has broken 
down altogether, organized religion has remained intact as “the only institution 
possessing a measure of credibility, trust, and moral authority among the population at 
large.”202 The Churches and other religious institutions are the most effective when they 
have institutional stability and moral authority, the capability for empowering 
individuals to act and a commitment to non – violence.  
 The faith-based diplomat contributes to peacemaking by: 1. Offering a new 
vision of the past and reality, 2. Building bridges, tangible and intangible relations 
between individuals and offering a pluralist vision of community, 3. Healing conflict 
(bring an end to hostilities, resolve the issues underlying the conflict and restore the 
relationship) and 4. Healing the wounds of history.203 The new diplomat is among the 
best equipped to heal the society as there are “resources within religious traditions that 
can enable adherents to (1) reflect on their history in a redemptive manner, (2) bring 
meaning and dignity to the suffering, and (3) hold out the promise of genuine 
healing.”204 However, agents of reconciliation must (a) demonstrate empathy for victims 
on all sides, (b) have a profound commitment to the nonviolent management of 
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differences, (c) political insight, (d) extraordinary quantities of “grace” – forbearance, 
patience, dedication, and the sacrifice of ego, and (e) must be able to speak a second-
order language that transcends religious and ethnic boundaries and fosters collaboration 
with secular and governmental agencies and representatives and judge the appropriate 
time and place for reconciliation.205  
 There are different types of religious actors and they respectively assume various 
roles and functions during conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Appleby 
speaks of three different modes of religious peacebuilding: the “crisis mobilization 
mode”, the “saturation mode” and the “interventionist mode”.206  
 Religious peacemaker acting in the first way oppose authoritarian regimes during 
the conflict but these actions are crisis oriented and aim to address immediate issues. 
While this type of involvement in the conflict is common place the “saturation model” is 
fairly rare and best exemplified by the Northern Ireland case. As the term says, in the 
“saturation model”, religious peacemakers are historically involved, well – established 
and acknowledged in all institutions and levels of the society. They are an essential part 
of the institutional and religious landscape and offer comprehensive and multifaceted 
strategy in resolving conflict and achieving reconciliation. However, not all social 
settings and historical legacies are a fertile ground for the evolution of a saturated mode 
of peacebuilding.  
 The most promising mode of religious peacebuilding is the third type, the 
“interventionist mode”, refers to the situation in which external religiously motivated 
actors engage in the conflict as mediators. A Bosnian example for this kind of 
peacebuilding is the World Council of Churches that brought the leaders of the four 
religious communities to one table and assisted them in the establishment of the 
Interreligious Council immediately after the war.   
 Another categorization of religious peacemakers is offered by Cynthia Sampson 
categorizes and she divides their activities in: advocacy, mediation, observation, 
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education and interfaith dialogue.207 In addition, other activities of faith-based actors 
towards peace include relief and development work208 or direct involvement in 
transitional justice mechanism. Carter and Smith offer fourteen ways religious leaders 
can be involved in promoting peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.209  
 David Little identifies two types of peacemaking particular to religious actors: 
institution-and-capacity building and agreement – making.210 When religious actors build 
institutions and capacity they design and create institutions and engage in practices that 
enforce social harmony and civil unity over hostility and violence. Hereby, religious 
actors promote commitment to respect for religious pluralism and respect for other 
communities. Agreement – making refers to activities that contribute or engage in 
official peace negotiations directly. Some religious actors contribute to the process of 
peacebuilding by directly involving into the truth – finding and justice – seeking 
mechanisms of transitional justice. Especially in the creation and the conduct of truth 
and reconciliation commissions, religious agents have been active and successful.211 In 
Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, South Africa, East Timor, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Germany 
religious communities have lobbied for a truth commission or established it by 
themselves. Once established, religious actors assisted the process of truth finding 
through logistical support, encouraging victims, organizing hearings and counseling 
victims during and after the hearings. In addition, religious communities shaped the 
process by defining key terms and giving meaning to the concepts of truth, justice or 
forgiveness.  
 The example that stands out is Desmond Tutu’s engagement in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa which made reconciliation its central theme. 
The whole South African process was colored in the Christian religious tradition. The 
themes of justice, reconciliation and forgiveness have been highly influenced by this 
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religious perspective. The final report of the TRC gives particular importance to 
restorative justice and forgiveness. In his contribution to this discussion Desmond Tutu 
sees truth commissions as the appropriate place and way to seek justice.212 He rejected 
amnesia and argued for a concrete encounter with the past. However, for him justice in 
South Africa could not be met through ordinary judicial processes and through the 
“victor’s justice” mechanisms as exemplified in the Nurnberg trails. Tutu describes the 
TRC as the third way, a middle way between two extremes – amnesia and criminal trails 
such as the Nurnberg trails.213 The Commission recognized the complexity of the 
concept of justice and defined four distinct types of truth: 1. factual or forensic truth; 2. 
personal or narrative truth; 3. social or ‘dialogue’ truth and 4. healing and restorative 
truth.214  
 The healing truth is the personal truth – “the truth of wounded memories” and it 
is a heling truth with therapeutic effects on witnesses.215 However, the Commission 
challenges the understanding of justice as retribution and considered restorative justice 
as a viable alternative: “This means that amnesty in return for public and full disclosure 
suggests a restorative understanding of justice, focusing on the healing of victims and 
perpetrators and on communal restoration.”216 Tutu also applied the concept known as 
Ubuntu, and defined it as the Weltanschaung of the African people.217 At the center of 
Ubuntu stand the values of showing humanity and forgiveness.218 The South African 
experience thus stands out for the direct involvement of Christian actors and potential of 
Christian values in shaping the process of peacebuilding.  
 In other countries, such as Rwanda, Argentina, Czech Republic or the former 
Yugoslavia had little influence on the international and national efforts in truth – finding 
and justice – seeking.  However, we will see in more detail how Bosnian Muslim 
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religious leaders engage more frequently in the institution – and – capacity building 
activities at their local communities.  
 Two points need to be mentioned here. First, several authors correctly point out 
that religious actors must not be understood as a substitute to official state initiatives, but 
rather as a crucial supportive force. Religious peacemakers and religiously motivated 
groups cannot be effective enough by themselves. They are a crucial part of the wider 
civil society interacting and coordinating with other secular peacemakers within the 
society. Jafari notices that not all religious actors are consequently religious 
peacemakers. In order to be effective, religious peacemakers have to have on the ground 
knowledge of the society and complex dynamics of the conflict as well as the know-how 
to address the complex role of religion, be committed to the process and lead their co-
religionists with personal example.219 For Brewer et al. religious actors are one crucial 
part of the general civil society and are specifically effective in their peace efforts if they 
occupy key social spaces: the intellectual, institutional, market and political spaces.220 
The effectiveness of religious actors depends on the relationship they have with the 
state. The majority or minority status of the religious group and official or unofficial 
character of religious intervention facilitate or constrain religious peacebuilding efforts. 
That said, it becomes apparent that the state is important in linking religion to 
peacebuilding. Second, it needs to be said that faith – based diplomacy is relevant and 
makes a difference in societies in which religion was the determining or supportive 
factor in conflict and in which religion is an essential part of the society.221 Only in 
societies in which religion is a present social force, religious actors gain importance. 
  
 2.3.4. Interreligious Dialogue: The Special Tool of Religious Peacemakers  
 Interreligious dialogue is a powerful tool in conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
because it directly engages and confronts participants with the beliefs, concerns and 
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fears of their opponents. Abu Nimer argues that a religious approach to peacebuilding 
has important features that secular tools lack. He identifies three characteristics that that 
are specific to religious peacebuilding and that surface in the context of interreligious 
dialogue.222 The foundation of religious peacebuilding is the spiritual motivation and 
religious identity of its participants which gives these actors the opportunity to connect 
on deeper level. This motivation that has its source in religiosity, distinguish this tool 
from other intergroup encounters. Further, the source of vision is the sacred text of every 
religious group which additionally enriches this approach. Holy texts enrich the process 
as they can become a foundation for the deconstruction of social reality. Furthermore, 
religious traditions offer rituals and a specific language that can be utilized for 
peacebuilding. Rituals can become powerful ways of communication between the 
participants and the common religious language can help in discovering similarities and 
developing trust.  
 Interreligious dialogue can be describes as a tool of second – track diplomacy 
that is specific to religious peacebuilding and is most effectively used by religious based 
actors. Authors have elaborated on the opportunities this peacebuilding tools has and 
how they can be applied.223 In the process of peacebuilding and reconciliation, 
interreligious dialogue opens the opportunity for participants to build relationships, to 
rehumanize the other and change personal attitudes towards the other group.224 However, 
interreligious dialogue should not be mistaken with interfaith dialogue that is done at the 
highest level of the religious communities and that focus on theological issues.225 
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Interreligious dialogue refers to the activities people who are of different religions 
undertake with the aim to build and improve their relationship and thereby work for 
change and justice in their societies. Interreligious dialogue’s focus is on building 
bridges and changing attitudes between the groups involved to the conflicts. Because of 
its focus interreligious dialogue can be most effectively utilized in the contemporary 
conflicts that are identity – based. To be effective, Bernstein argues that that participants 
in the interreligious dialogue interact as individuals, not as representatives of religious 
institutions. Participants should discuss issues concerning “the individual people – their 
loves and hates, their thoughts, beliefs and feelings.”226 Interreligious dialogue groups 
engage in issues concerning all groups equally and try to solve problems together. The 
interpersonal encounter of opponents is more important than the issue at hand as “their 
views and perceptions of the conflict and the enemy change [as] participants realize, 
acknowledge and understand their mutual fears and concerns.”227 Thus, successful 
interreligious dialogue should be relationship – centered and its ultimate goal social 
change to the extent that altered attitudes about the other are translated into practice. 
 Paying attention to the use of “primary” or “secondary” religious language is 
important for this kind of encounter. A well planned interreligious dialogue will utilize 
secondary religious language.228 When participants use primary religious language they 
focus on beliefs, symbols and language characteristic to their particular group and 
elements that are usually not used by others. Therefore, the reactions by the outside 
group might become defensive. Instead, interreligious dialogue has to use the framework 
of secondary language. “Secondary language” utilizes universal values and principles 
shared by all religions.   
 Because of the centrality of the interreligious dialogue as a tool in religious 
peacebuilding the interview questions that were designed for the interviews with imams 
included a set of questions related to interreligious communication and cooperation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RELIGION AND RECONCILIATION IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 In the first section of this chapter I discuss the research design and the 
assumptions that guided me in conducting in – depth interviews and in analyzing my 
findings. In the second part I review and analyze the actions and official statements 
toward peacebuilding and reconciliation by the religious communities in Bosnian and 
Herzegovina, focusing specifically on the role of the top – level and local religious 
leaders of the International Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In my review of the 
ICBH, I divide the analysis in two sections. The first part is devoted to the official 
statements of the highest religious representatives while the second part is left for the 
personal experiences and perspective on peacebuilding and reconciliation by imams who 
live in localities in which Bosnian Muslims are a minority. In the analysis part I set to 
answer the questions: How is the approach to reconciliation of imams different from the 
public statements of the ICBH? Can local imams in Bosnia be characterized as religious 
peacemaker? What are the values motivating them and strategies they apply towards 
peacebuilding and reconciliation in their communities? What are the strengths and 
obstacles in their work?  
 3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 Before analyzing the public statements of top – level leaders of the Islamic 
Community and the interviews with local imams that I have conducted I would like to 
explain in more detail the research method and the assumptions that guided me while 
conducting this qualitative study. In the first part of this section more general issues 
relating to the process and approach to the interviewees and conversations in this study 
are addressed and dealt with.  




 This research is a qualitative study229 and is based on semi – structured 
interviews conducted in six different cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 
between January and February 2017. The interviews seek to answer a set of questions:  
- How do imams within their communities understand and define reconciliation 
and its most important components? How do they define themselves and the out 
– group? What is their perception of the level and progress of reconciliation in 
their local communities? How do they define a reconciled society? 
- Can imams act as local reconciliation and peace makers? How do they connect 
reconciliation to their work and define their role in the processes of 
peacebuilding and reconciliation? Do they take responsibility and action for the 
reconciliation process in their communities? 
- What kind of initiatives are imams taking to promote peacebuilding and 
reconciliation among their members and in the wider society? 
- What are the underlying assumptions guiding their action and reconciliatory 
practices they employ in their communities?  
 In the second part the verbatim translations of the interviews are presented and 
compared to the official statements made by religious leaders of the Islamic Community. 
The two levels and approaches to peacebuilding and reconciliation are compared based 
on how they define reconciliation and the required elements for true reconciliation. 
Further, I enlist the different steps imams take to promote peace and reconciliation and 
the values and principles that motivate reconciliatory acts are discussed. I compare 
strategies, values and principles to the literature on religious peacemaking and 
peacemakers to evaluate to what extent imams can be called religious peacemakers. I 
also enlist obstacles imams face in their efforts.  
 3.1.1. Research Methodology 
 The methodology applied in this study is a qualitative research method, in – 
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depth interviews. The topic of my study is context bound and imams were chosen 
because they are able to offer a local perspective on the process of reconciliation and 
peacebuilding. Local religious leaders are among the most involved individuals in social 
issues and have insight in all social issue that influence the individuals, interpersonal 
relations and the whole community. I intended to learn about these experiences and 
imams’ practices trough in – depth interviews. The official statements I evaluate here are 
derived from interviews with the representative of the Islamic Community to the 
Interreligious Council in Sarajevo and a professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies who 
as well serves as a representative of the Islamic Community in another function. Also I 
have used the draft of the “Platform for Dialogue” designed by the Islamic Community 
and statements on peace and reconciliation by the highest representative of the Islamic 
Community, the Reis ul Ulema, during TV interviews. In my evaluating of the public 
statements of the Islamic Community and the experiences of the local imams I use the 
methodology called Critical Discourse Analysis that was developed by Fairclough. This 
methodology is interpretative and exploratory. CDA analysis how statements that are 
given relate to the wider social reality. Specifically, CDA analysis how utterances are 
related to power relations within a society. Moreover, CDA implies that the way 
something has been said creates social reality, that it continues discrimination, 
suppression/dominance, and prejudice. The aim of CDA is not only to analyze and 
criticize the discourse but to explain how it fits in the existing reality and in what way it 
contributes to the maintenance of such reality. It is an attempt of explaining how it 
relates to other elements of social reality such as power relations, ideologies, and social 
institutions. However, “being critical is looking for explanations”230. By 
recontextualizing the discourse we aim at looking how statements of the different actors 
relate to the person’s state of mind, their fears or anxieties. While normative critique of 
discourse identifies internal contradictions within arguments it is the explanatory 
critiques which is making a critique of the existing social order.231 Critical discourse 
analysis is oriented towards “transformative actions”, which are actions that change the 
                                                 





existing social order towards the better.232    
 3.1.2. Contact with Imams and Professors of Islamic Studies  
 My insight in the issue is obtained from interviews with nine imams from six 
different cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and three professors of Islamic Studies 
working at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. In the first place I obtained the 
written permission of the Islamic Community’s Directorate for Religious Questions and 
the dean of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo for contacting the imams and 
professors. Their permissions were in the form of recommendation for all imams and 
professors to participate in the study (Appendix 3). Then I contacted several professors 
of Islamic Sciences and inquired who is the most knowledgeable on the topic of 
reconciliation. Three particular professors were recommended to me by the stuff of the 
Faculty of Islamic Studies as experienced in the issue of reconciliation. All of them were 
ready to speak with me on the topic. Prior to the formal and recorded interview I 
presented myself and the research. During our conversation the work and activities of 
the Interreligious Council were mentioned frequently and I decided to include one of the 
representative of the Islamic Community in my research. Their experiences were 
valuable and important and I decided to use them in the discussion of the Islamic 
Communities official statements and initiatives for reconciliation.  
 The imams included in this study were primarily selected according to the 
locality in which they live and work, and their readiness to participate in the interview. 
Due to the fact that all of them live in different cities in Bosnia it was impossible to have 
pre – interview conversation but had to select them according to the localities and 
contact them with a phone call. The first group of imams are living and working in the 
majority Bosnian Croat municipalities. These imams are from Kiseljak, Prozor and 
Orašje. The second group of imams are active in majority Bosnian Serb municipalities 
and are form the following cities: Banja Luka, Srebrenica and Bratunac. In the city of 
Prozor, Orašje and Banja Luka the imams I have initially contacted at short notice were 





not available but found replacement but in the cities of Orašje and Prozor only one imam 
in each case was available. Imams in Kiseljak, Orašje, Srebrenica and Bratunac are 
secondary school or university collogues of my father-in-law and some of the imams 
said that they trust me because of this fact. In the cities of Banja Luka and Prozor the 
imams were very welcoming and we were able to establish rapport easily.  
 3.1.3. Semi – Structured Interviews 
 I used the semi-structured and in-depth interview method combining open – 
ended and close – ended interview questions. The interview questions were designed so 
as to offer the respondents the best possible way to express their views, assumptions and 
approaches.  
 The interviews with the professors were conducted in their offices. The 
interviews with the imams were conducted in the local mosque or in their offices. In one 
case I have visited the imam in his home and conducted the interview there. It was 
important to me to visit every city personally and experience the social environment, 
atmosphere and see how people live in these different localities. For example, I was 
surprised by the poverty of the city in which Bosnian Serbs are the majority but also the 
bad infrastructure and poor condition of the houses in its surrounding area. The fact that 
Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs live in separate villages is underlined by the image of only 
one religious building per village. On the other hand intermingling of churches and 
mosques in the city of Banja Luka and the restoration of almost all mosques (fourteen 
out of fifteen) in the city and surrounding conveys the opposite meaning. Prozor is a 
small but very nice city that we reached very slowly due to the mountainous natural 
environment. Therefore, Prozor seems to be very isolated from the different centers 
surrounding it.  
 All interviews were tape – recorded, transcribed, translated and edited. The 
interviews with imams started with a more general question about their city and 
community and how war events affected the social relations within the community. This 
question gave me general knowledge of the suffering and losses, but also some insight in 




immediate experiences and narratives about the post – war period.  
 I prepared different sets of interview questions for interviews with imams and 
professors of Islamic Studies. I have used different question in order to first obtain 
answers from the right levels and second to obtain a broader and deeper picture of the 
reconciliation processes at the different levels of the Islamic Community.  
 A more detailed description of the social and demographic reality in the cities I 
visited and interview questions can be found in the appendix. In the following the 
translation of the interviews is presented. I use the word “imam” for all the imams 
without specifying the name of any one of them. 
 3.2. THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 AND RECONCILIATION 
 Before discussing the statements of top – level and local religious leaders of the 
Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is necessary to provide an overview of 
the organization, position and activities of this religious community. The Islamic 
Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina (ICBH) is defined as a “single and unique 
community of Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Sandžak, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, 
Bosniaks who are living abroad and other Muslims who accept its authority.”233 Defined 
according to its organizational structure, the ICBH is a non – profit, non – governmental 
organization which is recognized by the state as a historically established religious 
community with enjoying a legal entity status. The history of the Bosnian Muslims and 
the Islamic Community as their official representative is full of suppression and foreign 
control.234 The Austro – Hungarian and the Yugoslavian leaders used the ICBH as an 
instrument to control the Muslim community and often to stabilize and bring balance to 
the region. The regime co – appointed the leaders of the ICBH and consequently had 
influence on the public statements and policies of the ICBH. Since the end of the war, 
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the ICBH is more independent from the political regime. However, the Islamic 
Community has the status of a non – governmental organization that has no legal and 
binding contract signed with government actors like the other religious communities in 
Bosnia.235 Because of the fact that for now the ICBH has not signed a contract with the 
state it is restricted in its opportunities and decision – making power.236 Beginning with 
the liberations of religious policies in the 1960’s and the reconstruction of religious 
buildings after the war the ICBH today counts 1.985 religious buildings (mosques, 
masjids and tekkes) in which the religious service is actively performed, 3 higher 
education institutions (Islamic and Islamic – Pedagogic faculties), 8 secondary education 
institutions (madrasas) and 1.771 primary education institutions (maktabs) with a 
membership over 672.958 members (households) and 1.368 religious employees who 
serve at various levels of the ICBH structure.237 The ICBH’s role is not restricted to 
religious issues but it is also involved in discussion of many socio – political issues 
among them the identity, language, displacement and refugee questions, elections and 
other significant political events concerning the Muslim community and their economic 
and political wellbeing. The religious representatives see themselves as the protectors of 
the Bosniak people and the interest of the Bosnian Muslims, foremost in territories 
where the Bosniaks constitute a minority.    
 3.2.1. The Official Statements of the Islamic Community  
 Here I evaluate the official statements of the Islamic Community on 
reconciliation based on the “Platform for Dialogue”, and statements of top – level 
leaders. In the draft form of the “Platform for Dialogue”238 composed by the ICBH it is 
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stated that: “The Islamic Community in its relationship with other religious communities 
follows the Qur’anic guidance on life in peace, justice and goodness with all people of 
good faith”, based on the verse: “God forbids you not with regard to those who fight you 
not for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with 
for God loveth Those who are just.” When it comes to reconciliation, coexistence and 
interreligious dialogue the draft states:  
 Reconciliation, dialogue and coexistence in multicultural Bosnia has no 
 alternative and the role of religious communities and churches in this respect is 
 huge. Dialogue and coexistence are not our tactic for academic delight but it is a 
 strategic choice because we see in this the only means of survival.239  
 The officials of the Islamic Community understand reconciliation as a “means of 
survival”. Several imams similarly refer to reconciliation processes in the same way. 
This way of conceptualization is rather a minimalist understanding of the more complex 
and comprehensive process. The representatives of the ICBH understand that they are 
under threat and reconciliation is a mean to protect the Bosnian Muslims.         
 Further, the draft reveals that reconciliation has to be achieved by the 
mechanisms of retributive justice, truth – finding, acknowledgment of war crimes and 
compensation: “Only the just punishment of crimes can disrupt the circle of violence 
which is repeated every few decades and for the sake of the future the crime of the past 
needs to be punished.”240 Truth is an important elements for the establishment of true 
reconciliation: “For the establishment of stable peace and justice, truth needs to be 
satisfied even if peace can be established before the satisfaction of justice and complete 
acknowledgement of the truth.”241 The Platform further states: “Oral apology is not 
sufficient for reconciliation. It needs to be preceded or accompanied by the 
compensation of victims, the return of the displaced, the return and restoration of taken 
and destroyed property and religious buildings.”242 Similarly, a professor states that the 
acknowledgment of truth and justice are important precondition for genuine 
reconciliation. He underscores that objective but not subjective truth about the events of 








the recent past that were determined by the court must be acknowledged.243  
 When it comes to forgiveness it is evident that the ICBH fears that promoting 
forgiveness would lead to forgetting: “Reconciliation and forgiveness must not harm the 
right to remembrance. Because of this the request to remove the pictures of the 
destroyed Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka and the Aladža in Foča from the textbooks 
for religious education are disgraceful.”244 In the interviews I conducted with 
representative of the Islamic Community the interviewees emphasized that there are two 
distinct processes. The first process is the process of distributing justice and determining 
and acknowledging the truth. A separate process is the process of forgiveness. Only after 
truth and justice the process of forgiveness can be started:  
 The Islamic Community based on the Islamic theology insists on justice. In order 
 to achieve justice you need to know the truth. The ICBH has full credit for the 
 sequence and the maxim behind the statement “truth, justice and reconciliation”. 
 When you listen to the Catholic theologians they invert the order and say that 
 forgiveness should be at the first place. You can tell so in a theological 
discussion  but you cannot relate it to reality. It has no logic. You cannot forgive 
something  that you do not know. First, you need to know what someone has done so 
that you  can forgive him. Secondly, that person needs to ask for forgiveness. No 
one has  asked us to forgive. You cannot forgive when no one is asking for 
forgiveness.245  
 However, even if the leaders of the ICBH do not promote forgiveness until the 
crimes are acknowledged and justice determined, it does not mean that Muslims need to 
hate the others. The Reis ul – Ulema, Husein Kavazovic, states in this respect: “I would 
like to say this to the Bosniaks: no to hatred. Hatred is the same way that lead us to this 
evil in Srebrenica. This was, nevertheless, hatred and it is the cause for all this.”246  
 When it comes to interreligious dialogue the Islamic Community stresses that 
dialogue among religions is important and that the ICBH is open for these activities. 
However, the Platform does not link interreligious dialogue directly to the theme of 
reconciliation.  
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 One who search for answers in these statements about how people should live 
with each other in multiethnic societies when objective truth is not acknowledged, when 
there is no repentance or adequate punishment or compensation is disappointed. Neither 
does the “Platform for Dialogue” nor the statements of the top – level figures answer 
these important question. A helpful digression here is how Lederach conceptualizes 
reconciliation inspired by Psalm 85 verse 10. He posits that reconciliation is a process of 
paradoxes or put in other terms a process of finding a balance between four core 
elements: Truth, Mercy, Justice and Peace.247 It is paradoxical because for example on 
the one hand Truth longs for the acknowledgment of past sufferings while Mercy 
encourages letting go off the past and searching for a future. Reconciliation opens the 
space for people to deal with the painful past and simultaneously urges them to envision 
a more hopeful future. Reconciliation involves dealing with justice but at the same time 
encourages forgiveness and healing. The process in an ideal way should make a balance 
between what happened in the past and the future. Remembrance and justice should be 
conceptualized in a way that they will help individuals be at peace with the past. The 
official position of the Islamic Community is that truth and justice need to be determined 
and acknowledged before the Bosnian people can reconcile. There is no theological 
framework for discussing reconciliation nor is the reconciliation topic frequently 
mentioned in the official discourse of the Islamic Community. The Platform presents 
Bosnian Muslims as the victims of the war but does not mention in any way the 
atrocities that were conducted by Bosnian Muslims during the war. Reconciliation is 
envisioned by the top – level leaders of the ICBH in minimalist terms and understood 
from a legalist perspective. In other words, they advocate and promote tolerance and 
coexistence that needs to be realized through the truth – finding, justice – seeking and 
retributive mechanisms. Lederach asserts that top – level leaders, due to their high 
visibility and public role, are careful to maintain a position in the conflict that is 
expected by the in – group.248  By virtue of these characteristics leaders with high public 
profiles are locked into certain positions and they are constrained in activities, decisions 
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and official statements. Because of the role the ICBH plays in the Bosnian society as the 
highest authority for Bosnian Muslims, the ICBH’s reluctance to open up a more 
dynamic discussion on reconciliation can be explained.  
 This brief analysis of the official statements confirms what Lasić, Kristić and 
Knežević have found in their broader research on the public statements of religious 
communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 Lasić notes that religious debates and writings published by the three religious 
communities in their official gazettes do not deal enough with the topic of reconciliation 
and have not developed a theological framework nor institutional strategy in this 
respect.249 Based on his findings he suggests that religious institutions must establish 
four conditions for a more effective contribution to reconciliation. First, he notes that all 
religious institutions justify current and recent conflicts with historical reasons. Myths 
are overemphasized in all religious communities and all institutions present their own 
believers as the main victims of the war, while victims from other groups are ignored or 
mentioned to justify one’s own acts. To counteract, Lasić argues that religious 
institutions should engage with these myths and a fact – based history. Second, the 
author mentions structural and institutional preconditions. He observes that all 
institutions are preoccupied with internal differences, political issues and the protection 
of religious rights restitution of property of their own communities. Other issues are in 
the second plan and remain declarative in nature as all actors wait for the other to make 
the first step. Most importantly, no academic framework exists that deals with 
peacebuilding and reconciliation. Third, Lasić sees that the authority of religious 
institution is primarily used for political and national interests. Fourth, religious 
institutions have internal issues and other more important (often political) events that 
decrease their peacebuilding and reconciliation potential.250  
 In congruence with Lasić’s observations, Kristić identifies eight features of 
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religious communities’ public speeches that negatively affect the reconciliation process 
in Bosnia. He proposes that religious institutions are unable to accept critique and 
develop self – criticism, instead they propagate a false sense of belonging which is not in 
cohesion with authentic religion, are silent about their own wrongs but emphasize 
wrongs done to them, which together culminates in the stubborn denial of guilt.251  
 Knežević sees many obstacles to the full capacity of religion in the process of 
reconciliation and identifies as the major issue the selective approach towards the 
victims and the past by all three major religions. His main argument is that support for 
reconciliation is weaker where religions are representing majority and where they are 
strong holders of national identity. In these contexts they are reluctant to change their 
views about the past and their position in the transitional justice process.252  
 The ICBH does not define a strategy of reconciliation and focuses more on the 
losses of its own religious community. This confirms our previous conclusion that 
reconciliation as described by the top – level leaders of the ICBH is a minimalist 
understanding. In other words, they advocate and promote tolerance and coexistence 
rather than deep reconciliation. In his critical assessment of the position the ICBH has 
towards the process of reconciliation, a professor teaching at the Faculty of Islamic 
Sciences compares the ICBH insistence on the truth and acknowledgment of the crimes 
to a stone that is a hurdle on the path that leads to the future. He argues that there are 
many reports, judgments and commission reports that are evidence and one more 
judgment or report will not make perpetrators change their mind and acknowledge past 
wrongs. Instead, he states, new ways should be searched for: 
 What should we do? Should we wait or should we search for alternative ways, 
 ways of forgiveness maybe? As far as I can see the atmosphere is that we wait 
but  I am not sure if we are going to see that moment, that this rock will move. But 
 Bosniaks should direct their attention to some other points. Planning the future. 
 Instead of waiting or trying that the perpetrators admit their crimes of the past we 
 do nothing to prevent that it repeats to us in the future. There are a lot of ways 
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 that it can be done, from educations to economic development. I think that we 
 should be more creative in finding ways to get from perpetrators what we want 
 which is that they give up their plans. I think there are alternative ways outside 
the  court. I think that we got from the courts what we could.253   
 
 3.3. INTERVIEWS 
 In the following I categorized the responses of imams according to how they 
conceptualize reconciliation, how they relate their work to reconciliation, what they do 
to contribute to the process and what values and principles motivate them to act in this 
process.  
 3.3.1. Conceiving Reconciliation  
What kind of reconciliation? 
 This section evaluates the responses to the following questions: What does 
reconciliation mean to you? How should the process of reconciliation develop and how 
should a reconciled society look like? Imams that are included in this study showed 
themselves ready to talk about the topic of reconciliation in their communities. Each of 
them had different understanding of what reconciliation means and ideas about the best 
approach to achieve genuine reconciliation. All imams regarded reconciliation as a 
crucial process for their local communities and perceive that reconciliation is still 
ongoing process. Almost all imams assume that the ICBH and the imams in particular 
have a central role in these processes.254 The responses varied from very minimalist to 
maximalist definitions of reconciliation. Reconciliation according to imams refers to:   
• a necessity for survival of Bosniaks: “we cannot live by ourselves” 
• establishing the truth, delivering justice and acknowledging crimes that were 
determined by international courts 
• peaceful coexistence and nothing more: “living next to each other” 
• not hating each other, giving less space for nationalistic thoughts and not hurting 
each other 
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• giving someone the right he has as a human; reconciliation is not about loving or 
trusting someone 
• economic cooperation, trade and work  
• living with each other but accepting certain limits: “we should develop 
relationships but be cautious” 
• acknowledgment of wrongs by both sides  
• respecting each other and tolerance 
• getting to know each other 
• talking about the past with each other 
• having a constant dialogue and communication with each other  
• breaking stereotypes and prejudice about each other and listening to the story of 
the other side 
• living in harmony and cooperation with each other  
• being good neighbors: “living with each other” 
• being friends 
 I ordered the various conceptions of reconciliation by imams from the most 
minimalist to the most maximalist understanding. In both minimalist and maximalist 
conceptions reconciliation is understood as building more stable and positive 
relationships between former enemies. However, in the minimalist conception 
relationships are defined narrowly and often very superficial and distant relationships are 
meant. According to my analysis I classify minimalist conception of reconciliation the 
following statements: “We need reconciliation because of the survival of Bosniaks”, 
purely legalist understandings of the process, “living next to each other”, “not hating and 
hurting each other”, “reconciliation is not about loving or trusting each other” and 
reconciliation as a purely economic activity. These minimalists understandings of 
reconciliation expect the first step to be made by the other side, see themselves as 
victims and are the imams take a defensive stance towards the other. The relations that 
need to be rebuild are between the victim and the perpetrator and often defined 
negatively as “not hating each other” or “not hurting each other”. Imams who advocate 
this kind of reconciliation are backward – looking and understand the future from the 
prism of the past. In this way the statement that “reconciliation is necessary for the 
survival of Bosniaks” should be understood. In comparison, maximalist 
conceptualizations of reconciliation are forward – looking and see reconciliation as a 




underscore the importance of caution in their future relations their perception of the 
future is more positive and less laden with the past. Relationships that need to be rebuild 
are relationships between humans. Both sided need to understand each other and 
acknowledge each other, show interest for the other’s story and suffering. These imams 
depict the other side in more human terms and do not define them as perpetrators or 
bystanders. Deeper relationship are envisioned and hoped for through the process of 
reconciliation by this group of imams, good neighbor relations and even friendship is 
mentioned. The imam in Bratunac and one imam in Srebrenica understand reconciliation 
in minimalist terms, in Kiseljak and Orašje in rather maximalist terms while in Prozor 
and the other imam in Srebrenica in maximalist terms.  
 The imams in Bratunac and Srebrenica defined reconciliation in legalist terms:  
 Reconciliation is a long – lasting process and it must be based on the truth, facts 
 and proofs. Primarily, it is based on respect towards the judgments of the 
 International Court of Justice and the national courts. Everyone must 
acknowledge  his own responsibility and guilt. It means also that the neighboring 
countries, I  think before all on Serbia and Croatia, should acknowledge what has 
happened,  that they have helped their people and that the Bosniaks were the greatest 
victims  of this war. When all things are ordered in the right way and named as 
they should  be and when all are held responsible and brought to the court for 
genocide and  other war crimes, only then we will be able to feel true reconciliation and 
I think  for this to happen we will need a lot of time.255  
 In Bratunac the imam says:  
 They claim that everything that happened came from the outside, that none of 
them  has participated in all this but that people from outside have set us against each 
 other. However, we continue to search for some 300 people that are still missing. 
 No one wants to show us the mass graves. We have until now not met one person 
 who admits and says yes, we are responsible for the destruction of your mosques, 
 yes we did war crimes, yes, we killed your religion leader. No, they are totally 
 silent. They would like to get over what has happened. They think that we 
 should look in the future without looking at the past.256 
 In these two quotations truth, court, facts, evidence, acknowledgment, 
responsibility, guilt, punishment are key themes. True reconciliation can only be 
established by delivering justice and acknowledging crimes determined by national and 
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international courts, that is, through the legal procedure that determines the truth about 
the past.   
 The imam in Bratunac sees economic cooperation as the best way to advance the 
process of reconciliation: 
 So I am trying… people work with each other, they cooperate… but I am not 
 telling them to… as before the war… people were visiting each other in their 
 homes, they have attacked when they saw that we have nothing to defend 
ourselves  with. I think that the economy has the primary role in reconciling people. 
 Existence is giving the direction. Of course, genocide has recently happened, 
 heavy crimes  have been committed and people have shot at one another… you 
 cannot accept  now, never in the future that this process will be something 
special.  You cannot expect brotherhood and unity. But reconciliation can happen 
to the  extent that the  state exists, that the local community exists. For me economy is 
 dictating plurality.257 
 In addition to what has been said before, the imam argues that the relationships 
between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks in Bratunac should be based on economic 
cooperation rather than intimate personal relationships. In his opinion economic 
cooperation will help the local citizens to improve their livelihoods and at the same time 
keep them safe as “they [the Serbs] have attacked when they saw that we have nothing 
to defend ourselves with.”  Almost all imams that were interviewed explicitly state that 
trust is not present in the interethnic relationships and argue that reconciliation is 
important but it should be approached with caution:  
 The Prophet said that a Muslims must not allow himself that he is beaten from 
the  same  hole (by a snake) a second time. A Muslim must be cautious. We have to 
 keep in mind that we need to build trust but with a certain measure of caution.258 
 However, as our neighbors wanted to eliminate us from this region we do 
 everything that we do with sincerity but also with cautions towards those who 
have  done what has happened to us. The relationships are slowly normalizing but we 
 cannot have relationships as they were before the aggression. Before mixed 
 marriages between Bosniaks and Serbs were common, even an imam who 
worked  and continues to work here, married a Serbian women and has today 
children with  her. We cannot talk anymore about this kind of relations.259   
 Here, the imams mention episodes of the recent war or examples of difficult 
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social interaction and the fragile political situation as reasons for caution in dealing with 
the “other” and as obstacles for trust – building among them.  
 In Prozor, Orašje, Banja Luka and Kiseljak reconciliation is perceived as a form 
of restoring relationships through dialogue and frequent encounter. While they regard 
truth and justice as important components of genuine reconciliation they perceive 
reconciliation as the process of developing relationships. In Prozor, Banja Luka and in 
the case of one imam in Srebrenica the religious leaders expressed the readiness for very 
close and intimate relations such as friendship and close interreligious neighbor 
relations.  
 There is nothing in the world that is worth that I turn my head away from my 
 neighbors, the Catholics or that I do not greet them in the city. They say, we live 
 next to each other. I say that we live here with each other. I live 12 km from the 
 city center and my house is the only Muslim house among Catholics. But no 
 Christmas or Easter can pass, or one Eid or the other that we do not visit each 
 other. The daughter and son of my brother, they are very small and have two 
 Catholic friends Ivo and Catarina. They eat with us every day for lunch.260  
 As this example from Prozor shows, the imams in these cities have very close 
relationships with the members of the other community and regard real friendship and 
trust between the two communities as possible. While the imam in Prozor states to have 
very intimate relationship with the Catholic priest and his Croat neighbors, the imam in 
Srebrenica has several good friends among the local Serb community but no contact 
with the local Orthodox religious leaders. Compared to the experiences of the imam in 
Bratunac and the other imam in Srebrenica these two imams from Prozor and Srebrenica 
do not preclude intimate relationships between the two local groups. The position of 
imams in Orašje and Kiseljak can be positioned at the middle of the two attitudes 
previously mentioned. These imams do not see the necessity of developing very intimate 
relations between the two groups but do not exclude the possibility of close and intimate 
relationships. Primarily, they argue that reconciliation can be achieved by better 
relations in terms of interreligious dialogue, common cultural projects and other kind of 
cooperation. The following statement from the imam in Orašje makes clear the 
                                                 




importance he gives to constant interaction and communication over intimate 
relationships.      
 Living together with each other is more important than reconciliation. The most 
 important thing in reconciliation is to work together on projects which are 
uniting  us, on projects that are of the common interests of everyone. We need to 
avoid  things that further divide us or can cause misunderstandings. These terms 
 “reconciled society” and “reconciliation” have become crude phrases or to 
 say it in a better way they have become impossible. Nowhere in the world you 
 have a “reconciled society”, everywhere you have people who are not satisfied 
 and obstruct things. In our context, where we have so many victims, 
reconciliation  has a different meaning. A reconciled society needs to be a society that is 
tolerant,  nothing else. Sometimes it means to tolerate and sometimes to respect the 
other.  We need to respect the rights of the other who lives next to you. So we need to 
 respect each other and give the other the opportunity to live with each other.261 
 Contrary to the case of the imam in Prozor, in his view reconciliation does not 
necessarily require the establishment of intimate relationship between Croats, Bosniaks 
and Serbs. Instead, reconciliation should be understood as a state in which the three 
groups interact with each other while respecting the others’ rights and tolerating their 
differences. 
Forgiveness 
 Imams regard forgiveness as an important value and principle in Islam and the 
act of forgiving is perceived as very honorable. However, all of them emphasize that 
forgiveness is an individual process and that no one can forgive in the name of 
somebody else. In addition, they underscore that forgiveness requires true repentance by 
those who conducted war crimes and that forgiving makes sense only when asked to 
forgive. Some of them argue that forgiveness without repentance as promoted by 
Christian theology is not based in Islam. A more detailed discussion on forgiveness can 
be found in the section “Religious Values and Other Principles”.  
Victimization, Rehumanization and Accommodation of Identity 
 In Srebrenica and Bratunac imams depict Bosnian Muslims as the main victims 
of war more readily than in other cities. They do not see Serbs as victims of the war but 
                                                 




as perpetrators and bystanders. The imam in Bratunac describes Bosniaks as the 
historical victims and Serbs as the perpetrators throughout history:  
 throughout generations we have the same people killing people from the same 
 houses and families. We as responsible human beings have to stop this and we do 
 everything so that new generations of Bosniaks do not experience what is 
 happening through generations. In 120 years they have gone through the same 
for  several times. It is the duty of all of us, Bosniaks throughout the world and those 
 here, that new generations do not experience the same things.262 
 Imams in these cities see reconciliation as a means to ensure the “survival of 
Bosniaks” in these territories rather than as a model for building relationships. A reason 
for this is certainly that these are the two cities that have experienced the greatest 
damage in human lives and material destruction during the last war. In the cities of 
Prozor, Orašje, Kiseljak and Banja Luka the sufferings of one’s own people are 
described but at the same time the losses of the other ethnic group are mentioned. They 
also acknowledge that the other side has suffered, that individuals from the Bosnian 
Muslim community have also done crimes and that everyone, no matter from what 
ethnic group should be taken to the court if responsible.  
 While describing the atrocities and losses all imams are careful to make a 
difference between perpetrators and those who are not engaged in the crimes. Thus, they 
do not describe the Serbian/Croat people as genocidal and they do not generalize the 
crimes of individuals to the whole community. No matter what individuals have done, 
the whole community must not be blamed.  
 If a person has done crimes or something that is wrong then it is different, you 
 should  isolate him. But you cannot characterize a whole nation based on your 
 opinion about a few of them. I advise them to be a good human, to be just and I 
 tell them that if the person has not done anything wrong you cannot take away 
his  rights.263 
 They have never admitted that they have committed genocide but it is impossible 
 that a whole nation has committed genocide, it is always about individuals. It is 
 wrong to say that they are a genocidal people.264 
 We cannot generalize everything. I have witnessed that other people have 
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rescued  Bosniaks. That is why I say that not all Serbs are war criminals. There are 
humans  and non – humans. Some people are not conscious of this difference. But 
the deeds  of individuals belongs to them and not the whole community. Every war 
crime has  a name and surname. We have to nurture good relations among ourselves, 
we have  to live with each other, cooperate and help each other.265 
 They also acknowledge that many Serbs were manipulated by the Serbian media 
and politicians and deceived to go into war:    
 I know that the Serbian people were manipulated by the media that was 
 broadcasted by Serbs. I can tell this by the example of a woman from Orašje who 
 lived in Belgrade with her husband who was a Serb. She came after the war to 
 Orašje to visit her family. She did not let say that they started the war and that 
they  had to talk long with her to tell her our story. This is the result of the propaganda. 
 This propaganda presented us as the dark part of the war and presented us as the 
 war criminals who have supposedly killed and persecuted the Serbs and 
destroyed  their churches. All their war crimes they have ascribed to us. In this way 
they  created a misguided mass. Slowly this will go away.266 
 Rehumanizing, which is giving back human characteristics the one who was my 
enemy during the conflict, is an important aspect in the process of reconciliation. The 
interviews that I have conducted show a mixed account of the rehumanization of the 
other ethnic/religious group. I will give two examples that are at two extremes. In the 
city of Bratunac the imam compares and contrasts the Muslim population, religion and 
history to the Serbian people, religion and history. Thereby he presents Islam and 
Muslims in very positive terms and Serbs in negative terms: the Serbian Orthodox 
Church misuses religion, they did not help us during the war as our people helped them, 
and he gives an examples of the war events where 40 children were killed in the 
kindergarten by the Serbian army. He also asks: 
 why do they not tell me where the mass graves are? The communal utility was 
 involved in this. Everyone knows this. Why do they not tell us where they have 
 buried them? Why do we have to pay a Serb to tell us where our fathers are 
buried?  Is this human, that he asks for money to tell us where they are buried? 
This is not  civilized.267  
 The imam in Bratunac argues that all the Serbs know what happened during the 
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war but do not want to acknowledge the crimes or help them find those Bosniaks who 
are missing. In contrast to this, the imam in Banja Luka perceives and depicts the 
Bosnian Serbs of his city in very positive terms. He gives several instances in which his 
Serbian neighbors show compassion and care for their fellow Muslim citizens. 
 We have a lot of beautiful things going on. When for example a Serb comes and 
 gives us a Qur’an. He says that the Qur’an was given to him by his neighbor who 
 has left the holy book with him, so that he preserves it. After 20 years he has 
come  to give us this Qur’an or for example a prayer rug. They show that they care. Or 
 for example they come and say that they have cried the day (that the Ferhadija 
was  opened). They, the Orthodox, say we are happy because today a part of us has 
 returned. Because the Ferhadija is the symbol of our city, of our life. Everything 
 started at the Ferhadija, we would meet at the Ferhadija and everything would 
start  from the Ferhadija.268       
 When it comes to the “accommodation of identity” as was discussed by Herbert 
Kelman, I will mention two examples that positively surprised me. The first is the 
example of an imam in Srebrenica who said that the Serbian, Croat and Macedonian folk 
dance are dances of the local region and that one of his daughters dances the Serbian and 
the other the Bosniak dance. This is an excellent example of how this imam has included 
the other in his own identity. He does not neglect the Serbian heritage but regards it as 
the heritage of his country and his people:  
 One of my daughters was playing the Bosniak folk dance and my other daughter 
 the Serbian dance. And people from outside would be very surprised when they 
 see my daughter dancing the Serbian dance. These are all dances of our region, 
 this is our culture, all the Serbian, Croat, Bosniak and Macedonian dance. This 
 was perfect.269 
 The other example of how an imam accommodated the identity of his Croat 
fellow citizens in his own identity is from Orašje. I originally visited Orašje to interview 
the local imam about the reconciliation process between the Bosnian Muslims and the 
Bosnian Croats. But in our conversation he would use the pronoun “we” to refer to 
Bosniaks and Croats and “they” when he talked about the Serbs in the next village. So 
while I prepared myself to evaluate the reconciliation process between Bosnian Muslims 
and Croats, the imam from the very beginning understood that the reconciliation process 
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under discussion was between the residents of Orašje and the Serbs in the next village. 
When I asked him in more detail he answered the following:     
 “We” always have been ‘we’. I just have given you the example of the mosque. I 
 say “we” because we never experienced inconveniences from Croats even during 
 the war. During the war I also regularly met with the Catholic priest and they are 
 very welcoming. We do not meet so often nor are we so close to each other but 
we  live here together, sometimes sit down and drink coffee and we have no 
problems.  They never made any problems as the majority population to us. And no 
one of  them ever has done anything to our women. We felt secure and no one was afraid 
 of being here.270 
 3.3.2. Reconciliation Acts 
 I categorize reconciliatory activities that were mentioned by the interviewed 
imams into three distinct groups according to what kind of focus the imams had in their 
approach to reconciliation. Their efforts are oriented towards the individual believer/the 
community, the communication between the groups or the structure in their society. 
Each approach will be explained in more detail in the following.  
 Those imams who stress that individuals are the focus of their attention 
understand that the obstacles to reconciliation and harmonious coexistence are found in 
the deeds and thoughts of individuals. Because the individuals do not apply to moral 
standards problems occur and persist. Therefore, their mission is to improve the 
understanding of religion and it correct application in the community. The second 
category of imams understands that the improvement of dialogue and communication 
between the two communities is crucial for peace and reconciliation. They point out that 
lack of communication, dialogue, and unbiased knowledge of the other maintain the 
unwanted status quo. The third category of imams claims that political and economic 
structures hinder peacebuilding and reconciliation. According to what kind of problem 
the imams define as most pressing and urgent they apply different reconciliatory 
activities. It does not mean that all imams focus only on one type of problem and 
therefore fall in one of these categories, but often their focus on one issue let them apply 
one particular kind of activity.  
                                                 




1. Individual – Oriented Reconciliation Strategies  
 As mentioned the imams who understand that individual believers should be the 
focus of attention in reconciliation therefore apply strategies that are aimed to contribute 
to the personal development of their coreligionists as individuals and as a community. 
Improvement of the personal religious life is related to better intercommunal relations as 
this quote from the imam in Banja Luka illustrates:  
 My Leitmotif is the following. A good believer, no matter if he is a Jew, 
Christian  or Muslim cannot do any evil to another person. The cure is that you 
neighbor has  faith. If your neighbor is a believer everything can be handled. When I 
say believer  I think that the Christian and Jew are also believers. I do not enter into 
theological  discussions, but he believes in God. That is why believers are brothers. 
However  believes in one God we need to respect and accept him and be friends 
with each  other. We should not feel threatened by these people. Faith should be a 
kind of  indicator about the neighborhood you are in.271  
 Imams in this category stress the importance of religious education and teaching 
their own children from an early age about other nations and religions in a “right” and 
“healthy” way. Also, they argue that it is important to include other children and explain 
Islam to the children of other faiths. Another individuals – focused reconciliation 
strategy is to encourage the members of their local religious community to personally 
develop and change their own perspectives and attitudes. In addition to this, they argue 
that it is important for the process of reconciliation that they as leaders of their religious 
community lead with good example. An important other type of reconciliation strategy 
is that they emphasize the importance of good neighborhood relations and the 
universality and inclusiveness of Islam during the khutba.  
a) Religious Education  
 The imam in Banja Luka pays a lot of attention to educating the children in a 
way that they will respect other faiths and their neighbors.   
 We went with our children in the kindergarten to visit an Orthodox and Catholic 
 Church. This cannot be foreign to our children. That they have passed by the 
 church and do not know how it looks like inside. In this way we learn our 
children  to cherish, respect and accept each other. This is our tradition and this is 
                                                 




the way  we have lived. A church, mosque, synagogue is part of me. I have grown 
up next  to them. It is important for us to teach our children and teach other 
children. We  had a war here and it is difficult to get rid of this toxin in the older 
generations. If  you poison a child from the very beginning then maybe will grow 
up prepared for  worse things. Our children have to grow up in a healthy 
environment and healthy  thoughts. We hope that our children will in this way with 
this approach learn that  every human is important regardless of who he is. When 
our children learn that  every human should be accepted and respected as he is we 
will have a healthy  society. Until then we have a lot of work to do.272  
 Educating children from other religious groups is also important: “We have a lot 
of visits by children who are Orthodox coming as groups from schools and it is 
important for us that they have a good impression of what they see here. This is their 
first encounter with Islam.”273 
b) Personal Improvement of Every Believer  
 A different method through which imams aim to change the society and 
contribute to reconciliation is by altering attitudes of their coreligionist.    
 We have here a very young religious community. 90% of people are young 
people.  I try to  talk with them and advise them how to live their lives and that do 
not get involved with the wrong people. I tell them that they would find a problem in a 
 night club at 11 o’clock even with a Bosniak, you do not need to go to a night 
club  in a place where 90% are Catholics to find a problem. So we try to educate the 
 members of our community about religion, through the work in the maktab, in 
the  school education, tomorrow when they grow up that they know how to behave.274 
 I advise them to care for them. They ask me: “Can I go to their funeral?” Of 
course  I say they are not going to become Christians if they go to a funeral. You are not 
 becoming a Christian but a better man because you went for your neighbor. 
When  your neighbor needs help you have to help him because the neighbor has big 
 importance in the life of a Muslim.275 
 Giving advice and religious guidance are methods that imams, as leaders of their 
religious communities, use to improve the religious life, attitudes, and behavior of their 
coreligionists. This religious guidance contributes to more respectful behavior towards 
fellow citizens. 
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c) Providing Personal Example  
 The imams mention as well that they are responsible in the way their 
coreligionists behave: “It is very important how an imam deals with his jamah and other 
people who are not in the jamah and are not of the same religion. People look at our 
example and behave accordingly and experience Islam through us.”276 Thus, imams, 
fully aware of the importance of their own conduct and its impact on the believers, aim 
to influence the way their coreligionists behave and think towards the religious/ethnic 
other through their personal example and behavior towards other religious/ethnic groups.  
d) The Messages of the Khutba  
 Another individuals-oriented tool to contribute to reconciliation and that was 
mentioned by imams is the Friday sermon. According to them the khutba is the most 
important channel to transmit the universal message of Islam to their communities.  
 We transmit the message of peace and the universal message through this 
medium.  We are explaining Islam and the Qur’an. The Qur’an is a universal book 
which  does not only belong to the Muslims but to all people. In the Qur’an Allah talks 
to  all people because there is often mention “O, people…” Through the Friday 
 sermon, our advices and personal example we transmit this Qur’an’s universal 
 message. People hear and accept this universality of Islam and know that Islam 
 does not only include a certain group of people but all humans regardless of faith 
 or nationality.277 
 Thus, through this regular public preaching imams aim to transmit values 
important for harmonious coexistence and future reconciliation.   
2. Communication – Oriented Reconciliation Strategies   
 Imams utilizing this type of strategy explain that their focus in contributing to 
reconciliation is in improving communications, participating in common meetings, 
symposiums and manifestations. The silence that exists between the communities is an 
obstacle for true reconciliation. Imams who see this as the main obstacle to genuine 
reconciliation try to establish meaningful contact with members of the other community 
either through interaction with the other religious leader or the members of the other 
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religious community.  
a) Daily Communication and Personal Relationships 
 Personal relationships between the imams and the other religious community 
members are perceived as very important and high on the agenda.   
 I know every Serb in the town and all of them know me. And with all of them I 
 have at least drunk a coffee. With many of them I drink coffee at the daily basis 
 and among them, I do not want to mention names maybe they do not like it, I 
 have some really good friends. With several of them I meet weekly, with one 
Serb  I play tennis and meet daily with him. I know hundreds of Serbs who in the 
 beginning did not want to talk with me at all but today they are my friends. I did 
 not do this through talk but through personal example. We had no opportunity to 
 talk, but through my personal example in daily situations they started to 
 communicate with me, to open up and talk. In this way the prejudice they had 
 towards me has gone, and we continue to talk with each other.278 
 By way of their personal example and personal interaction with the members of 
the other group imams aim to open new communication channels and reduce tension and 
biases. In addition to their personal efforts to establish meaningful communication and 
intercommunal relations, imams also encourage their coreligionists to communicate with 
their neighbors and help each other:  
 We should not allow ourselves that we talk about how nice we should be towards 
 our neighbors and at the same time build a wall of five meters height. We invest 
a  lot into the walls and fences and less in the human interaction. When we have 
 healthy relationships we do not need fences. I advise my community member 
that  the neighbor is holy and that they should build good relationships with them. 
 Sometimes a neighbor will help you before anyone else. For us Bosnian 
 Muslims the neighborhood was always holy. I tell them to return to this and 
 practice this.279   
b) Meetings with Religious Leaders  
 According to all interviewed imams equally important for reconciliation is the 
regular communication with the leaders of the other religious community. In Orašje and 
Prozor imams have personal or institutional communication with other religious leaders: 
 Well, we do not have a cooperation on the administrative level, we do not 
organize  seminars or symposiums. But we drink coffee on the daily basis. We do 
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not have  an official communication. But for example I have been with the priest in 
Rumbuci  a few nights before and I stayed with him almost the whole night. This is 
very  normal. We have a good communication and we sit down and drink coffee all 
 the time. For example, the priest came recently here to the mosque and we play 
 billiard together. For our people it is very normal because they see us interacting 
 on the daily basis. For example, recently the two of us… we walk almost every 
 night between evening and night prayer a few rounds around the city, the priest 
 waits for me at the church after the evening prayer and then we make our rounds. 
 After that we usually go to drink a coffee in a motel that is close to here and that 
 has a coffee as well. But we do a lot together, me and the priest. It has also effect 
 on the  people around us.280 
  In Kiseljak the imam reported that he invests a lot of efforts to realize some kind 
of communication with other religious leaders:       
 A month after I was appointed as the chief imam in the majlis of Kiseljak which 
 was in  September 2015 I went to the Church together with the president of the 
 majlis. We went there to talk with them, to drink some coffee. We want to relax 
 the life in Kiseljak and we want to have cooperation. I have invited them to come 
 and see us so that we can start with some kind of cooperation. This has not yet 
 happened. I did the first step. Then a young Franciscan invited me and some of 
my  colleagues to a celebration dinner. There were around 2000 of the representatives 
 of the Catholic Church and we were there in our official religious clothing and I 
 have even had a speech. I have also suggested to the mayor that he  invites all the 
 religious leaders of the communities present in the municipality of Kiselajk, 
 because we also have an Orthodox Church here so that we get to know each 
other.  I think that we do everything that we can to establish a contact. I also have been 
in  the Monastery as they are keeping the Firman of 1463 and the cloak of Sultan 
 Fatih. We have also invited them to the Milodraz, a conference that we are 
 organizing to remember the days of Firman.281   
 In Srebrenica, Bratunac and Banja Luka no communication exists between the 
religious institutions despite the fact that imams are willing to establish regular 
interaction with the Orthodox religious leaders.  
c) Organization of and Participation in Interreligious Dialogue  
 The interreligious dialogue was discussed in the previous chapter as an important 
tool that specifically religiously based actors can utilize. In cities in which religious 
leaders communicate with each other they have some form of organized interaction 
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among the communities. In Orašje the imam gives an example of how the groups from 
Orašje, Tolis and Zabar – Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox – organized an 
interreligious program for the broader community: 
 In Orašje we organized a meeting for all people here but we also went to that 
 village as well. We went together with the Croats to their [Serbian] village, 
Zabar.  They welcomed us and we visited first their local church. After that we had lunch 
 and a kind of meeting with them. And there was a number of youth and women 
 who would return with us to Orašje and visit our city. So these women for 
example  before the war visited every week the local market in Orašje, they bought 
there  what they needed, their children were going to school in Orašje and many of 
them  were employed here. After the war they never came and we also never went to 
 their village. When we arrived at Orašje we also first visited the mosque and for 
 most of them it was the first time that they visited a mosque. So we also went to 
 the Catholic Church and after that we visited Tolis. After that we had dinner in a 
 big saloon with a capacity of 500 people here in Orašje. We had a nice meeting. 
 We sang, danced and talked together. With respect that it was the first time, the 
 people and youth easily harmonized. Later it would repeat.282 
 This and similar meetings between people who have shoot at one another are 
important and necessary if they are to live in peace with each other in the future. It can 
be noticed from this quote that the interreligious dialogue is an interaction as individuals 
as is considered specifically important by Bernstein for the success of the encounter.283 
These meetings open the space and offer the general population opportunities to open up 
and share thoughts, feelings and experiences. As was reported by the imam, the program 
offered some participants for the first time to visit the city they used to travel to 
frequently. These projects are crucial channels and one of the best strategies for 
peacebuilding and reconciliation as they give opportunity for participants to build 
relationships, rehumanize and change personal attitudes.284      
3. Structure – Oriented Reconciliation Strategies  
 Imams who focus on structural reforms within their communities argue that 
unjust economic structures and political institutions are the main obstacle to true 
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reconciliation. They understand that economic and political factors have important 
effects on the road reconciliation is going to take. The imam from Bratunac argues: 
“Who gives the people salary and money has the opportunity to direct all processes and 
thoughts of people. I think that the economy has the primary role in reconciling people. 
Existence is giving the direction.”285  He also asserts that imams need to be political 
actors, involved in political processes and positive changes. Both imams in Srebrenica 
that I have interviewed were involved in the politics of their local community. This 
group perceives that better institutions are the primary way through which they can act 
on the reconciliation process at the local level. This can be linked to what was 
previously discussed by David Little. In his opinion one role of religious actors in 
peacebuilding is institutions and capacity building. Acting in this way they design and 
create institutions and engage in practices that enforce social harmony and civil unity 
over hostility and violence.286 Building capacities means that they teach other individuals 
about these principles. These interviews present that imams were building institutions 
that encourage unity and harmony. Some of the imams have actually acted while other 
plan to put these ideas into action.       
a) Open Institutions 
 An excellent example of institution-building efforts comes from Banja Luka. The 
imams reported that the ICBH has opened a kindergarten that is open to all children. On 
purpose the founders did not include any religious content in the daily program of the 
kindergarten so that it would not discourage Orthodox residents to enroll their children:  
 We have opened a kindergarten and one third of this children are Orthodox 
 children. It is  based on halal diet and it is open to everyone. We opened this 
 kindergarten with a diet plan that suits our Muslim customs but we do not have 
 any religious content. Religious content is in the mektab. People have recognized 
 that the diet plan is good and that it is healthy and they have no problem to enroll 
 their children here. Even if the founder of the institution is the ICBH. We plan to 
 open other education institutions as well.287  
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 It needs to be note that project of this scale require high levels of financial 
support. In the case of Banja Luka the kindergarten was supported by the Islamic 
Community. Otherwise, in Banja Luka and in other places it would have been 
impossible to establish such an institution. Another example where imams from Banja 
Luka have included other religious groups in their activities is the following:  
 During the last two Eid days we build up a small theme park for our children to 
 amuse  themselves a bit. Last year we announced that the park is open to all 
 children. And many children who are not Muslims came with their parents. They 
 wanted to pay but we explained that the Islamic Community is organizing it for 
 the children because of Eid and that nobody has to pay. A woman came and she 
 was so thankful. She said that she has three children and that she had no money 
to  offer them this. And she said that today we have fulfilled her children’s dream. A 
 lot of people came. This has left such a positive effect on all the people. It was a 
 very small gesture but they can help us in creating a harmonious environment.288 
 Like the previous example of an open institution this also signifies to the other 
religious/ethnic group that the Islamic community is an open community, ready to 
receive others and welcome them in their midst. 
b) Common Cultural Activities  
 In other cities the imams together with other religious leaders organized activities 
that bring communities together. In the city of Orašje Catholic religious leaders together 
with the imam organized an exhibition of handicraft, a poetry night and a night of music. 
In Srebrenica, however, the citizens united and established a mixed folklore association 
named “Vasa Jovanovic”. While active the association counted fifty members, Bosniak 
and Serb children, and had international appearances. Common cultural activities, of 
which imams are part, contribute to more frequent encounter and hopefully to deeper 
understanding in the future. Thus, among other institution-and-capacity building 
activities shared cultural activities have an important role. 
c) Open Mosque 
 Another crucial aspect of the structural approach to reconciliation are open 
religious objects. Imams in Banja Luka and Bratunac reported that they organize open 
                                                 




days and specifically in Banja Luka imams welcome frequently Orthodox visitors: 
 What I find interesting and what I have witnessed myself is the great number of 
 visitors to the Ferhadija Mosque by Catholics and Orthodox Christians. People 
 who believe and practice their religion. They come with a certain image of 
 Muslims and Islam. But after they see a mosque from inside, see what real Islam 
 is and what Muslims do, they leave with a different opinion and they are often 
very  fascinated. I have witnessed these situations. I think that the mere presence of the 
 mosque contributes to the improvement of the relationship between the people 
 here in Banja Luka. I think that the mosque in itself is a transmitter of peace.289  
 As the imam already indicated, open religious institutions can serve to correctly 
educate and reduce biases.   
d) Economic Cooperation  
 Other imams argue that the most important structural activities that they perform 
for the sake of future reconciliation are economic.  
 We have managed to bring ROBOT markets and the BBI bank to this town. 
 We started to sell agricultural products. But we have also started to open 
 different services. We opened a car mechanic service. Almost all kinds of 
services  we have here in Bratunac. If we do not create anything here in the eastern 
part of  Bosnia there is no perspective for Serbs nor Bosniaks. Who controls the 
economy,  controls the minds of people.290  
 At a smaller scale imams from Banja Luka report that they have opened a gift 
shop which acts as:  
 an opportunity for all the citizens of Banja Luka to cooperate with each other. 
We  cooperate with them in all possible ways. We want to be citizens of this city and 
 we want to be equal to all others. But nothing will happen if we do not do it 
 ourselves and if we do not raise our voice.291  
 3.3.3. Religious Values and Other Principles  
 In our discussion in section 2.3. on the characteristics and strengths religious 
peacebuilding and peacemakers have, compared to other peacebuilding approaches, we 
explained that peacebuilding by religious peacemakers involves special resources and 
values. These values and resources are important motivations for religious actors and 
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encourage them to act in ways that will contribute to peacebuilding. Not only that these 
values encourage imams to act in a certain way, but imams also teach others in their 
community to adopt these values and apply them in their life. Abu – Nimer mentioned 
several Islamic values that can be utilized for peacebuilding. This section enlists the 
religious values imams from the six Bosnian cities included in this research mentioned. 
Most of these values overlap with Abu – Nimer’s list that constitute a framework of 
peacemaking and non – violence in Islam. The following are some of the most important 
values and principles imams mentioned that guide them in their daily work and their 
reconciliation efforts.      
1. The Holiness of the Neighborhood 
 The concept of the neighborhood traditionally is highly respected in the Bosnian 
society. The imams I interviewed consider respect a special care for one’s neighbor no 
matter of what creed as a principal that is based in Islamic teachings:   
 The Prophet said: Your neighbor, your neighbor, your neighbor. I advise them 
that  a neighbor is holy. We talk a lot about religion but we should show in practice 
 what religion is all about. If my neighbor is sick I should ask if he needs 
 something.292  
2. Pluralism is a Wealth 
 The imams pointed out that pluralism – religious, national or ethnic – is the 
“destiny” of Bosnia and that accepting this fact is unavoidable. Besides this, they see 
pluralism as an opportunity and an enrichment. The following quote illustrates how the 
imam in Orašje thinks about the presence of the religious/ethnic other in midst of the 
Bosnian war:   
 In 1994 a European delegation came with 7 bishops and a Jew from Brussel and 
 an Orthodox archbishop from Vienna. And they visited many places throughout 
 Bosnia. They asked me for the situation in Orašje, about the people and about 
 reconciliation. I told them that every person is unique and that everyone has his 
 own skills and capacities. No one can replace the other. I told them to imagine a 
 garden with flowers and every flower is nice in its own way. Every of them adds 
 to the beauty of the garden. If there were only roses in the garden, who are said 
to  be the queens among the flowers, it would be very monotonous. It is better that 
                                                 




we  have a garden full of different flowers. The same is with us people. It does not 
 matter if someone is an Orthodox Serb, Catholic Christian or Bosnian Muslim. It 
 does not matter, we are all humans.”293  
3. Special Bond Between the People of the Book 
 The imams point to the special bond between the Abrahamic religions which is a 
principle that encourage them to establish communication and engage in common 
activities. The imam in Bratunac states that the following verse is a motto guiding him in 
his daily activities: “The Qur’anic verse says ‘O People of the Scripture, come to a word 
that is equitable between us and you (3:64)”294 Similarly, the imam in Orašje says: “We 
have a lot of Qur’anic principles that advise us to gather around the common word, to 
advise each other and talk with each other etc. these are universal principles that we all 
have to take care of.”295 
4. Do Good (Khayr) and Be an Example in Goodness  
 Another values that was included by Abu Nimer in his framework of non-
violence and peacebuilding in Islam is the principle of doing khayr: 
 Our religion teaches us to be an example in all aspects of our life. We should be 
 good examples in our belief, the practicing of our belief, daily encounters, in all 
 aspects of life  and among other things it advises that we should behave nice to 
our  neighbors.296 
5. Respect others and Give Them their Rights  
 According to the imam in Orašje explains that according to the Islamic teachings 
God has given to everyone certain rights and that believers need to respect those rights 
regardless of the context. In the context of post – conflict Bosnia and the reconciliation 
process he states that a believer must follow these guidelines given by God.  
 The question here is not about loving or not loving someone. The crucial 
question  is to give the person who is in front of you the right that belongs to him. 
The crucial  point under this topic is to establish human relations and to give people 
the  opportunity for what God has given them rights and what He commands us to do. 
 We have to value and respect people because they are humans. Value him as a 
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 human and give him his right but the question of whether you like him is not 
 important.297 
 Thus, even if it is difficult and hard to deal with those who have been your 
enemies during the conflict, Islam requires that individuals respect every human being 
and fulfill their duties towards others. The following Islamic values are particularly 
important in the way that the past is remembered and dealt with. Imams inspired by 
these values can provide alternative interpretations that make more sense to religious 
men and women who have lost family members.  
6. No Revenge 
 Revenge is not approved of as an option to deal with the past by imams that I 
have interviewed. Instead, imams follow and preach that patience and forgiving is better 
than revenge:  
 Respecting the Qur’anic instruction to accept people as they are, as members of 
 other religion, and respecting the practice of our Prophet and the Qur’anic verse 
 that we do not  have a right for revenge, we have a right for revenge but we are 
 advised that it is better to forgive and be patient.298 
 Imams underscore that God is merciful and that believers should internalize this 
attribute in dealing with the past: “Forgiving is human. Look how God is merciful to 
humans, despite everything that they are doing. He created us, why should we not 
forgive?”299 Similarly, in Banja Luka the imam explains that the hope of every believer 
is that God will be merciful when it comes to one’s own wrongful acts. He adds that 
God has given to human beings this ability to forgive and that believers should be aware 
of it and apply it.300 The imam in Bratunac states that he is encouraging others to forgive: 
“I am maybe not the one who has right to forgive in someone’s name, but I will always 
encourage others through my lecture and by personal example that those who forgive are 
better.”301 However, imams emphasize that full forgiveness should be realized only after 
repentance and they point out that forgiving should never be equated with forgetting:  
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 Forgiving for the sake of reconciliation, yes. But forgiveness that will lead to 
 forgetting, never. What has happened to the Bosniaks should never be forgotten. 
 They started to say: what happened, happened. Even if we are not going to 
progress  a centimeter, we should never forget. I will always be the one who offers 
his hand  to the others.302 
 My personal opinion is that we do not have to forgive someone who has done 
 crimes and not repented nor should we ever forget. If someone repents he asks 
for  forgiveness and gets the opportunity to be forgiven. Everyone can make mistakes 
 but if he does not repent he shows that he is ready to this again in the future. It 
 makes no sense to forgive someone who has not asked for forgiveness.303  
7. Absolute Justice is in the Afterlife 
 In their interpretation of justice, imams utilize what Santa – Barbara calls 
“metaphysical retribution”304, i.e. God will punish wrongs in the afterlife justly. While 
justice is important and needs to be realized, a more satisfactory version of justice awaits 
believers in the afterlife:   
 A believer is well aware that absolute justice is with God and that he judges 
justly.  He judges according to what is right. There is no punishment on earth that can 
 bring a mother any satisfaction. Even if the person is punished with hundred 
years  of prison or even if he gets the death penalty. This will not give this mother any 
 satisfaction, it will not bring back her child. But it is important to have this 
earthly  satisfaction. Everyone strives to see that justice is satisfied but he is also 
aware  that absolute justice is with God.305  
8. Give Meaning to the Past and Sufferings  
 In their work and engagement with the members of their communities imams 
often discuss the past. I asked the imams how their community should remember the war 
and how they as religious leaders help them deal with the losses. Imams pointed out that 
religion is the force that keeps people endure these losses and gives them hope for the 
future. They, as religious leaders, aim to interpret the past and the sufferings in the light 
of religious texts and in this way reduce the burden and pain.          
 We try to explain to people that what has happened can either be a punishment 
for  what we have done or a trail from God to see how we will act. Everyone has 
 individually to ask themselves whether it is a punishment or a trail. Whether he is 
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 already doing good and this is another trail to prove himself or is it a punishment 
 for wrong acts that he has done. We try to direct their thoughts in this way.306  
 I am often in such a situation to talk with people who have lost their family 
 members. Just  recently I was in the situation to talk with a mother who has lost 
her  family members. I advise them to make invocation. I advise them to be patient 
and  to hope for paradise together with their martyrs. This kind of life filled with 
belief  makes this mother happy to wait for her return to her Lord and to her son. In 
 this way even though she has lost her son, she is honored to be a mother of a 
 martyr. We know at what kind of level the mother of a martyr is, that her son has 
 the right to shefaat, and in what way she is honored.307 
 Specifically in the second example it becomes clear how religious beliefs give 
meaning to the losses and relieve sufferings of a mother who has lost her son during the 
war.   
 3.3.4. Obstacles 
 I observed that more obstacles and context specific difficulties were mentioned 
by imams who live in the Serb Republic. All imams living and working in the Serb 
Republic report that they have unstable and fragile contact with the religious leaders of 
the Church but good and stable relations with the general Serb population. They state 
that the main obstacle for better communication and dialogue are the strong hierarchy in 
the Orthodox Church that controls all the actions of the local priests and a leadership that 
ignores common projects and inhibits already established projects. Discrimination in 
education and employment are as well mentioned frequently as obstacles to an advance 
in the reconciliation process. More general obstacles mentioned to the progress in 
reconciliation were politics, media, fear for existence and lack of knowledge about the 
other.  
 An important observation is that in general the imams who I have interviewed 
were very positive and optimistic in their perception of the relationship and 
reconcilability between the general population, i.e. members of the different religious 
communities but less optimistic about the institutional communication. This can be 
particularly observed in cities where the Serbian population is in majority. In the Serb 
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Republic between the religious representatives of the ICBH and the Serbian Orthodox 
Church there is a total lack of dialogue. In these same cities imams report that they have 
stable communication and relations with the general Serb population. The complete 
avoidance of dialogue and communication, even negligence is typical in all cities of 
Serb Republic. The reasons for a poor interreligious dialogue in this entity is attributed 
by the imams to the hierarchical structure, a lack of interest by the leadership of the SOC 
and general political circumstances that influence this process. In Srebrenica and 
Bratunac the ICBH initiated activities which were not answered by the other side. In the 
majority Croat cities the communication between religious leaders was reported to be 
very stable. However, in the city of Kiseljak imams reported a lack of vivid 
communication between religious institutions, too. In contrast to other majority Croat 
cities in Kiseljak the communication is weak.    
 The obstacles for better communication and reconciliation mention by imams in 
Serb Republic are the hierarchy and leadership of the Orthodox Church that hinder or 
obstruct interreligious communication and common projects as well as the political 
situation and human rights violations in Serb Republic. 
1. Obstacles Specific to the Serb Republic 
a) Hierarchy in the Serbian Orthodox Church  
 All imams living in the Serb Republic and imams who have direct contact with 
the Serbian Orthodox Church mention that the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church is reluctant to communicate with them and that it forbids local priests to 
establish communication with local imams.  
 They have a huge centralization in their Church and they do not have any 
freedom  to act. We have invited the local Orthodox priest to our meetings not as a 
religious  leader but a civil person but he said that he is not allowed and that there 
would be  harsh repercussions if they found out that he came. The ordinary 
Orthodox priest  have no problems with it and they would like to participate in our 
activities but  they are not allowed to. What I would like to emphasize is that every one 
of us in  the religious community has their own superiors and they are directing 




 freedom and space to act.308  
 I will tell you an example from Bosanski Brod (where he used to work before). I 
 went to one of my friends and colleagues who works as an Orthodox priest there. 
 I wanted to invite him to the opening of the Ferhadija mosques. And he told me 
in  tears that he would like to come but that he cannot. He said that I should send 
him  an invitation and he will respond that he is busy. Thus, the situation is very 
 complex.309     
b) The Leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church  
 Other imams give examples of the leaders of the Orthodox Church who hinder 
cooperation. In Srebrenica the two imams explicitly mention the local religious leader 
from the Orthodox Church as an obstacle to communication. 
 I would like if we had a cooperation with the Orthodox Church but we do not 
have.  It was  better during the mandate of the last Orthodox priest, but the new one is 
 very nationalistic. With him all common projects and cooperation have stopped. 
 He is very nationalistic and he does not allow any common project and destroys 
 every new attempt.”310  
 You have a pope who darns everyone who wants peace and coexistence. He 
writes  about it and publishes it. Whenever he sees that something normal is going on, 
he  destroys it. We had a folklore association and even its name was “Vasa 
Jovanovic”  and there were Bosniak and Serb children together, around fifty children. 
But when  this pope came he notices our activities and he established an exclusively 
Serbian  folklore association. And he transferred all the Serbian children to this 
new  association, made a one – national association. We also have the situation that 
 when in schools the new staff is elected an Orthodox priest has condemned 
 publicly via his facebook account all those Serbs who have voted for the Bosniak 
 teachers. All these are messages that complicate interaction, trust – building and 
 coexistence in this territory.311 
 Similarly, in Bratunac the imam mentions that the Orthodox Church ignores 
invitations to common projects. The imam interprets this reluctance to participate in 
common projects as disrespectful to the Muslim population and the goal of creating a 
shared future. 
 The American organization Pro – Life organizes every year a competition on 
 multi-confession and multi-culturalism. We have always answered this call. 
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 Unfortunately, our colleagues from the Orthodox Church, our neighbors have not 
 appeared to this session. Just to show with their presence that they are for this 
 project, it would for the beginning be enough.312 
 In Orašje the imam thinks that because of the close relationship between the 
Orthodox Church and the political establishment the Church ignores common projects. 
He notes that recently the representatives of the SOC have stopped responding 
completely to invitations for shared projects. 
 I think that the Orthodox Church is also involved in the politics and that they 
 continue to have this dream of Greater Serbia. I have the feeling that several 
 religious leaders of the Orthodox Church strive to contribute to the separation of 
 Serb Republic and that their cooperation or as now their non-cooperation in the 
 activities of the Interreligious Council follows this main goal. The Orthodox 
 Church is an agent in this as well. The Church is connected to the Serbian state 
 and the Church leaders have this intention. But I think that the ordinary priest are 
 open and willing to cooperate and meet.313  
c) Political Issues and Violations of Basic Human Rights 
 The imams notice that it is meaningless to talk about reconciliation in settings 
where the most basic laws and human rights are violated. In Bratunac the imam points to 
unlawful actions:  
 Churches are built upon waqif and private property. One church was built in the 
 yard of Fata Orlovic. It is illegally built. We cannot speak of religious and 
cultural  plurality. However, even though the International Community acted until 
these  days we have  this Church. We cannot do anything. They are still waiting for 
 something. Bosniaks in the Republika Srpska do not have their basic rights such 
 as the right on property, employment, freedom of expression and life.”314  
 In addition to this, the imam in Srebrenica points out: “In Srebrenica we also 
have in schools the language of the Bosniak people, they do not accept the Bosnian 
language.”315 And the other imam emphasizes that since the Serbian party got majority in 
the municipality the communication has even become worse: 
 Interfaith communication and cooperation is very low. This is especially felt now 
 in the situation where Bosniaks have lost in the last local elections. The daily 
 power demonstration they show is very negative and very terrifying. Even things 
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 that are not in the domain of the Orthodox Church their representatives are 
 involved in. For example it was previously not practiced that the Orthodox take 
 part in a liturgy, make a tour through Srebrenica with crosses, icons of the 
 Orthodox Church, the Serbian garb, Church banners and etc. This kind of 
 performances was unknown in Srebrenica.316 
 It can be concluded from what has been said so far that in the Serb Republic 
because of the difficult political structure and discrimination in school and employment, 
imams have additional hurdles to overcome on their way to reconciliation. Thus, the 
imams report that it is extremely difficult to strive for such a complex social change, as 
reconciliation is, when most basic rights are denied. Other obstacles mentioned by 
imams in Federation and Serb Republic alike were politics, media, fear for existence and 
lack of knowledge of each other.   
2. More General Obstacles 
a) Political Leaders 
 Imams point out that the political elites make local situation and reconciliation 
more difficult but that ordinary people want all peace and harmony. One imam even 
says: “This is a struggle between good and evil, or put differently between the ordinary 
people with the political institutions which do not want change.”317                         
 If there were no politicians we would very easily solve our issues. The ordinary 
 people  they all want the same. But every election brings the same worries and 
 problems, the same negative rhetoric. We as an Islamic Community are trying 
not  to fall into this trap, we are trying to build relationships with our neighbors. This 
 human  interaction is very important. We need our government but we do not 
want  them to disturb what we have built. We ask them to consult with us and ask us 
for  our living conditions. But they visit us and leave us with problems and we who 
are  left behind have to deal with it. What we built for a decade they destroy it in one 
 day.318  
 It is a lot of easier when ordinary people talk with each other and when people 
who  believe talk with each other. They meet more frequently and talk more easily and 
 sincerely. They easily agree upon common things.319  
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b) Media Coverage 
 Imams identified the media as a big hurdle to peace and reconciliation because 
media coverage focuses on shocking and negative stories that will attract a lot of 
attention but pays no interest to positive stories. “Mass media is as it is. People are 
guided by emotions, usually by nationalism. They are guided by statements such as ‘they 
are a threat to you’. This is happening for 20 years, they are telling us this the whole 
time. Why?”320  
 One imam also contends that they as religious leaders are incapable of 
counteracting the powerful influence of the media in their communities: 
 I think that media is the greatest problem in this topic of reconciliation. Everyone 
 agrees  on the same point: that in the near future we will have war. They only 
 disagree in what extent and in what kind we will have war. If a person is 
 permanently surrounded by this of cause he will be afraid, the crimes are very 
 recent. I think that the media is creating the collective attitude. Unfortunately, 
our  people create their thought based on the TV and internet, he comes to the Friday 
 prayer to sleep.321 
c) Fear for Existence 
 Another important point is that people in many cities of Bosnia fear for their 
financial existence. This fear influences whom they are going to support and how they 
are going to act towards the other in their community. The imam from Banja Luka points 
out that everything depends on the financial security and existence: “If you fear for your 
existence nothing else can function. When people live at the edge of existence and when 
they get employment on the basis of their political affiliation, they stop to think with 
their own head.”322 Similarly, the imam in Bratunac states that “in this territory, who 
gives the people salary and money has the opportunity to direct these processes (of 
reconciliation) and thoughts of people.”323 
d) Lack of Knowledge 
 A central reason in poor interreligious communication is the lack of knowledge 
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about each other’s religion and religious practices. He is concerned about the ignorance 
and lack of interest of local people to learn more about their neighbors and links this 
attitude to the growth in prejudice and disrespect. 
 I think that one of the reasons for the current situation is that we generally do not 
 know each other to a necessary degree. I asked other imams and a lot of other 
 people if they know how the Catholic Church is organized. Nobody knew the 
 answer. It was awkward to me and at that moment I realized that we have no idea 
 about each other. We have the situation that people live 50 – 80 years here and 
do  not know the name of the Church. When people do not know elementary things, 
 you have to imagine how ignorant they are towards the other. Among these 
people  prejudice is common. It is a shame and it is really bad that I do not know the 
priest  of the Church next to our mosque and he also does not know me.324  
 Moreover, the imam in Bratunac pointed out that religious education at the 
Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo does not prepare its students enough for the 
settings in which Muslims live with other religious communities. He explains that during 
his higher education in Sarajevo he learned about Buddhism but nothing in more detail 
about the Orthodox Church that would be useful for his practical work in his city.     
 In addition to these obstacles that imams face, they also perceive that they are not 
supported enough by the ICBH when it comes to reconciliation. They point out that 
there is no strategy, guideline by intellectuals nor proper education about these theme at 
the Faculty of Islamic Sciences. 
 Table 3.3.1. and 3.3.2. offer a short overview of the responses by imams 
discussed above. 
Table 3.3.1.  Overview of Responses to questions on the Conceptualization of 
   Reconciliation, Forgiveness, Victimization and 
Rehumanization 
                                                 










Table 3.3.2.  Overview of Responses to questions about Reconciliation Activities, 
   Interreligious Dialogue and Obstacles 
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 3.3.5. Imams as Middle – Range Religious Leaders   
 I argued that the brief analysis of selected ICBH official statements and the 
“Platform for Dialogue” comply with the findings of Lasić, Kristić and Knežević and 
there conclusion that the religious leaders in general and Islamic leaders in particular 
should be more active when it comes to reconciliation. However, I assert that the official 
statement and public speeches of top – level leaders in the ICBH cannot be taken as the 
complete evaluation of all religious leaders in the Bosnian reconciliation process.  
Therefore, in addition to the official statement of the ICBH I chose to elaborate in this 
study the perspective and experiences of imams on the processes of peacebuilding and 
reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina because this specific category within the 
ICBH structure has a strategic position and a perspective that top – level leaders do not 
have. Further, they have specific strengths as religious peacemakers. 
 In the first place, imams have deeper insight and more intimate relationships with 
local communities because they operate at the most basic unit of the overall structure, 
the local religious community. What I have been arguing and what I sought to show with 
this research is that a bottom – up organic approach to reconciliation and peacebuilding, 
actively engaging local imams has a lot to offer to the peacebuilding and reconciliation 
efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Local religious leaders are the leaders who have 
insight in the local dynamics, can most effectively initiate dialogue among the 




that is not present in the official statements and activities of the ICBH. Additionally, 
because they live and work in proximity with Bosnian Croats and Serbs they are more 
sensitive to the issue of reconciliation. Thus, within the structure of the ICBH imams 
have the most direct influence and provide guidance for religious communities on the 
ground. They live with their community and share the same social and economic 
challenges and misgivings. The local imam is often responsible for a whole village and 
sometimes only for several hundred Muslim households in a bigger city. In this way 
cities have often multiple jamahs while villages fall under the responsibility of one 
religious leader and form one jamah.  
 Important to note is that imams chosen for this research are those who live in the 
city and have a higher function than an ordinary local imam. Most of my interviewees 
are the chief imam in their city which means that they are responsible for a number of 
other imams. At the same time it means that they have more connections to the higher 
structures and can more easily issue changes. Many of the imams pointed out that the 
position they have in the hierarchy of the ICBH gives them certain responsibilities but at 
the same time opportunities to act more freely and more effectively. Because of the 
connections and links to the higher structures of the ICBH the imam in Bratunac, for 
example, was able to attract a bank to open its office and a big market chain one of its 
markets in Bratunac. At the same time however the imams underline that they are free in 
their actions and do not have to ask for permission when they are called for a conference 
or meeting with the religious leaders of the other religious community.  
 Put into the perspective of Lederach’s model of peacebuilding actors and 
approaches we can define the imams in this study as middle – range leaders. This 
position allows them to act freely without pressure that top – level leaders experience. At 
the same time they benefit from direct connection with the upper level and have direct 
connection to the grassroots.  
 Further, the local imam has a variety of tools he can use to transmit the message 
of peace and reconciliation. His responsibilities include: leading the five prayers of the 
day, preparing and leading the Friday prayer, teaching children the reading/reciting of 




maktab), organize and perform other religious activities. Among his community 
members he enjoys respect, he is consulted in matters of religion and often for important 
life decisions. He is invited at the most far – reaching events such as funerals, marriage 
ceremonies and naming the newborn child. Imams living and working in municipalities 
which dominant residents are Bosnian Croats or Serbs face more challenges and 
responsibilities. In these areas they see themselves as protectors and defenders of the 
interest of the Bosniak people and hold themselves responsible for the economic 
development of the region. An indicator of the significant role imams have in these 
specific areas is that refugees would only return when the imam has previously returned. 
All these responsibilities and functions that the local imam fulfills, ensure a constant 
contact with the members of his local community and occasions to speak about 
reconciliation and the universal values of Islam supporting it.   
 Local imams are educated in the Islamic sciences and are representatives of the 
ICBH. This gives them the opportunity to act as religious peacemakers. They are aware 
of religious values, derive inspiration and legitimacy through religious principles, have 
authority, enjoy respect among their own community and can transcend the 
ethnical/religious divisions with their universal messages.      
 I see three particular reasons why imams within local communities do 
particularly well serve as religious peacemakers in the process of reconciliation. In the 
first place, imams enjoy a lot of trust within their religious communities and are often 
respected by the broader society. Religious leaders are listened to and their guidelines 
are respected. Because of this strategic position of religious actors they are well – 
equipped to lead and direct their coreligionists towards peace. With small personal acts 
religious leaders set examples for their religious community how to behave.   
 Based on the interviews we have reviewed in this chapter I conclude that imams 
have developed important strategies to unite and offer a space for reconciliation in their 
local communities. While the imams focus on different problems and developed 
different strategies all of the actions they undertake lead towards peace and 
reconciliation.    




community members. Religious education that emphasizes respect for the other and 
openness for different points of views and beliefs is able to assist the reconciliation 
process tremendously. We have seen that imams use religious education and Friday 
sermons as tools to transmit the universal message of Islam and teach respect for 
plurality.  
 In addition to this, especially because of the religious values that are present in 
every religious tradition, imams are suitable to promote peacebuilding and 
reconciliation. Because religious and national identities intersect in the Bosnian context, 
religious leaders are perceived as biased and as protectors of their community. 
Particularly in Bosnia where religious and ethnic identity overlap with each other, 
religious leaders are not only representatives of the religious interests but as well 
national interests. In this direction, imams could use the link between religious and 
national affiliation and turn it to the advantage of peacebuilding. Religious leaders who 
promote and put into practice universal religious values are more likely to be perceived 
as neutral by all community members. In this way religious peacemakers and their 
messages can transcend national divisions.     
 I conclude that because of the strategic position of imams as middle – range 
leaders and the resources and tools that they employ as religious peacemakers they are 
particularly suitable to lead the process of reconciliation. Nevertheless, the obstacles that 
the imams encountered underline the point that religious actors cannot by themselves 
contribute to reconciliation and stable peace. The media, political leaders, and other 
religious communities need to support these efforts if they are to succeed. Most 
importantly, as previously underlined religious leaders are a crucial part of the civil 
society but should not be understood sufficient for the success of reconciliation.325 Their 
effectiveness is largely dependent on the relationship and support they have with the 
state. Thus, the true potential of imams in peacebuilding and reconciliation will only 
achieved when they are properly assisted by the state.       
 
 
                                                 























 The aim of this thesis was to research the role of religion and imams as religious 
leaders in the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The discussion in 
chapter one on the role of the religious factor during the war shows that religion was an 
important element in the Bosnian society. Today, religion remains to be an important 
factor in the Bosnian society as well and specifically for the process of reconciliation 
offers a rich source. Religious thinkers and doers with their specific perspectives and 
approaches have a lot to offer to societies troubled with enduring conflicts. Previous 
research demonstrates the significance of this kind of peacemakers and their ability to 
shape and contribute to these important processes. Religious peacemakers can contribute 




values and position in the society and this thesis presents that imams make use of their 
religious knowledge to contribute to reconciliation and peacebuilding in Bosnia. 
 As seen from the second chapter, although there are many approaches to 
reconciliation, the focus in this thesis was on the socio – psychological and spiritual 
approach and victimization, rehumanization, accommodation of identity and forgiveness 
as important factors in the reconciliation process. The socio – psychological approach to 
reconciliation gives importance to the transformation of relationships and cognitive and 
emotional processes. Overcoming victimization, rehumanizing the members of the out –
group and accommodating one’s own identity to the extent that it includes “the other” 
are all crucial in the way that the in-groups perceives the out-group and how both of 
them interact with each other. The spiritual dimension to the process of reconciliation 
includes elements such as healing, restorative justice and forgiving. The spiritual 
approach to reconciliation is a religiously inspired approach that perceives human beings 
as creatures that should be viewed not only from a psychological but as well spiritual 
dimension. Both of these approaches focus on relationship – building.    
 Religious peacemakers have been discussed in this thesis as important actors 
who with their special characteristics, resources and tools can tremendously contribute 
to the resolution of conflicts, peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in post – 
conflict societies. Specifically, within Lederach’s peacebuilding framework, imams were 
identified as middle-range religious leaders who are particularly important for the 
reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.      
 When it comes to the engagement of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina directly in initiatives of transitional justice and peacebuilding the record 
shows a minimal engagement of high officials. There are no examples in which the high 
level leaders of the Islamic Community engaged in truth – finding or justice – seeking 
initiatives. Partially successful, however, in the reconciliation process are representatives 
of the ICBH at the Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Nevertheless, the 
ICBH failed for now to offer a “political theology of reconciliation”. Thus, an overall 
strategic framework that is directing the reconciliation process is missing, even though 




 In my research I explored to what extent Bosnian imams living and working in 
geographies in which Bosnian Muslims are in the minority, can fill this gap within their 
communities. To what extent can they be characterized in general as local religious 
peacemakers and do they act as contributors to the reconciliation process?  
 Reconciliation is defined in various ways by the imams at different localities. In 
the Serb Republic predominantly a minimalist reconciliation is promoted. While imams 
encourage reconciliation, they neither support very close relationships between the 
members of the different communities nor do they think that trust between the 
communities will ever be possible to build after the war. In contrast to this, in cities in 
which Muslims live together with a majority Croats population imams considered more 
readily close neighborhood relations and friendships as possible. These findings can be 
partially explained by the fact that the Bosniak population suffered more in regions of 
today’s Serb Republic during the war. On the other hand, the findings can as well be 
related to the specific challenges that Bosniaks face in the Serb Republic and that further 
complicate the process of reconciliation. The political situation in Srebrenica or human 
rights violations in Bratunac municipality are examples of this aggravating 
circumstances. An additional obstacle is the lack of institutional interreligious 
communication in these territories. However, even under these circumstances the imams 
in Serb Republic try to establish communication with the general population, engage in 
the general social life of the city and seek to contribute to the economic development of 
the city.  
 In the Federation, which is in societies in which Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks 
live together, the prospects for reconciliation are much better. Imams face less obstacles 
in communicating with the Croat Catholic religious leaders and can more actively 
implement their reconciliation strategies. While their colleagues in Serb Republic 
communicate almost exclusively with the general Serb population, in the Federation 
imams have generally more frequent communication with the highest representatives of 
the Church. Because interreligious dialogue is important, in cities in which institutional 
communication between religious leaders was impossible, local imams have found other 




 The imams within their local communities have developed three types of 
strategies through which they contribute to the reconciliation process: individuals, 
communication and structure – oriented reconciliation strategies. Imams who understand 
that the behavior and attitudes of individuals are the main obstacle to reconciliation 
focus on strategies that educate the individuals and change negative behavior and 
attitudes. They, as religious leaders, strive to give guidance and advice, and encourage 
tolerant and peaceful behavior between the groups. Some of the imams mentioned that 
they give special attention to the Friday sermon where they sometime address the 
importance of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. Imams promote religious values 
and principles that support peace and reconciliation in order to shape the attitudes of 
their coreligionists. Through their personal example and religious education they 
encourage individuals in their own religious community to behave according to these 
principles.  
 The in – depth interviews have also revealed a set of other important strategies. 
These reconciliatory acts often include the general population of the city regardless of 
religion. Structure – oriented initiatives show that the goal of imams is to create an open 
and inclusive society with shared institutions and common projects. The establishment 
of a kindergarten by the ICBH in Banja Luka that is open to all children of the city, 
small initiatives to which imams invite the members of the other religious/ethnic group, 
and open mosques which welcome everyone, create a place and time where a shared 
future can be discussed. In other cities imams focus on building economic cooperation 
between the Muslim and Croat/Serb population. The economy is defined by these imams 
as the most influential dimension in the citizens’ lives and therefore can be used in such 
a way that it will support reconciliation among the Bosnian people. Other institution and 
capacity building initiative are the organization of common cultural activities and the 
establishment of shared cultural associations.  
 In addition to these two types of reconciliation strategies, in their communication 
– oriented projects imams pay specific attention to develop stable and frequent 
communication and interaction with individuals outside their religious group as well as 




contact with the general population, meetings with other religious leaders and the 
organization of interreligious dialogue projects.   
 The majority of the values and principles that motivate their work and were 
mentioned by imams in this study correspond with values mentioned by other 
researchers who investigated the contribution of religious peacemakers in other settings. 
Among the values that were referenced most frequently are forgiveness, patience, the 
respect for the humanity of all individuals, respect for pluralism, doing good to others 
and being a good example for others. Some of the values are particularly important for 
how imams interpret the past to their coreligionist and advise them to deal with loses and 
sufferings. The belief in the absolute justice in the afterlife and the rejection of revenge 
were given as the most significant and helpful principles in this respect. All these values 
identified by imams are found in the Islamic non-violence and peacebuilding framework 
outlined by Abu-Nimer. However, a value that was mentioned specifically by Bosnian 
imams is the special status and care that they are obliged to show for their neighbors 
regardless of their neighbors’ creed or ethnicity. These imams are guided by these 
religious and cultural values and principles in their work with the local society, but also 
show effort to teach the members of their own group about these values. 
 However, in their efforts to reconcile the local community imams face difficult 
obstacles that hinder or even make completely impossible reconciliatory work. Imams in 
the Serb Republic reported obstacles to reconciliation that were not mentioned by imams 
living in majority Croat cities. Imams in the Serb Republic have very irregular 
communication with the Orthodox religious leaders. Also they mentioned that the strong 
hierarchy within the Orthodox Church hinders local priests and the general population to 
engage in common projects. These obstacles, in addition to the generally difficult 
economic situation and the discrimination that Bosniaks experience in education and 
employment, makes genuine work towards reconciliation in theses territories almost 
impossible. Other more general obstacles for successful reconciliation were nationalist 
political elites, negative media coverage and a predominantly weak knowledge of the 
other religion and believers.          




and offer alternative ways in dealing with the past and “the other”. The discussion on 
their contributions to the de – victimization of the self and re – humanization of the other 
religious groups shows that the majority of imams interviewed create an “ethos of 
peace” and deconstruct the societal beliefs of the “conflictive peace”. All the imams who 
were interviewed regard reconciliation as an important factor in the future of Bosnian 
society and they show themselves open and ready to discuss and contribute to shared 
future. Reconciliation work is easier in areas in which Bosnian Muslims live with 
Bosnian Croats and in cities in which communication is more frequent with the other 
group and their religious leaders. Further, financially supported religious communities 
and their imams are more innovative in their reconciliation work. State institutions and 
international organization should support and train this group of leaders more and create 
an environment in which they can act for effectively. 
 








APPENDIX ONE: DESCRIPTION OF MUNICIPALITIES, LOCAL  IMAMS 
LIVE AND WORK 
 This description of the social setting is based on the description given by the 
imams I interviewed in the cities of these municipalities, data on the ethnic/nation and 
religious affiliations that provided here are based on the population census conducted in 
2013 and data on the death rates in these municipalities are based on the publication The 
Bosnian Book of Dead by the author Mirsad Tokača. The author and his team after 10 




surname. Out of this number 62, 013 were Bosniaks, 24, 953 Serbs, 8, 403 Croats and 
571 “others”. The civilian losses during the war which were in total 38,239 are 
especially high among the Bosniak population 31, 107. In the case of Bosniaks the 
number of civilian causalities was higher than that of the Bosniak soldiers which was 30, 
906. Serbian civilians 4, 178, Croat civilians 2, 484 and 470 “others” suffered.      
Bratunac 
 The causalities of Bosniaks during the war were higher in the territories of Serb 
Republic. During the war in the municipality of Bratunac in total 3,533 died and out of 
this were 2,076 Bosniak civilians and 127 Serb civilians. In the municipality of Bratunac 
out of 20,340 today 7,803 are Bosniaks. Compared to the population census in 1991 
when Bosniaks made up 64% of the overall population. 7,807 are members of Islamic 
religion. The imam explains that because of the destruction, killings and sufferings that 
have changed dramatically the demographic picture the interethnic relations are 
disturbed. He understands that the last war was just one of the many attacks on the 
Bosnian Muslims:  
 We have 2.180 people from Bratunac who are missing since 1992 and 1995. 6 or 
 7 skeletons were found here in the place Adema close to Drina and with the 
DNA  analysis of these victims we found that those excavated were in reality the 
 grandfathers of those we were searching for. They were killed by the Partisans in 
 1946. So, throughout generations we have the same people killing people from 
the  same houses and families.326 
 Further, he states that the discrimination of Muslims in the Serb Republic and the 
lack of basic human rights (education, employment, illegal construction of Churches and 
language issues) hamper the normalization of relationships.  
Srebrenica  
 During the war in Srebrenica 7,243 people lost their lives, out of which 5,233 
were Bosniak civilians compared to 158 Serbian civilians. In Srebrenica live 13,409 
people and 54,1% are Bosniaks by ethnic/national affiliation which is 7,248. In 1991 the 
ration of Bosniaks living in Srebrenica municipality is 72,2%. 7,258 declared themselves 
                                                 




as members of the Islamic religion. Both imams that were interviewed in the city of 
Srebrenica refer to the genocide and its consequences: “When we consider that many 
families have lost all their members, families that have lost 5 – 6 members, mainly male, 
genocide has left lasting marks on these families, on their health but also on their 
relationship towards the other side.”327 They also point out that the silence and negation 
of genocide repeat every day and that this deepens the wounds already cause by 
genocide. One of the imams mentions that since the elections in 2016 when Mladen 
Grujičić became the new mayor of the municipality they endure provocations.   
Banja Luka 
 During the war 1,772 people lost their life in the municipality of Banja Luka. 
Banja Luka is the fifth municipality in this region when it comes to the number of 
Bosniak civil losses which is 96. In Banja Luka municipality live 185,042 citizens out of 
which 7,681 are Bosniaks. Today Bosniaks made 4,2% of the population in this 
municipality while in 1991 14,6% lived in Banja Luka municipality. 7,528 declare 
themselves members of the Islamic religion. The imam identified employment issues 
and the status of refugees as the most pressing problems in Banja Luka but states that 
since the opening of the Ferhadija Mosque the interreligious relations have revived, 
intensified and improved.328 
Kiseljak 
 In the war period 421 individuals lost their lives. According to the results of the 
last population census in Bosnia and Herzegovina out of 20,722 living in the 
municipality of Kiseljak 7,838 are Bosniaks by ethnic/national affiliation which is 37,8 
% of the population. In the census of 1991 40,5% declared themselves as Bosniaks. 
According to the last census 8,099 declare themselves as members of the Islamic 
religion. When it comes to the personal experiences of one imam living in Kiseljak he 
says that he has “accustomed to some things, to discrimination and to some 
injustices”329. He gives examples from discrimination in employment and mentions 
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problems in the education system that is structured to accommodate “two-schools under 
one roof”:  
 You can tell the difference between the two schools by just looking at them. The 
 Croat’s school has a nice façade and they have nice furniture and equipment. In 
 our Bosniak school the furniture and equipment is from the 1970’s and our 
 children when they come back home they have teared up trousers because the 
nails  are coming out of the chairs.330  
 He adds:  
 We do not have in the high school the national group of subjects. They learn the 
 Croat language and they learn about the Croat geography, at the beginning of the 
 school year they have the Croat anthem playing and things like this. There is no 
 Bosnian flag in the city, nowhere at the state institutions, even though we are 
38%  according to the last census.331   
Prozor   
 During the war in Prozor municipality in total 450 lives were lost. 196 is the 
number of Bosniak civil causalities and 135 of Bosniak soldiers. The number of Croat 
civil losses is 39 and soldiers of the Croat nationality 77. Today, in the municipality of 
Prozor out of a population of 14,280 3,525 are Bosniaks which is 24,7% of the 
population. In 1991 the ratio of Bosniaks living in Prozor municipality was 36,6%. 
According to the latest census 3,514 declared themselves members of the Islamic 
religion. The imam from Prozor recounts the difficulties in 2002 when he returned to the 
city of Prozor:  
 Across this central mosque here in Prozor was the municipality court. Next to the 
 mosque was the room in which we prepare the body for the funeral. So when we 
 were taking the body from this room and passed the building of the municipality 
 officials would open the windows and spit on us. They would call us with 
 pejorative names.332  
 He mentions that Prozor has gone through great suffering but that “both sided 
have black taints” and both are still missing people from their communities. Today, 
however the situation is relaxed and the imam himself has great relations with the Croat 
community in his city.   
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 In this municipality in the period 1992 – 5 372 people lost their lives. In Orašje 
out of 19,861 population in the municipality 2,015 declared themselves Bosniaks by 
ethnic/national affiliation. Today Bosniaks make 10,1% of the population in this 
municipality which is slightly higher than before the was with 7,8%. 2,032 of them are 
members of the Islamic religion. The imam of the city of Orašje describes the interethnic 
relations between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as very harmonious and 
peaceful. He attributes this to the following factors: Muslims were during the war part of 
the Croatian Defense Council and did not establish their own army, the Muslim 
population felt safe and secure during the whole war period, there was not one incident 
of rape or murder, and when differences in opinion emerged they were resolved 
peacefully.333 Important to mention for the perceptions of Muslims living in this 
municipality where they are a small minority is a very specific episode in the war. 
Namely, it was ordered from Mostar that Bosniaks should be arrested and taken away to 
the camps but Croats “our people here”334 as the imam says, would not believe them and 
they were suspicious of their political games. In this way Bosnian Croats and Muslims 
preserved their good relationships.    
 
 
APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH 
LOCAL IMAMS 
Conducted by: Neira Omerovic 
Introduction 
 Thank you for accepting to talk with me. I hope that this experience will be 
pleasant and interesting for both of us. The aim of this research is to find out how 
Bosnian Muslims think and feel about reconciliation. We would like to explore if and 
how Islam motivates Muslims to act toward reconciliation with the other ethnic groups. 
We would like to know their experiences around reconciliation and events related to this 
                                                 





process. The reason why I asked you for this interview is that you live in a locality 
where interaction with the members of other communities is inevitable and maybe 
sometimes challenging. You are at the spot where reconciliation is mostly needed, if we 
can say so. At the same time you are the local imam, head of a religious community and 
responsible for their religious education and daily religious practice. How reconciliation 
is put into practice. Is there a specific religious approach to reconciliation?  
 The interview is expected to take 40 minutes to one hour. Before we start I 
would like to check some things with you. When I called you before you agreed to have 
this interview with me. Do you still agree to talk with me? I also want to let you know 
that you can stop the interview anytime to take a break. Also, if I ask you a question that 
you do not feel comfortable to answer or do not want to answer, please just say so, it is 
absolutely fine.  
 This interview will be used for research purposes only. I would like to record the 
interview in order to be able to focus on what you are saying more closely. I will 
transcribe this record and go through it to identify some themes and see what we can 
learn from it. I do not ever identify the names of who spoke to me and I will not identify 
the site. We use this information to help to put together a picture about what is going on. 
So I would like to ensure you that your name will not be associated with this. I am doing 
this because I want you to be candid and open as much as possible.  I take seriously this 
responsibility to protect your identity. Do you want me to share with you the final 
version of the research? Before we start, do you have any questions for me?    
Interview Questions 
1. Can you describe the city/community in which you live? In what way did the 
last war influence interpersonal relations in your city? 
2. What means reconciliation to you? 
3. What do you think about the process and level of reconciliation between the 
three people of Bosnia and Hercegovina and what are your experiences 
regarding this in your city/community? 
4. What are the most important elements for successful reconciliation (truth, 




5. Do you think that forgiveness is an important aspect of reconciliation? 
6. How do you build trust between your religious community and the other? 
7. Do you think that there will come a time when the three people of Bosnia 
will live together without fear? What needs to happen to realize this future? 
8. What is the main obstacle to reconciliation in your city/community/area? 
9. How do you connect you work as an imam to the reconciliation between 
Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats/Catholics or Serbs/Orthodox? 
10. What are the principles and values that guide you in your efforts of 
rapprochement with Bosnian Croats/Serbs? 
11. Do you have cooperation with members of the other religion? How would 
you describe this relations? 
12. Do you have common projects that you together engage in? Can you describe 
these activities? 
13. How do you advise the members of your religious community (jamah) to 
deal with the members of other religion or ethnic group? 
14. Should your religious community members remember the war and in what 
way should they remember it?  
15. How do you help them to deal with the war and its consequences? 
16. Do you speak with your jamah about reconciliation? What do you emphasize 
in these conversations? 
APPENDIX THREE: CONSENT AND RECOMMENDATON BY THE 
DIVISION FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AT THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY OF 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO CONDUCT THE RESEARCH WITH 






Abazović, Dino. “Reconciliation, Ethnopolitics and Religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” In 





———. “Religious Claims during the War and Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
Borderlands E-Journal Vol. 14, no. No. 1 (2015): 1–23. 
Abazović, Dino, and Ivan Cvitković. “Religion and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Illustrations from the Postwar and Post-Socialist Transition.” In Religion in the Post - 
Yugoslav Context, 79–100. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
Abazović, Dino, and Mitja Velikonja, eds. Post-Yugoslavia New Cultural and Political 
Perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Abou El Fadl, Khaled. “Conflict Resolution as a Normative Value in Islamic Law Handling 
Disputes with Non-Muslims.” In Faith-Based Diplomacy : Trumping Realpolitik, 178–
209. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammad. “Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training 
Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding.” Journal of Peace Research Vol.38, no. No.6 
(2001): 685–704. 
———, ed. Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2001. 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammad, and David Augsburger, eds. Peace-Building By, Between, and 
beyond Muslims and Evangelical Christians. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009. 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammad, Amal Khoury, and Emily Welty. Unity in Diversity: Interfaith 
Dialogue in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2007. 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. “A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam.” 
Journal of Law and Religion Vol. 15, no. No.1/2 (2001 2000): 217–65. 
———. Non-Violence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2003. 
———. “The Miracles of Transformation Trough Interfaith Dialogue: Are You a Believer?” 
In Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, 15–32. Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2002. 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, and Ayse S. Kadayifci - Orellana. “Muslim Peace-Building Actors 
in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs.” Peace and Change Vol. 33, 
no. No. 4 (2008): 549–81. 
———. Muslim Peacebuilding Actors in the Balkans, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes 
Region. Washington DC: Salam Institute for Peace & Justice for the Clingendael 
Institute, 2005. http://salaminstitute.org/portal/publications/. 
Alibašić, Ahmet. “Osnovni Sporazum Između Islamske Zajednice I Države Bosne I 
Hercegovine.” Preporod. 2015. Osnovni sporazum između Islamske zajednice i države 
Bosne i Hercegovine. 
“An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.” The United 
Nations, 1992. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-
92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2029_Agenda%20for%20peace_.pdf. 
Appleby, R. Scott. “Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, 33–60. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
———. “Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of 
Peacebuilding.” In Faith - Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, 231–58. New York: 




———. The Ambivalence of the Sacred : Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
———. “Towards a Theory and Practice of Reconciliation.” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 
Vol. 39, no. No. 1-2 (2002). https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-
112798584/toward-a-theology-and-praxis-of-reconciliation. 
Auerbach, Yehudith. “The Role of Forgiveness in Reconciliation,” 149–75. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Augsburger, David. “The Practice of Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Conflict 
Transformation.” In Peace-Building By, Between, and beyond Muslims and Evangelical 
Christians. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009. 
Banchoff, Thomas, ed. Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Bar - Tal, Daniel. “From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: 
Psychological Analysis.” Political Psychology Vol. 21, no. No. 2 (2000): 351–65. 
———. “Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case.” International 
Journal of Conflict Management Vol. 9, no. No. 1 (1998): 22–50. 
———. “Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as It 
Does in the Israeli Society?” Political Psychology Vol. 22, no. No. 3 (2001): 601–27. 
Bar - Tal, Daniel, and Gemma H. Bennink. “The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and 
as a Process,” 11–39. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, ed. From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
Basic, Goran. “Conditions for Reconciliation: Narratives of Survivors from the War in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Journal of Criminal Justice and Security Vol.17, no. No.2 
(2015): 107–26. 
Belloni, Roberto. “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Journal of 
Peace Research Vol. 38, no. No. 2 (2001): 163–80. 
Bercovitch, Jacob, and Ayse S. Kadayifci - Orellana. “Religion and Mediation: The Role of 
Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution.” International Negotiation Vol. 
14, no. No. 1 (2009): pp.175-204. 
Bercovitch, Jacob, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds. The SAGE Handbook of 
Conflict Resolution. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009. 
Berg, Bruce L. Qualitative Research Methods in Social Sciences. 4th edition. Needham 
Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon, 2001. 
Bernstein, Sarah E. “Is ‘Interreligious’ Synonymous with ‘Interfaith’?  The Roles of Dialogue 
in Peacebuilding.” In Peacebuilding  and Reconciliation: Contemporary Themes and 
Challenges, 105–18. London: Pluto Press, 2012. 
Bhargava, Rajeev. “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies.” In Truth v. Justice: The 
Morality of Truth Commissions, 45–67. Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University 
Press, 2000. 
———. “The Difficulty of Reconciliation,” June 1, 2013. 
http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022254. 
Bieringer, Reimund, and David J. Botton, eds. Reconciliation in Interfaith Perspective: 
Jewish, Christian and Muslim Voices. Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2011. 




A Handbook. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance IDEA, 2003. 
Bouth, Tsjeard, Ayse S. Kadayifci-Orellana, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Faith-Based 
Peacebuilding: Mapping and Analysis of Christians, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors. 
Washington DC: Salam Institute for Peace & Justice and the Clingendael Institute, 2005. 
Brajovic, Zoran. “The Potential of Inter - Religious Dialogue: Lessons from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” In Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia - Hercegovina: Ten Years 
After Dayton, 149–79. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006. 
Brewer, John D., Gareth I. Higgins, and Francis Teeney. “Religion and Peacemaking: A 
Conceptualization.” Sociology Vol.44, no. No.6 (2010): 1019–37. 
Bringa, Tone R. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central 
Bosnian Village. Princeton, New Yersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Brinkmann, Svend. Qualitative Interviewing. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun, and Friederike Mieth, eds. 
Transitional Justice Theories. New York: Routledge, 2014. 
“Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” United States Institute of Peace, no. Special Report 103 (2003): 1–11. 
Carter, Judy, and Smith, S. Gordon. “Religious Peacebuilding: From Potential to Action.” In 
Religion and Peacebuilding, 279–301. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2004. 
Ćeramilac, Saša. “Kontekst: Poruke Svetih Knjiga.” Kontekst. Sarajevo: Al Jazeera Balkans. 
Accessed April 11, 2017. http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/kontekst-poruke-svetih-
knjiga. 
Chapman, Audrey R. “Approaches to Studying Reconciliation.” In Assessing the Impact of 
Transitional Justice, 142–72. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2009. 
———. “Coming to Terms with the Past: Truth, Justice, And/Or Reconciliation.” Annual of 
the Society for Christian Ethics Vol. 19 (1999): pp.235-258. 
Chapman, Audrey R., and Bernard Spong, eds. Religion and Reconciliation in South Africa : 
Voices of Religious Leaders. Philadelphia and London: Templeton Foundation Press, 
2003. 
Ćimić, Esad. “Bosanska Raskrižja.” Društvena Istraživanja : Journal for General Social 
Issues Vol. 3, no. No. 6 (1994): 611–28. 
Clark, Janine N. “Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Are Religious 
Actors Doing Enough?” Europe - Asia Studies Vol. 62, no. No. 4 (2010): 671–94. 
Clegg, Cecelia. “Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern 
Ireland.” In Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity, 81–94. Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2008. 
Cohen, Lenard. “Bosnia’s ‘Tribal Gods’: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Politics.” In 
Religion and the War in Bosnia, 43–73. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1998. 
Coleman, Peter T. “Intractable Conflict.” In The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory 
and Practice, 533–59. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. 
Coward, Harold, and s. Gordon Smith, eds. Religion and Peacebuilding. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004. 




Dimension of Statecraft, 266–82. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Cvitković, Ivan. “Kako doci do pomirenja? Postoji li Univerzalni Model?” In Uloga Religije 
U Pomirenju I Tranzicionoj Pravdi, 11–20. Novi Sad: Centar za istraživanje religije, 
politike i društva, 2013. 
Daly, Erin, and Jeremy Sarkin. Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common 
Ground. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. 
Dark, Ken R. Religion and International Relations. First edition. Wiltshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2000. 
Darweish, Marwan, Carol Rank, and Sarah Giles, eds. Peacebuilding and Reconciliation: 
Contemporary Themes and Challenges. London: Pluto Press, 2012. 
De Gruchy, John W. Reconciliation: Restoring Justice. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002. 
Desmond, M. Tutu. No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday, 1999. 
Deutsch, Morton, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric C. Marcus, eds. The Handbook of Conflict 
Resolution: Theory and Practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. 
Douglas, Johnston, ed. Faith-Based Diplomacy : Trumping Realpolitik. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Douglas, Johnston, and Cox Brian. “Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement.” In 
Faith-Based Diplomacy : Trumping Realpolitik, 11–29. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
Dubois, Heather. “Religion and Peacebuilding: An Ambivalent yet Vital Relationship.” 
Journal of Religion, Conflict and Peace Vol. 1, no. No. 2 (2008). 
http://www.religionconflictpeace.org/volume-1-issue-2-spring-2008/religion-and-
peacebuilding. 
Duffy Toft, Monica. “Getting Religion?: The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War.” 
International Security Vol. 31, no. No. 4 (2007): 97–131. 
Enright, Robert D., and Joanna North, eds. Exploring Forgiveness. London: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1998. 
Fairclough, Norman. “What Is CDA? Language and Power Twenty-Five Years On,” n.d. 
“Faith-Based NGOs and International Peace Building.” United States Institute of Peace, 
Special Report, no. No. 76 (2001). 
Final Report. Vol. Vol. 1. Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998. 
Fischer, Martina, ed. Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia - Hercegovina: Ten Years 
After Dayton. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006. 
———. “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice.” In Advancing 
Conflict Transformation. The Berghof Handbook II, 405–30. Opladen/Framington Hills: 
Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011. 
Flere, Sergej. “Was the Bosnian War a Full Fledged Religious War...?” In Demitologizacija 
Religijskih Narativa Na Balkanu: Uloga Religija U (Post)Konfliktnom Društvu I 
Procesima Pomirenja, 7–24. Novi Sad: Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva, 
2012. 
Fox, Jonathan. “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations.” International 
Studies Review Vol. 3, no. No. 3 (2001): 53–73. 
Galtung, Johan. “Cultural Violence.” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 27, no. No. 3 (1990): 
291–305. 




London: SAGE Publications, 1996. 
Glosar Religigijskih Pojmova. Sarajevo: Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
1999. 
Goodwin, Stephen R. Fractured Land, Healing Nations. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 
GmbH, 2006. 
Gopin, Marc. Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and 
Peacemaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
———. Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
———. “Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution.” Peace and Change Vol. 22, no. No. 1 
(1997): 1–31. 
Hamber, Brandon, and Kelly Gráinne. “Beyond Coexistence: Towards a Working Definition 
of Reconciliation.” In Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies, 
286–310. Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2009. 
Hamber, Brandon, and Gráinne Kelly. A Place for Reconciliation? Conflict and Locality in 
Northern Ireland. Democratic Dialogue, No. 18. Democratic Dialogue, 2005. 
Hamber, Brandon, and Hugo Van der Merwe. “What Is This Thing Called Reconciliation?” 
Reconciliation in Review Vol. 1, no. No. 1 (1998). 
http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/articles/artrcbh.htm. 
Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths : Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001. 
———. Unspeakable Truths Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 
2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Helmick, Raymond G., and Rodney L. Petersen, eds. Forgiveness and Reconciliation: 
Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation. Philadelphia: Templeton 
Foundation Press, 2002. 
Hennink, Monique, Inge Hutter, and Ajay Bailey. Qualitative Research Methods. London: 
SAGE Publications, 2011. 
Hicks, Donna. “The Role of Identity Reconstruction in Promoting Reconciliation.” In 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation, Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, 
129–50. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2002. 
Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Draft of the Platform of the Islamic 
Community of Bosnia and Hercegovina for Dialogue,” December 5, 2015. 
http://vijecemuftija.islamskazajednica.ba/index.php/2015-12-08-13-41-32/fetve-i-
rezolucije/156-nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-za-dijalog. 
Jafari, Sheherzade. “Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign 
Policy.” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 61, no. No. 1 (2007): 111–30. 
Jelovac, Elma. “Reconciliation as a Condition for the Lasting Peace in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.” Haccetepe University, 2013. 
http://www.openaccess.hacettepe.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11655/2555/aafbc
489-f414-4521-a5e6-f705298d684e.pdf?sequence=1. 
Johnston, Douglas M., and Johnatan Eastvold. “History Unrequited: Religion as Provocateur 
and Peacemaker in the Bosnian Conflict.” In Religion and Peacebuilding, 213–42. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014. 




Statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Kacowicz, Arie M., Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ole Elström, and Magnus Jerneck, eds. Stable 
Peace Among Nations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
Kadayifci - Orellana, S. Ayse. “Ethno - Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion 
in Conflict Resolution.” In The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, 264–84. 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009. 
Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. New York: Picador St. 
Martin’s Press, 2005. 
Kelman, Herbert. “Building Trust Among Enemies: The Central Challenge for International 
Conflict Resolution.” International Journal of Inercultural Relations Vol. 29, no. No. 6 
(2005): pp.639-650. 
Kelman, Herbert C. “Interests, Relationships, Identities: Three Central Issues for Individuals 
and Groups in Negotiating Their Social Environment.” Annual Reviews Vol. 57 (2006): 
1–26. 
———. “Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social- Psychological Perspective.” In From 
Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation, 111–25. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004. 
———. “Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological 
Analysis.” In After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation, 193–205. London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999. 
Kim, Sebastian C. H., Pauline Kollontai, and Greg Hoyland, eds. Peace and Reconciliation: 
In Search of Shared Identity. Ashgate Publishing Limited, n.d. 
Kissinger, Henry. “Bosnia: Reasons for Care.” Washinton Post, 1995. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1995/12/10/bosnia-reasons-for-
care/4d99c734-5e28-4188-bf87-5d10b5793f33/?utm_term=.dfb0359045ce. 
Knežević, Nikola. “Religion, Politics and Transitional Justice in the Western Balkan.” In 
Religija, Odgovornost I Tranziciona Pravda, 39–45. Novi Sad: Centar za istraživanje 
religije, politike i društva, 2014. 
Knežević, Nikola, and Zlatiborka Momčilović Popov, eds. Uloga Religije U Pomirenju I 
Tranzicionoj Pravdi. Novi Sad: Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva, 2013. 
Knezevic, Nikola, Blagoje Pantelic, and Srdan Sremac, eds. Religija, Odgovornost I 
Tranziciona Pravda. Novi Sad - Beograd, Srbija: Centar za istrazivanje religije, politike 
i drustva and Hrišćanski kulturni centar dr Radovan Bigović, 2014. 
Knežević, Nikola, Srđan Sremac, and Goran Golubović, eds. Demitologizacija Religijskih 
Narativa Na Balkanu: Uloga Religija U (Post)Konfliktnom Društvu I Procesima 
Pomirenja. Novi Sad - Beograd, Srbija: Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva, 
2012. 
Kriesberg, Louis. “Coexistence and the Reconciliation of Communal Conflicts.” In The 
Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, 182–98. New York: The Continuum Publishing 
Company, 1998. 
———. “Comparing Reconciliation Action within and Between Countries.” In From Conflict 
Resolution to Reconciliation, 81–111. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
———. “Reconciliation: Aspects, Growth, and Sequences.” International Journal of Peace 
Studies Vol. 12, no. No. 1 (2007): 1–21. 




Pomirenje: Kontekstualna Promišljanja O Religiji U Postkonfliktnom Društvu, 33–72. 
Rijeka: Ex Libris, 2012. 
Küng, Hans. Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic. Translated by John 
Bowden. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publisher, 1991. 
Kurtz, Lester. Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict. Vol. Vol. 2. Academic Press, 
n.d. 
Lasić, Ivan. “Pomirenje I Vjerske Zajednice U Bosni I Hercegovini: Koncepti Pomirenja U 
Službenim Glasilima Katoličke Crkve, Pravoslavne Crkve I Islamske Zajednice U Bosni 
I Hercegovini.” In Uloga Religije U Pomirenju I Tranzicionoj Pravdi, 117–28. Novi 
Sad: Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva, 2013. 
Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 
———. “Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation Processes.” In Forgiveness 
and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, 193–203. 
Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2002. 
———. “Remember and Change.” In Transforming Violence : Linking Local and Global 
Peacemaking, 177–89. Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1998. 
———. The Journey Toward Reconciliation. Scottdale: Herald Press, 1999. 
———. The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
Little, David, ed. Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Little, David, and R. Scott Appleby. “A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious 
Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict.” In Religion and 
Peacebuilding, 1–23. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 
Lugo, Luis. “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity.” New York: Pew Research Center, 
2012. 
M., M. “Korak Naprijed: Deklaraciju Vjerskih Poglavara U BIH Nisu Potpisali Predstavnici 
Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve.” Blijesak Info. June 10, 2017. 
http://bljesak.info/rubrika/kultura/clanak/deklaraciju-vjerskih-poglavara-u-bih-nisu-
potpisali-predstavnici-srpske-pravoslavne-crkve/11135/ispis. 
MacLachlan, Alice, and Allen Speight. Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake 
of Conflict. Springer, 2013. 
Markovic, Ivo. “‘Would You Shoot Me, You Idiot?’” In Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of 
Religion in Conflict Resolution, 97–119. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Mason, Jennifer. Qualitative Researching Second Edition. 2nd edition. London: SAGE 
Publications, 2002. 
McEvoy, Kieran. “Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a ‘Thicker’ Version of Transitional 
Justice.” In Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for 
Change, 15–47. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008. 
McEvoy, Kieran, and Lorna McGregor, eds. Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008. 
Merdjanova, Ina, and Patrice Brodeur. Religion as a Conversation Starter Interreligious 
Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans. Continuum, 2009. 




Mass Violence. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1998. 
Moe, Christian. “Religion in the Yugoslav Conflicts: Post-War Perspectives.” Scripta Instituti 
Donnierani Abouensis Vol. 19 (2006): 256–75. 
Mojzes, Paul. Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century. 
Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011. 
———, ed. Religion and the War in Bosnia. Atlanta, Georgia: The American Academy of 
Religion, 1998. 
———. “Religion and the Yugoslav Wars.” In Religion in the Post - Yugoslav Context, 1–15. 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
———. “The Camouflaged Role of Religion in the War of Bosnia and Hercegovina.” In 
Religion and the War in Bosnia, 74–98. Atlanta, Georgia: The American Academy of 
Religion, 1998. 
Montville, Joseph V. “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy.” 
In The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, 161–75. Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1991. 
———. “The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution.” In Conflict Resolution 
Theory and Practice Integration and Application, 112–27. Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993. 
Murphy, Colleen. A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
Murphy, Jeffrie G., and Jean Hampton. Forgiveness and Mercy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
Mustafić, Ifet, ed. Religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Profile of Religious Communities 
and Churches. Sarajevo: Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012. 
Nakarada, Radmila. “Putevi Pomirenja.” Godišnjak FPN Vol.5 (2011): 361–76. 
Omer, Atalia, Appleby R. Scott, and David Little, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Religion, 
Conflict and Peacebuilding. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Palmer, Peter. “The Church and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia.” In Religion in 
International Relations, 83–99. Wiltshire: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. 
Perica, Vjekoslav. Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
———. “Religion as a Factor in Yugoslav Wars and the Peace Process.” In Uloga Religije U 
Pomirenju I Tranzicionoj Pravdi, 31–48. Novi Sad: Centar za istraživanje religije, 
politike i društva, 2013. 
Perry, Valery. “A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Gap 
Between People and Politics.” In Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict 
Societies, 207 – 231. Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2009. 
Philpott, Daniel. Just and Unjust Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
———. “Religion, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: The State of the Field.” Social 
Science Research Council, 2007, pp.1-46. 
———. “What Religion Brings to the Politics of Transitional Justice.” Journal of 
International Affairs Vol. 61, no. No. 1 (2007): 93–110. 
Powers, Gerard F. “Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia 
and Yugoslavia.” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 50, no. No. 1 (1996): 221–52. 




Sarajevo: BHTV, June 24, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YEsLJ8Ny3U. 
Quinn, Joanna R., ed. Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies. 
Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2009. 
Radeljić, Branislav, and Martina Topić, eds. Religion in the Post - Yugoslav Context. 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
Radzik, Linda. Making Amends Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: 
The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, UK: Malden, MA : Polity, 2005. 
“Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis,” n.d. 
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, and Javier Mariezcurrena, eds. Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First 
Century Beyond Truth versus Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Rosoux, Valerie. “Reconciliation as a Peace - Building Process: Scope and Limits.” In The 
SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, 543–63. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 
2009. 
Rotberg, Robert I., and Dennis Thompson, eds. Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions. Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Said, Abdul Aziz, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, and Meena Sharify-Funk, eds. Contemporary 
Islam: Dynamic, Not Static. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Said, Abdul Aziz, and Nathan C. Funk. “The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict 
Resolution.” Peace and Conflict Studies: Vol. 9, no. No. 2 (2002): 37–50. 
Sampson, Cynthia. “Religion and Peacebuilding.” In Peacemaking in International Conflict: 
Methods and Techniques, 273–326. Washington DC.: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2007. 
Santa-Barbara, Joanna. “Reconciliation.” In Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies, 173–
86. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Saritoprak, Zeki. “Reconciliation: An Islamic Theological Approach.” In Reconciliation in 
Interfaith Perspective: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Voices, 75–91. Peeters Publishers, 
2011. 
Schaap, Andrew. Political Reconciliation. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Sears, David O., Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Sells, Michael Anthony. “Serbian Religious Nationalism, Christoslavism, and the Genocide 
in Bosnia, 1992-1995.” In Religion and the War in Bosnia, 196–206. Atlanta, Georgia: 
Scholars Press, 1998. 
———. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998. 
Shafiq, Muhammad, and Mohammad Abu-Nimer. Interfaith Dialogue: A Guide for Muslims. 
London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2011. 
Shore, Megan. Religion and Conflict Resolution Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Ashgate e-Book, 2009. 
Shriver, Donald W. An Ethic For Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 




Forgiveness, 131–50. London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998. 
Skaar, Elin. “Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective.” Transitional Justice 
Review Vol. 1, no. No. 1 (2012): 54–103. 
Smajic, Aid. “Uloga Vjere U Formiranju Stava Prema Drugom I Drukčijem: Između 
Religijskih Ideala I Bosanskohercegovačke Stvarnosti.” Vrhbosnensia Vol.17, no. No.1 
(2013): pp.5-26. 
Smock, David R., ed. Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2002. 
———, ed. “Religious Contributions to Peacemaking When Religion Brings Peace, Not 
War,” Peaceworks, no. No. 55 (2006): 1–45. 
Smyth, Marie Breen. Toward a Theology and Praxis of Reconciliation. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007. 
Sremac, Srđan, Zoran Grozdanov, and Nikola Knežević, eds. Opasna Sjećanja I Pomirenje: 
Kontekstualna Promišljanja O Religiji U Postkonfliktnom Društvu. Rijeka: Ex Libris, 
2012. 
Staub, Ervin. “Breaking the Cycle of Genocidal Violence: Healing and Reconciliation.” In 
Perspectives on Loss, 231–41, 1998. 
———. “Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation.” 
International Society of Political Psychology Vol. 21, no. No. 2 (2000): 367–82. 
Steele, David A. “Practical Approaches to Interreligious Dialogue and the Empowerment of 
Religious Communities as Agents of Reconciliation.” In Religious Dialogue in the 
Balkans: The Drama of Understanding, 81–90. Belgrade: Belgrade Open School, 2003. 
Sterland, Bill, and John Beauclerk. Faith Communities as Potential Agents for Peace 
Building in the Balkans. Norwegian Church Aid Balkans, 2008. 
Stover, Eric, and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds. My Neighbor, My Enemy Justice and Community 
in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Teitel, Ruti G. “Transitional Justice Genealogy.” Harvard Human Rights Journal Vol. 16 
(2003): 69–94. 
Topic, Franjo. “Krscansko-Muslimanski Dijalog U Bosni I Hercegovini.” U Služenju 
Božjemu Narodu. Zbornik Radova U Čast Msgr. Dr. Antuna Škvorčevića, 2007, 374–90. 
Van der Merwe, Hugo, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds. Assessing the Impact 
of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2009. 
Velikonja, Mitja. Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003. 
———. “The Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia 
1991-1999.” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe Vol. 23, no. No. 4 
(2003). http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol23/iss4/1. 
Verdeja, Ernesto. “Official Apologies in the Aftermath of Political Violence.” 
Metaphilosophy Vol. 41, no. No. 4 (2010): 563–81. 
Vinjamuri, Leslie, and Aaron P. Boesenecker. “Religious Actors and Transitional Justice.” In 
Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics, 125–54. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
Volf, Miroslav. Exclusion and Embrace A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, 




———. The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World. Michigan: Kerdmans 
Publishing, 2006. 
Vrcan, Srdjan. “The Religious Factor and the War in Bosnia and Hercegovina.” In Religion 
and the War in Bosnia, 108–31. Atlanta, Georgia: The American Academy of Religion, 
1998. 
———. “The War in Former Yugoslavia and Religion.” Religion, State and Society Vol. 22, 
no. No. 4 (1994): 367–78. 
———. “Transition, War and Religion.” Archives de Sciences Sociales Des Religions Vol. 
43, no. No. 103 (1998): 153–72. 
Vukomanović, Milan, and Marinko Vučinić, eds. Religious Dialogue in the Balkans: The 
Drama of Understanding. Belgrade: Belgrade Open School, 2003. 
Walker, Margaret Urban. Moral Repair Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Wallensteen, Peter, and Karin Axell. “Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War, 
1989-93.” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 31, no. No. 3 (1994): 333–49. 
Webel, Charles, and Johan Galtung, eds. Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Weiner, Eugene, ed. The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence. New York: The Continuum 
Publishing Company, 1998. 
Whittaker, David J. Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World. London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Wilkes, George R., Ana Zotova, Zorica Kuburić, Gorazd Andrejč, Marko-Antonio Brkić, 
Muhamed Jusić, Zlatiborka Momčilović Popov, and Davor Marko. “Factors in 
Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust Results From A Survey 
Conducted in 13 Cities Across Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2013.” Fojnica: The 
University of Edinburgh, 2013. 
Zartman, I. William, ed. Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques. 
2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. 
Zimmermann Herr, Judy, and Robert Herr, eds. Transforming Violence : Linking Local and 
Global Peacemaking. Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1998. 
Zukić, Amir. “N1 Pressing: Husein Ef. Kavazović.” N1 Pressing. Sarajevo: N1 Sarajevo, 
June 6, 2016. http://ba.n1info.com/n151/Video/Pressing. 
 
